Township of Stambaugh v. Ah-Ne-Pee Dimensional Hardwood, Inc.

841 F. Supp. 803, 1993 WL 551151
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Michigan
DecidedJanuary 23, 1993
Docket1:92-cr-00081
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 841 F. Supp. 803 (Township of Stambaugh v. Ah-Ne-Pee Dimensional Hardwood, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Township of Stambaugh v. Ah-Ne-Pee Dimensional Hardwood, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 803, 1993 WL 551151 (W.D. Mich. 1993).

Opinion

OPINION

QUIST, District Judge.

This case is a diversity action. Plaintiff, the Township of Stambaugh (Township), is a municipal corporation of the State of Michigan. Defendant Ah-Ne-Pee Dimensional Hardwood, Inc. is incorporated in Florida and has its principal place of business in Wisconsin. Defendant ANP Dimensional Lumber Michigan, Inc. is incorporated in Minnesota and has its principal place of business in either Minnesota or Wisconsin. More than $50,000 is in controversy. This action involve a dispute over the priority of different security interests in real and personal property.

FACTS

Ah-Ne-Pee Dimensional Hardwood, Inc. (Hardwood) manufactures wood products. In the late 1970s, Hardwood began operating from a facility in Ogema, Wisconsin. In the late 1980s, Hardwood decided to expand its operations and open a second facility in Michigan. The new facility was financed by a $200,000 loan from Miners State Bank, a $625,000 loan from the Township, and $125,-000 of owner equity.

On January 20, 1989, Miners State Bank loaned Hardwood $200,000 in exchange for a Promissory Note. The Promissory Note was secured by a mortgage on real property located in the Township of Stambaugh, Michigan. On January 26,1989, the mortgage was recorded. Additionally, the Promissory Note was secured by a Security Interest in equipment and personal property located at the Michigan facility. The Security Interest included an after-acquired property clause and a future advances clause. 1 That Security *805 Interest was perfected by filing Financing Statements with the Michigan Secretary of State on February 6, 1989, March 7, 1989, and September 25,1989. The Township contends that Hardwood used the loan proceeds for building renovations and as a down payment on equipment.

On September 22, 1989, the Township loaned defendant Hardwood $625,000 in exchange for a Promissory Note. This loan was made pursuant to the United States Department of Urban Development’s Economic Development Implementation Grant. The Promissory Note was secured by a Mortgage on the same real property as the Promissory Note given to Miners State Bank. Miners State Bank agreed to subordinate its interest in the real property to the Township’s interest. 2 In addition, this Promissory Note was secured by an interest in all tangible and intangible personal property and fixtures located at the Michigan facility. However, unlike the real property mortgage, the Township did not obtain a subordination of Miners State Bank’s Security Interest in the personal property. Like the Miners State Bank’s Security Interest, the Township’s Security Interest also contained an after-acquired property and future advances clauses. 3 The Township’s Security Interest *806 was perfected by filing a Financing Statement with the Michigan Secretary of State on October 12, 1989 — after Miners State Bank filed its Financing Statements.

The Township contends that Hardwood purchased a majority of its equipment shortly after Hardwood received the $625,000 loan from the Township.

In the summer of 1991, Hardwood was acquired by ANP Acquisition Corporation, a corporation wholly owned by Andrew Hunter and Robert Keith.

On July 8, 1991, Miners State Bank assigned its interest in its Promissory Note, Mortgage, and Security Agreement to defendant ANP Dimensional Lumber Michigan, Inc. (Lumber), a subsidiary of Dimensional Lumber Holdings — another corporation wholly owned by Andrew Hunter and Robert Keith. Miners State Bank received $159,-933.78 as compensation for the assignment. On July 10, 1991, this assignment was recorded. Dimensional Lumber Holdings earlier had purchased a note secured by equipment and personal property located at the Wisconsin facility.

The Township contends that Hardwood stopped making payments on the $625,000 Promissory Note after June 1991. The Township claims that defendant Hardwood is in default on the $625,000 Promissory Note because no one has made payments pursuant to the terms of the Note. As of March 23, 1992, $579,114.84 of principal and $41,840.40 of interest was owed on the Note.

In June 1991, Lumber executed a $500,000 note with Hardwood secured by Hardwood assets and real property. In July 1991, Lumber executed an additional $300,000 note secured by the January 20, 1989, security agreement between Hardwood and Miners State Bank. The July 1991 note was later increased to $800,000. Robert Keith claims that the money was loaned to pay Hardwood’s vendors. The then president of Hardwood, Geron Verville, does not remember any consideration being exchanged for the note, and he stated that Lumber was funneling money through Hardwood to increase the amount of its security interest.

On March 26,1992, the Township filed this lawsuit against defendant Hardwood seeking this Court to adjudge a foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property to satisfy the Hardwood obligations to the Township. The Township also seeks a judicial determination against Hardwood as to who has priority in the personal property. The Township argues that it has a purchase money security interest in the equipment purchased shortly after extending the loan to Hardwood. The Township also seeks an order from this Court restraining both defendants from re *807 moving property from the premises located in Stambaugh, Michigan.

On September 30,1992, the Township filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On October 1,1992, defendant Lumber filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The rule requires that the disputed facts be material. Material facts are facts which are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. A dispute over trivial facts which are not necessary in order to apply the substantive law does not prevent the granting of a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The rule also requires the dispute to be genuine. A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return judgment for the nonmoving party. Id. This standard requires the nonmoving party to present more than a scintilla of evidence to defeat the motion. The summary judgment standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict. The only difference between the two is procedural. Summary judgment is made based on documentary evidence before trial, and directed verdict is made based on evidence submitted at trial. 477 U.S. at 250-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. A moving party who does not have the burden of proof at trial may properly support a motion for summary judgment by showing the court that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct.

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841 F. Supp. 803, 1993 WL 551151, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/township-of-stambaugh-v-ah-ne-pee-dimensional-hardwood-inc-miwd-1993.