MacDonald, J.
The single issue presented by this appeal is whether the plaintiff, the town of Greenwich, can obtain injunctive relief under the provisions of the Environmental Protection Act of 1971 (§§ 22a-14 to 22a-20 of the General Statutes)1 against the state of Connecticut and the Connecticut Transportation Authority in their operation of [340]*340the Cos Cob railroad power plant nnder an agreement which, pursuant to § 16-344,2 is exempt from “state regulation.”
The facts relevant to the determination of this issue are undisputed and may be briefly summarized. On June 26, 1972, the plaintiff brought an .action against the defendants, the Connecticut Transportation Authority and the commissioner of transportation, seeking injunctive relief .against emissions from the Cos Cob power plant which allegedly violated the sanitary code of the town of Greenwich, the public health code of the state of Connecticut and the Environmental Protection Act of 1971. The Cos Cob power plant is located at Cos Cob, within the geographical limits of the town of Greenwich, and generates electric power which operates a portion of the Penn Central Eailroad.
On July 11, 1972, the defendants demurred to the plaintiff’s complaint on several grounds, one of which was that § 16-344 exempts from state regulation the operation of railroad service under contract [341]*341with the Connecticut Transportation Authority. On August 31, .1.972, the plaintiff moved to amend its writ and complaint to add the Penn Central Transportation Company, the operator of the Cos Coh power plant, as a party defendant. Leave to join the Penn Central as a party defendant having been granted by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the plaintiff’s motion was granted, and the Penn Central was cited in as a party defendant and filed an answer to the plaintiff’s complaint. On June 29, 1973, the Superior Court sustained the demurrer of the original defendants on the ground that § 16-344 created an exception to § 22a-18. The plaintiff has appealed to this court from the judgment rendered after the court sustained the defendants’ demurrer.
The resolution of this appeal quite obviously depends upon an interpretation of the term “state regulation” as used in § 16-344. If the relief sought by a cause of action maintained by virtue of the Environmental Protection Act of 1971 constitutes such regulation, then clearly the special provisions of § 16-344 conflict with the general provisions of the Environmental Protection Act. In such a case, as was pointed out by the trial court, the rule of statutory construction delineated in Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 385, 58 A.2d 5, would apply: “ ‘[I]f one of two enactments is special and particular and clearly includes the matter in controversy, whilst the other is general and would if standing alone, include it also, and if the inclusion of that matter in the general enactment would produce a conflict between it and the special provisions, it must be taken that the latter were designed as an exception to the general provisions.’ Wentworth v. L. & L. [342]*342Dining Co., 116 Conn. 364, 369, 165 A. 203.” In terms of the specific situation presented herein, the operation of the railroad power plant, by virtue of § 16-344, would be exempt from the relief sought by the plaintiff’s cause of action as an exception to §§ 22a-16 and 22a-18.
We find this to be the case. “ ‘The words used [in a statute] are to be construed according to their commonly approved usage. General Statutes § 1-1; Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Premo, 153 Corn. 465, 474, 217 A.2d 698; State v. Benson, 153 Conn. 209, 214, 214 A.2d 903; Baker v. Norwalk, 152 Conn. 312, 315, 206 A.2d 428. Or, stated another way, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Taylor, 153 Conn. 72, 82, 214 A.2d 362.’ Klapproth v. Turner, 156 Conn. 276, 280, 240 A.2d 886.” Windham Community Memorial Hospital v. Willimantic, 166 Conn. 113, 120, 348 A.2d 651. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “regulation” as “an act of regulating or the condition of being regulated.” “Regulate” is defined as meaning “to govern or direct according to rule; ... to bring u/nder the control of law or constituted authority.” (Emphasis added.) “Regulation connotes . . . the power to permit and control as well as to prohibit”; Yale University v. New Haven, 104 Conn. 610, 625, 134 A. 268; and “infers limitations.” Hartland v. Jensen’s, Inc., 146 Com. 697, 702, 155 A.2d 754.
The state public health code and the sanitary code of Greenwich are, by any reasonable application of the definitions given above, and by the express wording of the statutes authorizing their promulgation, exercises in “regulation.” See General Statutes §§ 19-13, 19-80. The Environmental Protection Act [343]*343of 1971 clearly was a legislative attempt to bring the ever-growing problems of air and water pollution “under the control of law.” That act, in its declaration of policy, specifically found and declared that there is a “public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state of Connecticut.” (Emphasis added.) § 22a-15. Through the medium of actions authorized by § 22a-16 the legislature sought to apply “limitations” on the “unreasonable pollution, impairment, or destruction” of those natural resources, or, in other words, to regulate those enumerated evils.
It could be argued that because the Environmental Protection Act of 1971 did not place complete regulatory authority over various forms of pollution within a traditional regulatory agency, but instead conferred standing to sue on a wide variety of agencies, municipalities and other entities, including “any person,” it cannot be said to establish “state regulation.” We are of the opinion, however, that § 22a-16 is an example of a legislative enactment of what has been described as the expanding doctrine of “private attorney generals,” who are empowered to institute proceedings to vindicate the public interest. See, e.g., Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707, 64 S. Ct. 74, 88 L. Ed. 414; 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 22.05. By utilizing this procedure, the legislature expanded the number of potential guardians of the public interest in the environment into the millions, instead of relying exclusively on the limited resources of a particular agency.
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MacDonald, J.
The single issue presented by this appeal is whether the plaintiff, the town of Greenwich, can obtain injunctive relief under the provisions of the Environmental Protection Act of 1971 (§§ 22a-14 to 22a-20 of the General Statutes)1 against the state of Connecticut and the Connecticut Transportation Authority in their operation of [340]*340the Cos Cob railroad power plant nnder an agreement which, pursuant to § 16-344,2 is exempt from “state regulation.”
The facts relevant to the determination of this issue are undisputed and may be briefly summarized. On June 26, 1972, the plaintiff brought an .action against the defendants, the Connecticut Transportation Authority and the commissioner of transportation, seeking injunctive relief .against emissions from the Cos Cob power plant which allegedly violated the sanitary code of the town of Greenwich, the public health code of the state of Connecticut and the Environmental Protection Act of 1971. The Cos Cob power plant is located at Cos Cob, within the geographical limits of the town of Greenwich, and generates electric power which operates a portion of the Penn Central Eailroad.
On July 11, 1972, the defendants demurred to the plaintiff’s complaint on several grounds, one of which was that § 16-344 exempts from state regulation the operation of railroad service under contract [341]*341with the Connecticut Transportation Authority. On August 31, .1.972, the plaintiff moved to amend its writ and complaint to add the Penn Central Transportation Company, the operator of the Cos Coh power plant, as a party defendant. Leave to join the Penn Central as a party defendant having been granted by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the plaintiff’s motion was granted, and the Penn Central was cited in as a party defendant and filed an answer to the plaintiff’s complaint. On June 29, 1973, the Superior Court sustained the demurrer of the original defendants on the ground that § 16-344 created an exception to § 22a-18. The plaintiff has appealed to this court from the judgment rendered after the court sustained the defendants’ demurrer.
The resolution of this appeal quite obviously depends upon an interpretation of the term “state regulation” as used in § 16-344. If the relief sought by a cause of action maintained by virtue of the Environmental Protection Act of 1971 constitutes such regulation, then clearly the special provisions of § 16-344 conflict with the general provisions of the Environmental Protection Act. In such a case, as was pointed out by the trial court, the rule of statutory construction delineated in Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 385, 58 A.2d 5, would apply: “ ‘[I]f one of two enactments is special and particular and clearly includes the matter in controversy, whilst the other is general and would if standing alone, include it also, and if the inclusion of that matter in the general enactment would produce a conflict between it and the special provisions, it must be taken that the latter were designed as an exception to the general provisions.’ Wentworth v. L. & L. [342]*342Dining Co., 116 Conn. 364, 369, 165 A. 203.” In terms of the specific situation presented herein, the operation of the railroad power plant, by virtue of § 16-344, would be exempt from the relief sought by the plaintiff’s cause of action as an exception to §§ 22a-16 and 22a-18.
We find this to be the case. “ ‘The words used [in a statute] are to be construed according to their commonly approved usage. General Statutes § 1-1; Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Premo, 153 Corn. 465, 474, 217 A.2d 698; State v. Benson, 153 Conn. 209, 214, 214 A.2d 903; Baker v. Norwalk, 152 Conn. 312, 315, 206 A.2d 428. Or, stated another way, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Taylor, 153 Conn. 72, 82, 214 A.2d 362.’ Klapproth v. Turner, 156 Conn. 276, 280, 240 A.2d 886.” Windham Community Memorial Hospital v. Willimantic, 166 Conn. 113, 120, 348 A.2d 651. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “regulation” as “an act of regulating or the condition of being regulated.” “Regulate” is defined as meaning “to govern or direct according to rule; ... to bring u/nder the control of law or constituted authority.” (Emphasis added.) “Regulation connotes . . . the power to permit and control as well as to prohibit”; Yale University v. New Haven, 104 Conn. 610, 625, 134 A. 268; and “infers limitations.” Hartland v. Jensen’s, Inc., 146 Com. 697, 702, 155 A.2d 754.
The state public health code and the sanitary code of Greenwich are, by any reasonable application of the definitions given above, and by the express wording of the statutes authorizing their promulgation, exercises in “regulation.” See General Statutes §§ 19-13, 19-80. The Environmental Protection Act [343]*343of 1971 clearly was a legislative attempt to bring the ever-growing problems of air and water pollution “under the control of law.” That act, in its declaration of policy, specifically found and declared that there is a “public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state of Connecticut.” (Emphasis added.) § 22a-15. Through the medium of actions authorized by § 22a-16 the legislature sought to apply “limitations” on the “unreasonable pollution, impairment, or destruction” of those natural resources, or, in other words, to regulate those enumerated evils.
It could be argued that because the Environmental Protection Act of 1971 did not place complete regulatory authority over various forms of pollution within a traditional regulatory agency, but instead conferred standing to sue on a wide variety of agencies, municipalities and other entities, including “any person,” it cannot be said to establish “state regulation.” We are of the opinion, however, that § 22a-16 is an example of a legislative enactment of what has been described as the expanding doctrine of “private attorney generals,” who are empowered to institute proceedings to vindicate the public interest. See, e.g., Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707, 64 S. Ct. 74, 88 L. Ed. 414; 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 22.05. By utilizing this procedure, the legislature expanded the number of potential guardians of the public interest in the environment into the millions, instead of relying exclusively on the limited resources of a particular agency. That this is the case is demonstrated by the provisions of § 22a-20, which states, in part, as follows: “Sections 22a-14 to 22a-20, inclusive, shall be supple[344]*344mentary to existing administrative and regulatory procedures provided by law and in any action maintained under said sections, the court may remand the parties to such procedures.” (Emphasis added.) The mere fact that the Environmental Protection Act of 1971 allows towns or private citizens to initiate proceedings, for example, to enforce public health codes, does not prevent the act from constituting “state regulation.”
The plaintiff urges upon this court a more restrictive view of the term “state regulation,” and apparently relies heavily upon the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 80 S. Ct. 813, 4 L. Ed. 2d 852. While that case dealt with the constitutionality of a local smoke abatement code in light of the interstate commerce clause of the United States constitution and is thus inapposite to the case at hand, it is interesting to note that even the language of that case (p. 443) depicted the code as “local regulation to effectuate a legitimate local public interest.” (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff nonetheless maintains that the correct interpretation of § 16-344 is that interstate railroad service operated under compact is exempt only from control of the management of the roads or the fixing of rates which may be charged by the service. The obvious weakness in this argument is that no such limitation is expressed in § 16-344, whereas its predecessor statute, Public Acts 1967, No. 474, which was repealed with the passage of § 16-344 (Public Acts 1969, No. 46, § 3), did expressly state that the service operated pursuant to the contract was exempt from federal and state regulation of “rates and schedules of service.” The obvious [345]*345legislative intent was to expand the exemption beyond the narrow confines of those specific areas of regulation.
The plaintiff finally argues that the definition of “regulation” found within the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act3 (hereinafter UAPA) (General Statutes chapter 54) is the applicable one and that the major purpose of § 16-344 is the exemption of railroad service operated under compact from the procedural confines of the UAPA. This contention is without merit. The exemption established by § 16-344 was enacted and in effect before the passage of the UAPA, which went into effect on January 1, 1972. Moreover, mindful, as we must be, of the directive of § 1-1, we cannot impute to the legislature the quantum of linguistic imprecision necessary for it to mean “regulation” as defined in § 4-166 by its use of “state regulation” within the context of § 16-344, as the plaintiff would have us do.
The smoke which is claimed to cloud the skies over Greenwich does not in any way serve to obfuscate what appears to be the clear intent of the legislature specifically to exempt those responsible therefor from state regulation of the type sought by this action.
There is no error.
In this opinion House, C. J., Shapiro and Loiselle, Js., concurred.