Opinion
ARMSTRONG, J.
Plaintiff Traci & Marx Co. appeals the grant of the motion of defendants Legal Options, Inc., and Stuart Grant to vacate the sister state default judgment obtained by plaintiff in Ohio. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting the motion, and so reverse the judgment.
FACTS1
Plaintiffs sued defendants in the Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County, Ohio for fraudulent inducement to enter contract, bad faith, negligence, and fraud, and for violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the Ohio Corrupt Activity Act. Their prayer for relief requested, among other things, “compensatory damages in excess of $25,000” and “punitive damages in excess of $25,000.”2 Defendants did not answer. The Ohio court conducted a “default hearing” on September 20, 2001, after which it granted plaintiff judgment against defendants in the amount of $25,890 as compensatory damages and $130,000 as punitive damages (the Ohio Judgment). On December 22, 2002, pursuant to the Sister State Money-Judgments Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.10 et seq.), the Superior Court for Los Angeles County ordered entry of the Ohio Judgment in the amount of $171,793.50, representing the principal amount of the Ohio Judgment, along with accrued interest.
[158]*158On January 17, 2003, defendants filed a motion to vacate sister state default judgment, seeking to collaterally attack the Ohio Judgment on three separate bases: Lack of personal jurisdiction due to failure to serve defendants in the underlying action; lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to a forum selection clause in the underlying contract; and unenforceability of the Ohio Judgment because the damages awarded exceeded those sought in the complaint.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on defendants’ motion to vacate. The court found that defendants were properly served in the Ohio action; that the forum selection clause of the underlying contract did not divest the Ohio court of subject matter jurisdiction; and that “the sums set forth in the [Ohio] default judgment exceeded those which could have been awarded. Since this Court has no authority to modify the Ohio Judgment, the motion to vacate the entry of the sister state judgment must be, and hereby is, granted.” Thus, the vacation of the judgment was based on the trial court’s conclusion that the Ohio Judgment was in excess of the jurisdiction of the Ohio court in which it was rendered, because the damages awarded exceeded the prayer for relief in plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff appeals this latter ruling.
DISCUSSION
We begin our analysis with the observation that “ ‘California must, regardless of policy objections, recognize the judgment of another state as res judicata, and this is so even though the action or proceeding which resulted in the judgment could not have been brought under the law or policy of California.’ ” (Silbrico Corp. v. Raanan (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 202, 207 [216 Cal.Rptr. 201], quoting World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1011 [193 Cal.Rptr. 830].)
“[A] sister state money judgment entered pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Act may be vacated in California only when the statutory ground or grounds therefor have been established. Section 1710.40 provides in relevant part that ‘A judgment entered pursuant to this chapter may be vacated on any ground which would be a defense to an action in this state on the sister state judgment.’ In elaborating on the defense available under [Code Civ. Proc.] section 1710.40, the Law Revision Commission makes the following comment: ‘Common defenses to enforcement of a sister state judgment include the following: the judgment is not final and unconditional (where finality means that no further action by the court rendering the judgment is necessary to resolve the matter litigated); the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud; the judgment was rendered in excess of jurisdiction; the judgment is not enforceable in the state of rendition; the plaintiff is guilty of misconduct; the judgment has already been paid; suit on the judgment is barred by the statute [159]*159of limitations in the state where enforcement is sought.’ (19A West’s Ann. Codes (1982) p. 694; accord: 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Enforcement of Judgment, §§ 194-195, pp. 3549-3550; Rest. 2d Conf. of Laws, §§ 103-121.)” (World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1009-1010.)
Ohio law, like California law, limits a default judgment to the amount requested in the complaint or demand for judgment. (Ohio Civ.R. 54(C); Code Civ. Proc., § 580, subd. (a).) “A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment.” (Ohio Civ.R. 54(C); see also Raimonde v. Van Vlerah (1975) 42 Ohio St.2d 21, 27 [325 N.E.2d 544] [“In Ohio, a party is not limited to the relief claimed in the complaint, except when judgment by default is entered or when a judgment for money is sought and awarded”], italics added.) As plaintiff notes, Ohio Civil Rule 54(C) was amended in 1994 to remove the second instance when relief is limited to the amount claimed in the complaint, that is, when a judgment for money is sought. Current Ohio law continues to limit the relief to that claimed in the complaint when the judgment is by default. The trial court below simply ruled that a default judgment for $25,890 in compensatory damages exceeded the requested relief of “in excess of $25,000” in compensatory damages, and the award of $130,000 in punitive damages exceeded the prayer of “in excess of $25,000” in punitive damages, rendering the judgment beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the trial court came to this conclusion not as a result of its reading or misreading of Ohio Civil Rule 54(C) or due to “the fact that the Appellant did not ‘prove up’ its prayer to the amount of damages ultimately awarded by the Ohio Court,” but because the court concluded that, in the absence of Ohio law, the California Supreme Court case of Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489 [165 Cal.Rptr. 825, 612 P.2d 915] was dispositive.
In Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d 489, plaintiff’s complaint alleged breach of contract and fraud, and sought damages “in excess of $20,000 ... or according to proof,” punitive damages of $100,000, and costs. A default judgment was entered for $26,457.50 in compensatory damages and $2,500 in attorney fees and costs. The appellants sought to collaterally attack the judgment as void on its face, because it granted relief which the court had no power to grant. The appellants maintained that the judgment violated Code of Civil Procedure section 580, which, like Ohio Civil Rule 54(C), requires that “[t]he relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his complaint. . . .” They contended that a compensatory damage award “in excess of $20,000—the largest amount specifically requested in the complaint”— violated the statute. The appellants made the common sense argument which plaintiffs here propose, that “the prayer for compensatory damages ‘in [160]
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Opinion
ARMSTRONG, J.
Plaintiff Traci & Marx Co. appeals the grant of the motion of defendants Legal Options, Inc., and Stuart Grant to vacate the sister state default judgment obtained by plaintiff in Ohio. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting the motion, and so reverse the judgment.
FACTS1
Plaintiffs sued defendants in the Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County, Ohio for fraudulent inducement to enter contract, bad faith, negligence, and fraud, and for violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the Ohio Corrupt Activity Act. Their prayer for relief requested, among other things, “compensatory damages in excess of $25,000” and “punitive damages in excess of $25,000.”2 Defendants did not answer. The Ohio court conducted a “default hearing” on September 20, 2001, after which it granted plaintiff judgment against defendants in the amount of $25,890 as compensatory damages and $130,000 as punitive damages (the Ohio Judgment). On December 22, 2002, pursuant to the Sister State Money-Judgments Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.10 et seq.), the Superior Court for Los Angeles County ordered entry of the Ohio Judgment in the amount of $171,793.50, representing the principal amount of the Ohio Judgment, along with accrued interest.
[158]*158On January 17, 2003, defendants filed a motion to vacate sister state default judgment, seeking to collaterally attack the Ohio Judgment on three separate bases: Lack of personal jurisdiction due to failure to serve defendants in the underlying action; lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to a forum selection clause in the underlying contract; and unenforceability of the Ohio Judgment because the damages awarded exceeded those sought in the complaint.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on defendants’ motion to vacate. The court found that defendants were properly served in the Ohio action; that the forum selection clause of the underlying contract did not divest the Ohio court of subject matter jurisdiction; and that “the sums set forth in the [Ohio] default judgment exceeded those which could have been awarded. Since this Court has no authority to modify the Ohio Judgment, the motion to vacate the entry of the sister state judgment must be, and hereby is, granted.” Thus, the vacation of the judgment was based on the trial court’s conclusion that the Ohio Judgment was in excess of the jurisdiction of the Ohio court in which it was rendered, because the damages awarded exceeded the prayer for relief in plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff appeals this latter ruling.
DISCUSSION
We begin our analysis with the observation that “ ‘California must, regardless of policy objections, recognize the judgment of another state as res judicata, and this is so even though the action or proceeding which resulted in the judgment could not have been brought under the law or policy of California.’ ” (Silbrico Corp. v. Raanan (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 202, 207 [216 Cal.Rptr. 201], quoting World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1011 [193 Cal.Rptr. 830].)
“[A] sister state money judgment entered pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Act may be vacated in California only when the statutory ground or grounds therefor have been established. Section 1710.40 provides in relevant part that ‘A judgment entered pursuant to this chapter may be vacated on any ground which would be a defense to an action in this state on the sister state judgment.’ In elaborating on the defense available under [Code Civ. Proc.] section 1710.40, the Law Revision Commission makes the following comment: ‘Common defenses to enforcement of a sister state judgment include the following: the judgment is not final and unconditional (where finality means that no further action by the court rendering the judgment is necessary to resolve the matter litigated); the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud; the judgment was rendered in excess of jurisdiction; the judgment is not enforceable in the state of rendition; the plaintiff is guilty of misconduct; the judgment has already been paid; suit on the judgment is barred by the statute [159]*159of limitations in the state where enforcement is sought.’ (19A West’s Ann. Codes (1982) p. 694; accord: 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Enforcement of Judgment, §§ 194-195, pp. 3549-3550; Rest. 2d Conf. of Laws, §§ 103-121.)” (World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1009-1010.)
Ohio law, like California law, limits a default judgment to the amount requested in the complaint or demand for judgment. (Ohio Civ.R. 54(C); Code Civ. Proc., § 580, subd. (a).) “A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment.” (Ohio Civ.R. 54(C); see also Raimonde v. Van Vlerah (1975) 42 Ohio St.2d 21, 27 [325 N.E.2d 544] [“In Ohio, a party is not limited to the relief claimed in the complaint, except when judgment by default is entered or when a judgment for money is sought and awarded”], italics added.) As plaintiff notes, Ohio Civil Rule 54(C) was amended in 1994 to remove the second instance when relief is limited to the amount claimed in the complaint, that is, when a judgment for money is sought. Current Ohio law continues to limit the relief to that claimed in the complaint when the judgment is by default. The trial court below simply ruled that a default judgment for $25,890 in compensatory damages exceeded the requested relief of “in excess of $25,000” in compensatory damages, and the award of $130,000 in punitive damages exceeded the prayer of “in excess of $25,000” in punitive damages, rendering the judgment beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the trial court came to this conclusion not as a result of its reading or misreading of Ohio Civil Rule 54(C) or due to “the fact that the Appellant did not ‘prove up’ its prayer to the amount of damages ultimately awarded by the Ohio Court,” but because the court concluded that, in the absence of Ohio law, the California Supreme Court case of Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489 [165 Cal.Rptr. 825, 612 P.2d 915] was dispositive.
In Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d 489, plaintiff’s complaint alleged breach of contract and fraud, and sought damages “in excess of $20,000 ... or according to proof,” punitive damages of $100,000, and costs. A default judgment was entered for $26,457.50 in compensatory damages and $2,500 in attorney fees and costs. The appellants sought to collaterally attack the judgment as void on its face, because it granted relief which the court had no power to grant. The appellants maintained that the judgment violated Code of Civil Procedure section 580, which, like Ohio Civil Rule 54(C), requires that “[t]he relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his complaint. . . .” They contended that a compensatory damage award “in excess of $20,000—the largest amount specifically requested in the complaint”— violated the statute. The appellants made the common sense argument which plaintiffs here propose, that “the prayer for compensatory damages ‘in [160]*160excess of $20,000’ was sufficient under [the statute] to provide adequate notice of defendants’ potential liability for $26,457.50.” (27 Cal.3d at p. 493.)
Our Supreme Court held that fundamental fairness requires that a default judgment be limited to “the specific amount of damages alleged in the complaint.” (Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 494.) Thus, in a default proceeding, a prayer for relief of an amount “in excess of’ a specified dollar amount will result in an award of “no more than” that dollar amount. (See, e.g., Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826 [231 Cal.Rptr. 220, 726 P.2d 1295] [“the Courts of Appeal have consistently read the code to mean that a default judgment greater than the amount specifically demanded is void as beyond the court’s jurisdiction”]; Schwab v. Rondel Homes, Inc. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 428, 432-433 [280 Cal.Rptr. 83, 808 P.2d 226]; Engebretson & Co. v. Harrison (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 436, 444-445 [178 Cal.Rptr. 77] [a plaintiff’s “prayer for damages ‘in excess of $5,000’ ” entitled that plaintiff to a default judgment of $5,000, but no more].) Thus, in a default proceeding in California, a prayer for relief “in excess of’ a specified dollar amount will result in an award of “no more than” that dollar amount.
However, the issue before the trial court was not whether, under California law, a prayer for relief of an amount “in excess of’ a specified dollar amount will result in an award of “no more than” than that dollar amount, but whether the same result would obtain in Ohio. For as noted above, “ ‘California must, regardless of policy objections, recognize the judgment of another state as res judicata, and this is so even though the action or proceeding which resulted in the judgment could not have been brought under the law or policy of California.’ ” (Silbrico Corp. v. Raanan, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d 202, 207 [216 Cal.Rptr. 201], quoting World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 1011.) And defendants, whose burden it was to establish that the judgment was not enforceable in Ohio, failed to provide any Ohio authority to support their assertion that Ohio law provides that the “in excess of’ language in the prayer for relief constitutes a ceiling rather than a floor for recoverable damages. (Tom Thumb Glove Co. v. Han (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 1, 5 [144 Cal.Rptr. 30] [“[T]he burden is on the party seeking relief to show by a preponderance of the evidence why he is entitled to it”].) Consequently, the trial court erred in vacating the judgment, since there was no basis to conclude that the Ohio court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, or that the judgment was not enforceable in Ohio.
In their supplemental letter brief, defendants request that, if we do not affirm the trial court’s vacation of the Ohio judgment, that we remand the matter to the trial court for a hearing on damages. We decline the request. [161]*161This is not an appeal of the Ohio judgment. Defendants had the opportunity to contest the damages in the Ohio action, and to appeal the Ohio judgment if they believed that the evidence did not support the damage award. That judgment is now final.
DISPOSITION
The order vacating the sister state default judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $171,793.50. Defendants shall bear costs of appeal.
Turner, P. J., concurred.