Town of Gorham v. Papi

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedMarch 27, 2015
DocketCUMvi-14-001
StatusUnpublished

This text of Town of Gorham v. Papi (Town of Gorham v. Papi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Town of Gorham v. Papi, (Me. Super. Ct. 2015).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CNILACTION DOCKET NO. VI-14-001

TOWN OF GORHAM,

Petitioner DECISION AND ORDER v.

JOHNPAPI, c..=.<:=~ Respondent MAR 27 2015

BEFORE THE COURT RECEIVED This matter comes before the court to enforce the Town's citation of John

Papi ("Papi") with violating the Solid Waste Flow Control Ordinance

("Ordinance"). The Ordinance requires an individual or business to obtain an

annual license from the Town before collecting, recycling, or hauling any solid

waste generated within the boundaries of the Town. The license applicant must

provide certain specified information, including proof of liability insurance, and

must also pay an annual license fee. The penalty for violating the Ordinance is a

$3,000 fine for the first violation and a $5,000 fine for any subsequent violations,

plus costs and attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the Ordinance. Papi

contends that the Town selectively enforces the Ordinance against him.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 28, 2014, Gorham Police Sgt. Dan Young cited Papi for

violating the Ordinance when Papi was caught in the process of loading solid

waste into his truck from a dumpster at Cook's Hardware Store in Gorham. At

the time he was cited by Gorham Police Sgt. Young, Papi was not licensed under

the Ordinance. This is not the first time that Papi violated the Ordinance by hauling

without a license. See Town of Gorham v John Papi, CV-98-69. On October 16,

1998, the Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town,

ordering Papi to pay a $3,000 fine plus $1,544.68 in attorney's fees, and enjoining

him from hauling any solid waste generated in the Town without obtaining the

required license. Papi did not pay the judgment entered in 1998. In this action,

the Town asks the court to order payment of that judgment together with post-

judgment interest, as part of the remedy in this case.

There is no factual dispute that Papi was collecting municipal solid waste

in the Town without a license. Rather, Papi argues that he is the victim of

selective enforcement, in violation of his right to equal protection under the law.

DISCUSSION

1. Selective Prosecution/Enforcement

Under the Equal Protection Gause of the United States Constitution,

the state cannot "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws." U.S. Canst. amend. XIV,§ 1. The Maine Constitution provides the

same protections. Bangs v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 186,

(citing both federal and state constitutional provisions).

However,

There is no right under the Constitution to have a law go unenforced against you, even if you are the first person against whom it is enforced, and even if you think (or can prove) you are not as culpable as some others who have gone unpunished. The law does not need to be enforced everywhere to be legitimately enforced somewhere ....

Futernick v. Sumpter Twp., 78 F.3d 1051, 1056 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Wayte v. United

States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)); cf Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-

2 88 (1955) (noting that a "law need not be in every respect logically consistent

with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for

correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure

was a rational way to correct it.").

To make out a defense of selective prosecution or enforcement, a

defendant must establish the following two elements:

(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and

(2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.

Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); Yerardi's Moody St. Rest. & Lounge, Inc. v.

Bd. of Selectmen, 878 F.2d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 1989); State v. Heald, 382 A.2d 290, 301

(Me. 1978).

For the first element, there must be a showing of discriminatory intent.

The challenged action must have a discriminatory effect and must be motivated

by a discriminatory purpose. Polk v. Town of Lubec, 2000 ME 152,

510. As for the second element, in the absence of any evidence of racial, religious

or speech discrimination, defendant must produce evidence showing that the

Town acted on a "bad faith intent to injure" the defendant. E. Perry Iron & Metal

Co. v. City of Portland, 2008 ME 10,

make out a claim that he is a "class of one," defendant must show that he "has

been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and ... there

is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Wojcik v. Mass. State Lottery

Comm'n, 300 F.3d 92, 104 (1st Cir. 2002) (quotation and citation omitted). It is not

sufficient to merely show that there are other individuals who are also violating

3 the law. B & B Coastal Enters., Inc. v. Town of Kennebunk, 276 F. Supp. 2d 155, 172

(D. Me. 2003). This is a heavy burden for defendant to meet: he must show that

(1) he was selectively treated; and (2) that the selective treatment was based on

impermissible considerations.

2. Defendant's Showing

The officer who summonsed Papi had not heard of Papi before the day

that he issued the summons. Sgt. Young had not heard any discussion that Papi

was a target of the Town's enforcement actions. Sgt. Young testified that he

never singled out anyone in the enforcement of an ordinance. He also had never

cited anyone else for trash hauling. The Chief of Police directed him to the

hardware to store. The Chief observed Papi pull in to the hardware store to pick

up the trash and called the Clerk's Office to see whether he was licensed. The

Chief was aware that Papi might not be licensed. When the Clerk confirmed that

Papi was not licensed, the Chief called Sgt. Young and directed him to the

hardware store to summons Papi for the violation. The Chief was not aware of

any other trash hauler in Town that had been cited.

According to the Town Manager, David Cole ("Cole"), he spoke with Papi

about the need to control the Town's waste in an effort to get him to get licensed.

He said most of the other haulers eventually come to be licensed and he was not

aware of another hauler who did not get licensed. Papi has come in most years

and paid the fees until recently. Papi contends that the Town's $700 fee is too

high. Cole admits that the Town's fee is higher than some, and some other

towns' fees are lower or consistent with the Town's. The Town Manager

periodically checks the revenue sources and if he is made aware that someone

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Related

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.
348 U.S. 483 (Supreme Court, 1955)
Oyler v. Boles
368 U.S. 448 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Wayte v. United States
470 U.S. 598 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Wojcik v. Massachusettts State Lottery Commission
300 F.3d 92 (First Circuit, 2002)
State v. Heald
382 A.2d 290 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1978)
Bangs v. Town of Wells
2000 ME 186 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2000)
Polk v. Town of Lubec
2000 ME 152 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2000)
E. Perry Iron & Metal Co. v. City of Portland
2008 ME 10 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2008)
B & B Coastal Enterprises, Inc. v. Demers
276 F. Supp. 2d 155 (D. Maine, 2003)

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Town of Gorham v. Papi, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/town-of-gorham-v-papi-mesuperct-2015.