Traficant v. Commissioner

89 T.C. No. 37, 89 T.C. 501, 1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 127
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedSeptember 10, 1987
DocketDocket No. 37845-84
StatusPublished
Cited by37 cases

This text of 89 T.C. No. 37 (Traficant v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Traficant v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. No. 37, 89 T.C. 501, 1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 127 (tax 1987).

Opinion

WILLIAMS, Judge:

The Commissioner determined a deficiency in Federal income tax for petitioner’s 1980 taxable year in the amount of $95,429.78 and an addition to tax pursuant to section 6653(b),1 in the amount of $47,714.89.2 The issues this Court must decide are (1) whether petitioner failed to report income on his 1980 Federal income tax return, and if so, (2) whether any portion of the resulting underpayment of tax is due to fraud with intent to evade payment of Federal income tax within the meaning of section 6653(b).

Preliminary Evidentiary Matters

Prior to the trial of this case, petitioner asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to certain interrogatories of respondent. Before discussing the merits of petitioner’s case, we reiterate that petitioner’s properly asserted Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination limits the permissible scope of his inquiry into matters that are the subject of his privilege. To assure fairness to the parties to a civil proceeding, it is appropriate to impose restrictions on petitioner’s introduction of evidence with respect to matters over which he has asserted the privilege. Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1968); Securities Exchange Commission v. Cymaticolor Corp., 106 F.R.D. 545 (S.D. N.Y. 1985). The nature and extent of the restrictions depend on the importance of the matters over which the privilege is asserted. Accordingly, to prevent unfair advantage or surprise, the Court may deny petitioner the right to present evidence on such matters. S.E.C. v. Cymaticolor Corp., supra.

Petitioner properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination3 in response to interrogatories of respondent asking (1) if tape-recordings of two meetings (the tapes) involving petitioner and other individuals, discussed in more detail below, accurately reflected conversations which took place and in which petitioner participated, and (2) if not, what conversations actually took place.4 Respondent sought petitioner’s explanation under oath of his understanding of the statements recorded on the tapes. Petitioner, who is the central figure and participant in the recorded conversations, is the only witness who could explain the meaning and substance of his statements on the tapes. He has, however, refused to be examined on these matters under oath, and we believe that he should not be permitted to construct his explanation indirectly through others while avoiding examination under oath on these matters. Because of the central importance of the recorded conversations both to the fraud allegations and the deficiency determination in this case, and because petitioner is the best source of direct evidence of those conversations, we prohibited petitioner from introducing any testimony or other evidence with respect to the statements recorded on the tapes. See S.E.C. v. Cymaticolor Corp., supra; In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 364 (M.D. Pa. 1979); cf. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976). Otherwise, petitioner would be allowed to adduce evidence that would be incomplete without his testimony, which respondent has been foreclosed from examining, and that would unjustly hobble respondent in bearing his burden of proof on the fraud issue.

At the suppression hearing, one of the issues before the Court was whether the tapes were authentic. Respondent called a number of witnesses who were present during some or all of the recorded conversations on the tapes to verify the tapes’ accuracy. These witnesses testified that the tapes accurately reflected actual conversations occurring during two separate meetings in which they had participated at the home of Charles and Orlando Carabbia’s mother. Petitioner called no witnesses but sought to cross-examine respondent’s witnesses on specific statements recorded on the tapes. We prohibited petitioner from pursuing on cross-examination any line of questioning directed to the content of specific statements on the tapes. In the language of the District Court in S.E.C. v. Cymaticolor Corp., supra at 549, we prevented petitioner “from offering into evidence any matter relating to the factual bases for his denials and defenses as to which he has asserted his fifth amendment rights.” It does not matter that petitioner sought to adduce this evidence on cross-examination of respondent’s witnesses. If petitioner had called these witnesses and attempted on direct examination to elicit testimony on specific statements on the tapes, we would have precluded the testimony. Respondent’s calling these witnesses does not eliminate the potential for unfair surprise or the prejudicial effect of petitioner’s inquiring into the very subject matters which he has properly refused to testify about.

It should also be plainly evident that a taxpayer’s assertion of the privilege may not be used to avoid meeting his burden of proof. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 761 (1983); see Steinbrecher v. United States, 712 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1983). Indeed, in civil cases the Court may draw a negative inference from facts over which petitioner has asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976). The negative inference we have drawn in this case is that, if petitioner had testified on the accuracy of the recordings, petitioner would have confirmed the substance of the conversations recorded on the tapes. Petitioner’s silence here has not impelled the result against him, but it has confirmed the credibility which we give to the tapes. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. at 318.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts in this case have been stipulated and are so found. Petitioner resided at Poland, Ohio, at the time his petition in this case was filed. Petitioner is currently a member of the U.S. House of Representatives representing the 17th Congressional District of Ohio.

Petitioner campaigned for sheriff of Mahoning County, Ohio, during 1979 and 1980, and was elected as sheriff of Mahoning County in November of 1980. The issues in this case center on whether petitioner received money from certain organized crime figures during his campaign for sheriff, that was income to him which he fraudulently failed to report on his Federal income tax return for his 1980 taxable year.

The contiguous counties of Mahoning County and Trumbull County,5 together referred to as the Mahoning Valley, are located midway between Cleveland, Ohio, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Certain factions of the Cleveland and Pittsburgh organized crime families of La Cosa Nostra (respectively, the Cleveland Faction and the Pittsburgh Faction) competed for control of certain illegal activities conducted in the Mahoning Valley during 1979 and 1980. The competing factions waged a “war,” primarily during the first half of 1979, in which a number of individuals associated with both factions were killed. However, the factions operating in the Mahoning Valley were also known to negotiate and to cooperate with each other.

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Bluebook (online)
89 T.C. No. 37, 89 T.C. 501, 1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 127, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/traficant-v-commissioner-tax-1987.