TP Link Systems Inc. v. Shenzhen Cudy Technology CO., LTD.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 * * * 3 TP Link Systems Inc., Case No. 2:25-cv-00057-JCM-BNW 4 Plaintiff, 5 ORDER v. 6 Shenzhen Cudy Technology CO., LTD., 7 Defendant. 8 9 Before this Court is Plaintiff’s motion to seal its motion for sanctions and accompanying 10 exhibits. ECF No. 138. The sealed motion for sanction is filed at ECF No. 134 and the sealed 11 exhibits are filed at ECF No. 135. This motion is unopposed. For the reasons discussed below, 12 this Court denies the motion to seal without prejudice. Should Plaintiff or Defendant wish to seal 13 the motion for sanctions and the accompanying exhibits, the appropriate party must file a new 14 motion to seal by March 26, 2026. 15 I. DISCUSSION 16 A. Motion to Seal 17 Generally, the public has a right to inspect and copy judicial records. Kamakana v. City & 18 Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). Such records are presumptively publicly 19 accessible. Id. Consequently, a party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of 20 overcoming this strong presumption. Id. In the case of dispositive motions, the party seeking to 21 seal the record must articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that 22 outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the 23 public interest in understanding the judicial process. Id. at 1178–79 (alteration and internal 24 quotation marks and citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has further held that the full 25 presumption of public access applies to technically non-dispositive motions and attached 26 documents as well if the motion is “more than tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. 27 for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). 1 Among the compelling reasons which may justify sealing a record are when such court 2 files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes, such as the use of records to gratify 3 private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets. 4 Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quotation omitted). However, avoiding a litigant’s embarrassment, 5 incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its 6 records. Id. 7 “[A] different standard applies to ‘private materials unearthed during discovery,’ as such 8 documents are not part of the judicial record.” Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 9 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180). Under Rule 26(c), a court may enter a 10 protective order “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 11 undue burden or expense.” “The relevant standard for purposes of Rule 26(c) is whether good 12 cause exists to protect the information from being disclosed to the public by balancing the needs 13 for discovery against the need for confidentiality.” Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678 (quotation omitted). 14 Given the “weaker public interest in nondispositive materials,” the court applies the good cause 15 standard in evaluating whether to seal documents attached to a nondispositive motion. Id. 16 “Nondispositive motions ‘are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause 17 of action,’ and, as a result, the public’s interest in accessing dispositive materials does ‘not apply 18 with equal force’ to non-dispositive materials.” Id. (citing Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). It is 19 within the court’s discretion whether to seal documents. Id. at 679. 20 Here, Plaintiff moves to redact portions of its motion for sanctions and to seal all exhibits 21 attached to it. Plaintiff relies on (1) the protective order entered into by the parties as the rationale 22 for sealing and (2) the argument that the sealed/redacted information contains “business 23 information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” 24 Stipulated protective orders alone do not justify sealing court records. Kamakana, 447 25 F.3d at 1183; see also Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 26 2003) (noting that reliance on a blanket protective order, without more, will not make a showing 27 of good cause). Stipulated protective orders “often contain provisions that purport to put the entire 1 || Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183. Because judges sign off on these protective orders without making 2 || individualized findings, they do not provide a finding that any specific documents are secret or 3 || confidential to overcome the presumption of public access. /d.; see also Beckman Indus., Inc. v. 4 || Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that blanket stipulated protective 5 || orders are over inclusive by nature and do not include a finding of “good cause”’). 6 Next, a quick review of the unredacted motion and the exhibits reveals that not all of the 7 || information qualifies as “business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” 8 As aresult, Plaintiff's motion to seal is denied without prejudice. If Plaintiff or Defendant 9 || wish to maintain this information under seal, the appropriate party must file a new motion in 10 || which it advances specific arguments in support of the need to seal this information. Such motion 11 || will be due March 26, 2026. In the interim, this Court will maintain ECF Nos. 134 and 135 under 12 || seal. Should such a motion not be filed this Court will assume neither party opposes the unsealing 13 || of these documents. 14 Il. CONCLUSION 15 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to seal (ECF No. 138) is 16 || DENIED. However, the Clerk’s Office is directed to maintain ECF Nos. 134 and 135 under seal 17 || until further order from this Court. 18 19 DATED: February 26, 2026 20 21 Li Sues Le bar □□□ BRENDA WEKSLER 22 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28