Tracie L Hamb v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 6, 2024
DocketPH-1221-20-0326-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Tracie L Hamb v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Tracie L Hamb v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tracie L Hamb v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

TRACIE L. HAMB, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-1221-20-0326-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: August 6, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Tracie L. Hamb , Daniels, West Virginia, pro se.

Craig Komorowski , Huntington, West Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner recused himself and did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

petition for review, the appellant argues the following: (1) the administrative judge erred in finding that she failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure; (2) the agency’s hiring practices were both discriminatory and in violation of agency policy and regulations; (3) she was unfamiliar with e-Appeal Online; and (4) she is in the process of procuring legal counsel. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 25-29. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). To establish jurisdiction in a typical IRA appeal, an appellant must show by preponderant evidence 2 that she exhausted her remedies before the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and make nonfrivolous allegations 3 of the following: (1) she made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in a protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the

2 Preponderant evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q). 3 A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). 3

agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). Corthell v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Requena v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 39. A protected disclosure is a disclosure of information that an appellant reasonably believes evidences any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (8); Linder v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 12 (2014). The disclosures must be specific and detailed, not vague allegations of wrongdoing. Linder, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 14. The Board, in Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶¶ 10-11, clarified the substantive requirements of exhaustion. The requirements are met when an appellant has provided OSC with a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation. The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those issues that were previously raised with OSC. However, appellants may give a more detailed account of their whistleblowing activities before the Board than they did to OSC. Id. Appellants may demonstrate exhaustion through their initial OSC complaint; evidence that they amended the original complaint, including but not limited to OSC’s determination letter and other letters from OSC referencing any amended allegations; and, their written responses to OSC referencing the amended allegations. Id. Appellants also may establish exhaustion through other sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or a declaration attesting that they raised with OSC the substance of the facts in the Board appeal. Id.

The appellant’s assertions do not provide a basis to disturb the initial decision. The appellant ostensibly asserts that the administrative judge erred in finding that she failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). PFR File, Tab 1 at 25-26. To this end, she claims that the agency failed to select her for a position because she had challenged the selecting official’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. However, we 4

discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s reasoned conclusion that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9, Initial Decision (ID) at 5-6. Indeed, the only information in the record regarding the appellant’s purported disclosure was a letter from OSC indicating that the appellant had alleged making disclosures about her supervisor’s “lack of action regarding COVID-19.” IAF, Tab 1 at 6. We agree that this vague allegation of inaction does not amount to a nonfrivolous allegation of any of the circumstances described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). See Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶¶ 2, 7 (2016) (concluding that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that he reasonably believed that he had disclosed a violation of law when he made vague allegations regarding the inadequacy of the agency’s law enforcement communication security system); see also King v. Department of Veterans Affairs , 105 M.S.P.R.

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Tracie L Hamb v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tracie-l-hamb-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.