Trader v. Rubin (In Re Crisp)

77 B.R. 215, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedAugust 18, 1987
Docket87-0037-CV-W-9
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 77 B.R. 215 (Trader v. Rubin (In Re Crisp)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trader v. Rubin (In Re Crisp), 77 B.R. 215, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645 (W.D. Mo. 1987).

Opinion

ORDER REVERSING DECEMBER 17, 1986, BANKRUPTCY COURT ORDER DISMISSING PRIOR APPEAL, VACATING DECEMBER 29, 1986, BANKRUPTCY ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND REQUIRING CLERK OF BANKRUPTCY COURT TO FILE APPELLANTS’ DESIGNATION AND STATEMENTS ON APPEAL

BARTLETT, District Judge.

John H. Trader and Dennis J.C. Owens (appellants) appeal the United States Bankruptcy Court’s December 17, 1986, order dismissing an appeal from an order dismissing a prior appeal and the December 29, 1986, order denying appellants’ motion to set aside order dismissing second appeal. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 8001(a).

Bankruptcy Rule 8013 provides that on appeal the district court “may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy court’s judgment, order, or decree or remand with instructions for further proceedings. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to adjudge the credibility of the witnesses.” The Advisory Committee Notes state that Rule 8013 accords to the findings of a bankruptcy judge the same weight given the findings of a district judge under Rule 52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

*217 A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). The district court must independently determine questions of law or mixed questions of law or fact. In Re Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 709, 713 (5th Cir.1980); In Re Hammons, 614 F.2d 399, 403 (5th Cir.1980).

Factual Background

On October 27, 1986, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri entered an order avoiding as a preference the transfer to appellants of a deed of trust on debtors’ residence. On November 6, 1986, appellants filed a timely notice of appeal (first appeal). On its own motion the bankruptcy court dismissed appellants’ first appeal on November 24, 1986, because appellants had not filed their designation of record and statement of issues on appeal within ten days of filing the notice of appeal as required by Bankruptcy Rule 8006. The Court dismissed appellants’ first appeal under authority of the October 30, 1986, General Order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.

On November 26,1986, appellants filed a motion to set aside the dismissal of their appeal and a motion for leave to file their designation and statement out of time. Concurrently, the designation of record and a statement of issues were filed. On November 28, 1986, the Court denied appellants’ motions to set aside and for leave to file out of time on the grounds that appellants’ mistake and inadvertence in failing to file the designation and statement did not constitute excusable neglect.

On December 4, 1986, appellants filed a notice of appeal (second appeal) from the November 24, 1986, and November 28, 1986, orders dismissing the first appeal and denying appellants’ motion to set aside the dismissal order. On December 17,1987, an order dismissing the second appeal was filed. The bankruptcy court dismissed on its own motion appellants’ second appeal because the appellants did not timely file the designation of record and statement of issues on appeal pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8006 and found that the statement of issues filed in connection with the first appeal would be materially different from those for the second appeal. Also, on December 17, 1986, appellants filed a motion for leave to file designation and statement out of time and tendered their designation and statement. Appellants state they requested leave to file out of time because they were unable to obtain a copy of the October 30, 1986, General Order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. On December 23, 1986, appellants filed a motion to set aside the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing their second appeal. This motion was denied on December 30, 1986. On December 31,1986, appellants filed a notice of appeal, the designation of record on appeal and the statement of issues.

Issues on Appeal

The issues on appeal are 1) whether the bankruptcy court’s December 17, 1986, dismissal of appellants’ second appeal because appellants had not complied with a bankruptcy rule and subsequent refusal to set aside its order of dismissal constitute an abuse of discretion; 2) whether the General Order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, en banc, dated October 30, 1986, is a delegation of authority that is prohibited by Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution; and 3) whether the General Order dated October 30, 1986, is an act denying appellants’ right of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Bankruptcy Court’s December 17, 1986, Dismissal of Appellants’ Second Appeal and Subsequent Refusal to Set Aside Its December 17, 1986, Order of Dismissal Was An Abuse of Discretion

Appellants argue that they made a good faith effort to obtain a copy of the October 30, 1986, General Order authorizing the *218 bankruptcy court to dismiss appeals for failure by the parties to perfect the appeal by not filing appropriate documents. Therefore, appellants contend that the attempted late filing of the designation and statement was due to excusable neglect of counsel. Further, they argue that the bankruptcy court’s refusal to set aside the order dismissing the second appeal was an abuse of discretion because the court acted on its own motion without notice to the parties and that the filing was late by only two days. The trustee contends that the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the second appeal was not an abuse of discretion because 1) there was no disparate impact on clients because the appellants are attorneys representing their own interests; 2) the trustee was prejudiced in his attempt to sell the property on which appellants have their deed of trust by the delays caused by appellants’ failure to file the designation and statement; 3) the appellants acted in bad faith by their consistent failure to meet deadlines; 4) the motion for leave to file out of time was not filed until after the appeal was dismissed; and 5) the appellants took no action in perfecting their appeal until after the dismissals.

On October 30, 1986, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8018, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, en banc, entered a General Order providing:

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Bluebook (online)
77 B.R. 215, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trader-v-rubin-in-re-crisp-mowd-1987.