T.R. Ellis v. Miller Oil Purchasing Company

Eighth Circuit

T.R. Ellis v. Miller Oil Purchasing Company

738 F.2d 269, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 244, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 20953

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedJune 29, 1984

Docket84-1265

StatusPublished

Cited by22 cases

This text of 738 F.2d 269 (T.R. Ellis v. Miller Oil Purchasing Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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T.R. Ellis v. Miller Oil Purchasing Company, 738 F.2d 269, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 244, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 20953 (8th Cir. 1984).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

T.R. Ellis appeals the trial court’s ruling excluding expert testimony in his negligence action. The trial court ruled that the testimony invaded the province of the jury. We affirm.

On or about July 4, 1979, Ellis had parked four of his tractor-trailer vehicles along the roadside of Highway 71 in Miller County, Arkansas. A Miller Oil Purchasing Company truck struck another car near where the tractor-trailers were parked. The truck overturned, spilling its cargo of crude oil. The oil caught fire and spread, damaging Ellis’s vehicles.

Ellis filed suit for damages against Miller Oil which in turn filed a counterclaim. The case went to trial with each side claiming the other’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. At trial, Ellis called A.O. Pipkin, an accident reconstruction expert, to testify concerning the cause of accident. After establishing Pipkin’s qualifications and familiarity with the scene of the accident, Ellis’s counsel asked whether Pipkin had arrived at any conclusions regarding the proper action for the Miller Oil Company driver just prior to the accident. The trial court sustained an objection to this question, noting that the expert was in no better position than the jury to determine the answer. A verdict in favor of Miller Oil was returned and Ellis appeals, contending that the trial court’s ruling excluding this testimony was in error.

Where the subject matter is within the knowledge or experience of lay people, expert testimony is superfluous. Bartak v. Bell-Galyardt & Wells, Inc., 629 F.2d 523, 530 (8th Cir.1980). Whether to admit expert testimony rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Fed.R.Evid. 703; Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, 516 F.2d 856, 858 (8th Cir.1975). We do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in this instance. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

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PER CURIAM.

T.R. Ellis appeals the trial court’s ruling excluding expert testimony in his negligence action. The trial court ruled that the testimony invaded the province of the jury. We affirm.

On or about July 4, 1979, Ellis had parked four of his tractor-trailer vehicles along the roadside of Highway 71 in Miller County, Arkansas. A Miller Oil Purchasing Company truck struck another car near where the tractor-trailers were parked. The truck overturned, spilling its cargo of crude oil. The oil caught fire and spread, damaging Ellis’s vehicles.

Ellis filed suit for damages against Miller Oil which in turn filed a counterclaim. The case went to trial with each side claiming the other’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. At trial, Ellis called A.O. Pipkin, an accident reconstruction expert, to testify concerning the cause of accident. After establishing Pipkin’s qualifications and familiarity with the scene of the accident, Ellis’s counsel asked whether Pipkin had arrived at any conclusions regarding the proper action for the Miller Oil Company driver just prior to the accident. The trial court sustained an objection to this question, noting that the expert was in no better position than the jury to determine the answer. A verdict in favor of Miller Oil was returned and Ellis appeals, contending that the trial court’s ruling excluding this testimony was in error.

Where the subject matter is within the knowledge or experience of lay people, expert testimony is superfluous. Bartak v. Bell-Galyardt & Wells, Inc., 629 F.2d 523, 530 (8th Cir.1980). Whether to admit expert testimony rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Fed.R.Evid. 703; Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, 516 F.2d 856, 858 (8th Cir.1975). We do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in this instance. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Robert W. Froemming, David D. Owen, Paul J. Sentman and Bruce F. Thompson v. Gate City Federal Savings and Loan Association, Robert W. Froemming, David D. Owen, Paul J. Sentman and Bruce F. Thompson v. Arvid P. Benson, Robert W. Froemming, David D. Owen, Paul J. Sentman and Bruce F. Thompson v. Sun Service Company, a North Dakota Corporation, Robert W. Froemming, David D. Owen, Paul J. Sentman and Bruce F. Thompson v. Warren T. Cowgill

822 F.2d 723 (Eighth Circuit, 1987)

Cashman v. Allied Products Corp.

761 F.2d 1250 (Eighth Circuit, 1985)

John M. Cashman, and Cashman Seed & Fertilizer, Inc., Courtesy Enterprises, Inc., AKA Cei, and Donald L. Gaddis v. Allied Products Corporation, Cashman Seed & Fertilizer, Inc. v. Courtesy Enterprises, Inc. A/K/A Cei, Donald L. Gaddis, and Allied Products Corporation

761 F.2d 1250 (Eighth Circuit, 1985)

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738 F.2d 269, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 244, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 20953, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tr-ellis-v-miller-oil-purchasing-company-ca8-1984.

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