Torshazo Williamson v. Captain Brown, et al.

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA TORSHAZO WILLIAMSON,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:24CV431

CAPTAIN BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case arises from Torshazo Schorder, Officer Ms. Ortagea, and Williamson’s pretrial detention at the Officer J. Thompson’s (“the moving Rockingham County Detention defendants”) motion for summary Center in March of 2024. Williamson, judgment, Docket Entry 52; the plaintiff in this Section 1983 civil 2) Joanna Peach’s (identified as action, alleges that he was held in a “Nurse Jo” in the complaint) motion cell next door to one with a broken for summary judgment, Docket Entry toilet and when county law 54; enforcement officers were moving 3) Peach’s motion to seal, Docket him to that same cell, they tased him Entry 57; and assaulted him without 4) Williamson’s motion for a justification. When he requested subpoena, Docket Entry 60; and medical assistance related thereto, 5) The moving defendants’ motion to they failed to provide it within strike Williamson’s surreply, Docket constitutionally-mandated bounds. Entry 71.

There are five pending motions before For the reasons set forth below, the the Court: Court should grant summary judgment as to all defendants save 1) Sheriff Sam Page, Cpt. Jennifer Sgt. Rodgers, Officer C.G. Brown, Brown, Sgt. Rodgers, Cpt. Mr. Brown, Officer Dillon, and Cpl. Kluk in their Sgt. Lee, Cpl. Kluk, Cpl. Ellis, Officer individual capacities, as genuine Dillon, Officer G. Brown,1 Officer issues of material fact remain

1 Williamson identifies this defendant as defendants’ motion for summary “Officer G. Brown”; as indicated in his judgment, he is Officer C.G. Brown. affidavit in support of the moving regarding the excessive force claims Williamson did not want to move to against them. cell H-118 because its toilet was broken, emanating the odor of feces The Court should grant Peach’s and urine. See Williamson Aff. ¶ 3. motion for summary judgment. Specifically, his “food trap in H-117 was allowed open to try to get some Finally, the Court denies Peach’s fresh air because of the smell from H- motion to seal and Williamson’s 118 traveled threw [sic] the air vent motion for a subpoena. The Court into [his] cell.” See id. ¶ 4. Williamson grants the moving defendants’ motion indicated to the officers that he did to strike Williamson’s surreply. not want to move to the cell because of “the unsanitary toilet.” See id. ¶ 7; I. FACTS see also Rodgers Aff. ¶ 3 (“When I informed Williamson of the change, The undisputed facts show the he stated that he would not move.”); following2: C.G. Brown Aff. ¶ 3 (“Sgt. Rodgers gave Williamson several verbal A. Sgt. Rodgers tases Williamson commands to pack his stuff up but Mr. during a cell transfer. Williamson continued to refuse.”); On March 11, 2024, Williamson was a Kluk Aff. ¶ 4 (noting Sgt. Rodgers’s pretrial detainee at the Rockingham “several attempts to get Williamson to County Detention Center. See comply”). generally Docket Entry 61-1 Sgt. Rodgers then approached (hereinafter “Williamson Aff.”). That Williamson. See Williamson Aff. ¶ 10; day, Sgt. Rodgers, Cpl. Kluk, Officer Rodgers Aff. ¶ 7. The two made Dillon and Officer C.G. Brown came to physical contact. See Williamson Aff. Williamson’s cell, H-117, to move him ¶ 10 (“Sgt. Rodgers come [sic] to the to cell H-118. See Williamson Aff. ¶ 2; back of the cell and was threatening Docket Entry 52-2 (hereinafter me. He started to bump his head “Rodgers Aff.”) ¶¶ 2, 8; Docket Entry against me to get a reaction.”); 52-3 (hereinafter “Kluk Aff.”) ¶ 2; Rodgers Aff. ¶ 7 (“I stepped over to Docket Entry 52-4 (hereinafter “C.G. Mr. Williamson and placed my arm on Brown Aff.”) ¶ 2. his right arm to try to talk him into

2 While Williamson’s complaint was not 2021) (“‘As a general rule, when one verified, he submitted a sworn affidavit party files a motion for summary along with his opposition to the moving judgment, the non-movant cannot defendants’ motion for summary merely rely on matters pleaded in the judgment reiterating the facts set forth in complaint, but must, by factual affidavit his Complaint, see Docket Entry 61-1, or the like, respond to the motion.’”) which the Court considers. See Goodman (quoting and citing Williams v. Griffin, v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 498 (4th Cir. 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991)). complying but he told me step [sic] Sgt. Rodgers then deployed the taser away from him.”). again, this time striking Williamson in the neck and face area. See The parties disagree about what Williamson Aff. ¶ 14 (“Sgt. Rodgers hit occurred next. Williamson states that me in the face with the taser, similar Sgt. Rodgers drew his taser and so he to a pistol-whipping”); id. ¶ 15 (“Sgt. (Williamson) began packing up his Rodgers held the taser to my mouth things and put his hands up to submit. and dry tased me (he used the taser See Williamson Aff. ¶¶ 11-12. The without the wires so it was more like a officers contend that Williamson stun gun). He also tased me on the continued to refuse orders. See side of my face and head.”); Rodgers Rodgers Aff. ¶ 8; C.G. Brown Aff. ¶ 3. Aff. ¶ 9 (“I went to apply the taser to his left arm, but he dropped his head The parties agree that Sgt. Rodgers as he approached me, causing the then deployed his taser, striking taser to catch him in the left side of the Williamson. See Williamson Aff. ¶ 13 neck area.”). (“Sgt. Rodgers then shot the taser at me in my side.”); Rodgers Aff. ¶ 8 (“I Officers subdued Williamson, asked Mr. Williamson again to including Cpl. Kluk, who took hold of comply, but he refused. I then moved Williamson’s feet. See Kluk Aff. ¶ 5 Officer Dillon out of the way and (“At this time, I went to grab Mr. deployed the taser on inmate Williamson’s feet to assist him to the Williamson[.]”). ground”); Williamson Aff. ¶ 16 (“Cpl. Kluk grabbed my right leg and held it The parties agree that Williamson up.”). Williamson maintains: “I never removed the taser probes once struck. fought back or resisted in any way. I See Williamson Aff. ¶ 13; Rodgers Aff. never showed any aggression. I never ¶ 8; Kluk Aff. ¶ 4. Officer C.G. Brown tried to take the taser from the and Williamson made physical officers.” See Williamson Aff. ¶ 17. contact; the parties dispute exactly how. See Williamson Aff. ¶ 14 (“Ofc. Sgt. Rodgers directed Officers Dillon G. Brown grabbed me and I was and C.G. Brown to take him to see the slammed on the floor. Ofc. Cl. Dillon nurse. Rodgers Aff. ¶¶ 10-11 (“I began to punch me with closed fist instructed Officers Dillon and Brown [sic]”); Rodgers Aff. ¶ 8 (“Officers to escort Mr. Williamson to see the Dillon and Brown grabbed him”); C.G. nurse.”); Kluk Aff. ¶ 5 (“Mr. Brown Aff. ¶ 4 (“Williamson began to Williamson was cuffed in the front fight myself and Officer Dillon”). and escorted to medical to be seen.”); Officer Dillon struck Williamson C.G. Brown Aff. ¶ 4 (“Williamson was multiple times in the arm and one secured and taken to the ground time to the side of the head. See without injury to him. However, he Rodgers Aff. ¶ 9; Kluk Aff. ¶ 4. was taken to the nurse as a precaution.”). B. Williamson seeks and receives Williamson lodged a March 12 sick medical care in the jail call request, wherein he reported that following the taser incident. the left side of his face felt numb and he was having migraines and pain in The facility contracted with Southern his neck, left shoulder, and lower Health Partners, Inc. (SHP) to back. See Peach Aff. ¶ 17. In his March provide nursing care to inmates. See 13 sick call request, Williamson Docket Entry 55-1 (hereinafter “Peach reported the same symptoms, adding Aff.”) ¶ 3. The medical professional on that the left side of his face and his top duty when officers brought lip were blistered and bleeding from a Williamson in for care was Joanna taser burn. See id. ¶ 19. Peach, a licensed practical nurse. See id. ¶ 2. Peach responded to the March 13 request, advising Williamson that In addition to Peach, SHP also medical personnel had seen the contracted a medical doctor, Linwood March 12 request and confirming that Robinson, as medical director for the he was on the list to be seen. See id. ¶ detention center. See Peach Aff. ¶ 5. 20. In Williamson’s March 14 sick call Robinson was available for phone request, he reported that he was consultation and on call to make suffering from migraines, the left side verbal orders for patients. See id. He of his face was more numb, and he generally came to the detention center was experiencing neck and lower back once a week, as well. See id. pain. See id. ¶ 21. In his March 15 request, Williamson asked why he had While Peach could see inmates for not yet been seen, and repeated the sick call visits, she could not do so symptoms reported in his earlier unless a detention officer requests. See id. ¶ 22. accompanied them, and when she did, she could not independently make Peach responded to the March 15 medical decisions for inmates. See id. request, advising Williamson that she ¶¶ 7-8. That is, Robinson had to had received the earlier requests and approve all medical decisions for had intended to see him on March 14 inmates, including prescriptions and but there were no officers available to treatment orders. See id. ¶ 8. bring inmates for sick visits on that day or the day prior. See id. ¶ 23. She Peach treated Williamson after he was further told Williamson that he would tased. See id. ¶ 14. She noted that his soon receive ibuprofen in his vital signs were stable and that taser medication package until he could be darts were located in his shirt, on his seen. Id. Williamson began receiving right abdomen and his mid-abdomen. the medication that evening. Id. See id. Peach did not recall seeing any injuries to Williamson’s face; had she That same day, Williamson submitted noted that, she would have recorded it another sick call request, asking why in his medical records. See id. ¶ 16. he had not yet been seen. Id. ¶ 26. Another nurse responded, advising twice-daily and antibiotic ointment, him that Dr. Robinson would see him both for seven days. See id. Dr. on the following Monday. Id. On Robinson also entered an order for March 18, Peach saw Williamson for a Williamson to receive an x-ray of his sick call visit. Id. ¶ 27. Williamson told left ankle and left foot. See id. ¶ 38. her he was tased with a dry stun on the left side of his face; Peach inspected On March 29, Williamson submitted a his left ear and it was “totally clear.” sick call request, stating that the See id. ¶ 27. Peach further noted that Excedrin was not helping as much as Williamson had no taser marks he had reported to Peach during that anywhere on his body, consistent with evening’s medication pass. See id. ¶ the barbs having attached to his 39. Peach responded to the request, clothing and not his person on March letting Williamson know that she 11. See id. Williamson’s vital signs would notify Dr. Robinson. See id. ¶ were stable at this visit. See id. 40. Two days later, Dr. Robinson discontinued the Excedrin and Peach prescribed a twice daily dose of prescribed naproxen twice daily for 220 mg of naproxen for Williamson, five days. See id. ¶ 41. which he began receiving on March 19. See id. ¶ 30. On April 2, Williamson submitted another sick call request, reporting he Williamson submitted another sick was still having issues with migraines, call request on March 22, noting that and experiencing numbness on the he told staff that he was dizzy when he left side of his face. See id. ¶ 42. Peach got out of the shower and had a sharp responded to the request and told him pain in his head even after sitting that he would see Dr. Robinson, a down. See id. ¶ 31. Another nurse message she had already relayed in responded, confirming that he was on person. See id. ¶ 43. the list to see Dr. Robinson. See id. ¶ 32. On March 26, Williamson Dr. Robinson saw Williamson again submitted a sick call request, noting on April 4; he noted that the x-ray of that he was experiencing migraines, Williamson’s left ankle and foot was as well as pain in his neck, lower back, negative for any issues. See id. ¶ 44. and ankle, and numbness in his left Williamson complained of numbness jaw and ankle. See id. ¶ 33. on the left side of his face but it had not grown worse. Id. Dr. Robinson Dr. Robinson saw Williamson on prescribed prednisone for the March 28. See id. ¶ 36. During the numbness, which was dispensed on examination, he reported numbness April 9. See id. ¶ 45. and a superficial wound to the left side of his face; he admitted that he had On April 11, Williamson submitted repeatedly removed a scab there. See another sick call request, reporting id. ¶ 36. Dr. Robinson entered an that he was still having migraines and order for Excedrin headache relief the medications were having no effect. See id. ¶ 46. Peach advised him that Williamson moved for the issuance of she would speak with Dr. Robinson. a subpoena directing Central Prison See id. ¶ 47. On April 16, a in Raleigh to produce his medical prescription order was entered for records between the dates of Williamson to receive prednisone November 19, 2025 and January 19, once daily for six days; Williamson 2026. See Docket Entry 60. He began receiving his prescribed responded in opposition to the two naproxen on April 17. See id. ¶ 49. motions for summary judgment. See Docket Entry 61. In Williamson’s Williamson finished his regimen on opposition, he voluntarily dismissed prednisone on April 22 and did not all claims against Lee, Schorder, submit any further sick call requests Ortega and Thompson, as well as all notifying the jail medical staff that his claims against all defendants in their headache pain continued or that he official capacities, save Page. See needed further pain medication. See Docket Entry 61. Williamson further id. ¶ 50. agreed that his claims for injunctive relief were moot upon his transfer to II. PROCEDURAL the custody of the North Carolina HISTORY Department of Adult Corrections, and Williamson filed this Section 1983 dismissed those, as well. See id. suit, alleging that the prison officers used excessive force in tasing him, in The defendants replied, see Docket violation of his Eighth Amendment Entries 67, 68, Williamson then filed rights,3 and the prison medical staff a surreply, see Docket Entry 70, and was deliberately indifferent to both the moving defendants moved to his medical needs and conditions of strike it, see Docket Entry 71. These confinement, in violation of his matters are ripe for disposition. Fourteenth Amendment rights. See III. STANDARD OF Compl. The defendants answered, see REVIEW Docket Entries 31, 33, and the magistrate judge set a discovery A court “shall grant summary schedule, see Docket Entry dated judgment if the movant shows that 06/30/2025. The moving defendants there is no genuine dispute as to any moved for summary judgment, see material fact and the movant is Docket Entry 52, and Peach entitled to judgment as a matter of separately did the same, see Docket law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine Entry 54. Peach also moved to seal dispute of material fact exists “if the Williamson’s medical records and evidence is such that a reasonable jury portions of her affidavit incorporating could return a verdict for the the same. See Docket Entry 57. nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

3 Because Williamson was not a prisoner, derives from the Fourteenth but rather a pretrial detainee, this right Amendment. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Celotex (1986). In analyzing a summary Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). judgment motion, courts “must construe all facts and “An affidavit or declaration used to reasonable inferences in the light support [summary judgment] must most favorable to the nonmoving be made on personal knowledge, set party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59 out facts that would be admissible in F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023). evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on The moving party bears the burden of the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. establishing the absence of a genuine 56(c)(4); see also Evans v. Techs. dispute of material fact by Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, “identifying those portions of ‘the 962 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Williams v. pleadings, depositions, answers to Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. interrogatories, and admissions on 1991)). file, together with the affidavits, if any’ which it believes demonstrate the A party cannot rely on statements in a absence of a genuine issue of material brief to support a motion for fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 summary judgment, because they are U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule not evidence. City of Greensboro v. 56). Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 15-CV-559, 2017 WL 11488724, at *1 “Where, as here, the nonmoving party n.4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2017) bears the ultimate burden of proof at (collecting cases); see also Hill v. trial, the moving party may discharge Carvana, LLC, No. 22-CV-37, 2022 its initial burden at summary WL 1625020, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 23, judgment by ‘showing – that is, 2022). pointing out to the . . . court – that there is an absence of evidence to IV. GOVERNING LAW support the nonmoving party’s case.’” Title 42, United States Code, Section Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp., 1983 “is a federal statutory remedy LLC, 117 F.4th 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2024) available to those deprived of rights (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at secured to them by the Constitution 325). “If the moving party carries this and, in a more sharply limited way, initial burden, the burden then shifts the statutory laws of the United to the nonmoving party, who must ‘go States” by persons acting under color beyond the pleadings and by [his] of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l own affidavits, or by the depositions, Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. answers to interrogatories, and 2009). A plaintiff bringing suit admissions on file, designate specific pursuant to § 1983 must show that a facts showing that there is a genuine person acting under color of state law violated a constitutional or other federal legal right. West v. Atkins, 487 courts to judge the reasonableness of U.S. 42, 48 (1988). the force applied “from the perspective and with the knowledge of A. Excessive Force the defendant officer. We have also explained that a court must take Here, as against the moving account of the legitimate interests in defendants, the constitutional right at managing a jail, acknowledging as issue is the right to be free from an part of the objective reasonableness officer’s use of excessive force, derived analysis that deference to policies and from the Fourteenth Amendment. See practices needed to maintain order Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 and institutional security is n.10 (1989) (the Fourteenth appropriate.” See id. at 399-400. Amendment “protects a pretrial

detainee from the use of excessive B. Deliberate Indifference force that amounts to punishment”). to Serious Medical Needs and/or Conditions of To succeed on such a claim, a pretrial Confinement detainee must show only that the force “purposely or knowingly used Here, as against Peach, the against him was objectively constitutional right at issue sounds in unreasonable.” See Kingsley v. the Eighth Amendment but derives Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 from the due process clause of the (2015). Courts may consider the Fourteenth Amendment because of following in weighing the Williamson’s status as a pretrial reasonableness or unreasonableness detainee. See Short v. Hartman, 87 of the force exerted: “the relationship F.4th 593, 606 (4th Cir. 2023) between the need for the use of force (“[T]his Court extended Estelle from and the amount of force used; the Eighth Amendment claims to Fifth extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any and Fourteenth Amendment Due effort made by the officer to temper or Process Clause claims, reasoning that to limit the amount of force; the ‘due process is at least as co-extensive severity of the security problem at as the guarantees of the [E]ighth issue; the threat reasonably perceived amendment.’”) (quoting and citing by the officer; and whether the Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1294 plaintiff was actively resisting.” See id. (4th Cir. 1978)).

The United States Supreme Court In Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, recognized in Kingsley that “[o]fficers 164 (4th Cir. 1984), the Fourth Circuit facing disturbances ‘are often forced adopted an objective test for to make split-second judgments—in Fourteenth Amendment claims of circumstances that are tense, deliberate indifference to serious uncertain, and rapidly evolving.’” Id. medical needs, derived from the (quoting and citing Graham, 490 U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Bell v. at 397). Therefore, it has directed Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), wherein the Court held that “[i]n evaluating (1) they had a medical condition the constitutionality of conditions or or injury that posed a restrictions of pretrial detention ... the substantial risk of serious proper inquiry is whether those harm; conditions amount to punishment of (2) the defendant intentionally, the detainee.” See Bell, 441 U.S. at knowingly, or recklessly acted 535. “The Court in Bell explained that or failed to act to appropriately whereas the Eighth Amendment only address the risk that the protects post-conviction detainees condition posed; from ‘cruel and unusual punishment,’ (3) the defendant knew or the Fourteenth Amendment Due should have known (a) that the Process Clause protects pretrial detainee had that condition and detainees from being punished at all.” (b) that the defendant’s action Short, 87 F.4th at 606, citing Bell, 441 or inaction posed an U.S. at 535-37. unjustifiably high risk of harm; and Thus, “deliberate indifference to (4) as a result, the detainee was serious medical needs violates the harmed. Fourteenth Amendment even in the absence of subjective intent to punish Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 because no legitimate nonpunitive (4th Cir. 2023).4 goal is served by a denial or unreasonable delay in providing A serious medical need is one that has medical treatment where the need for been “diagnosed by a physician as such treatment is apparent.” See id. mandating treatment” or is “so (internal quotation and citation obvious that even a lay person would omitted). easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Scinto v. Thus, Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016). To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a medical need, As to the jail personnel, principles of the specific type of deliberate deliberate indifference under the indifference claim at issue in Fourteenth Amendment also cover this case, a pretrial detainee inhumane conditions of confinement. must plead that See Karn v. PTS of America, LLC, 590

4 In Short, the Fourth Circuit found that their action or failure to act would result in Fourteenth Amendment deliberate in harm … Now, it is sufficient that the indifference claims, “[t]he plaintiff no plaintiff show … that the defendant longer has to show that the defendant should have known of that condition and had actual knowledge of the detainee’s that risk, and acted accordingly.” See 87 serious medical condition and F.4th 593, 611. consciously disregarded the risk that F. Supp. 3d 780, 809 (D. Md. 2022) from the challenged conditions or ... a (citing cases). The Supreme Court substantial risk of such serious harm recognized as much in Bell v. Wolfish: resulting from ... exposure to the challenged conditions.” See Scinto v. [I]f a particular condition or Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 229 n.3 restriction of pretrial detention (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations is reasonably related to a and citation omitted). legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without Next, courts look to whether “the more, amount to defendant acted or failed to act in the “punishment.” Conversely, if a face of an unjustifiably high risk of restriction or condition is not harm that is either known or so reasonably related to a obvious that it should be known.” legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary Hammock v. Watts, 146 F.4th 349, or purposeless—a court 360 (4th Cir. 2025). The injury permissibly may infer that the suffered or risked must be more than purpose of the governmental de minimis. See Heyer v. United action is punishment that may States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d not constitutionally be inflicted 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017); Robles v. upon detainees qua detainees. Prince George’s Cty. Maryland, 302 Courts must be mindful that F.3d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2002). these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements Courts have found that “grossly and that judicial answers to overcrowded and unsanitary” them must reflect that fact facilities can satisfy the objective rather than a court’s idea of prong, see Brown v. Mitchell, 308 F. how best to operate a detention Supp. 2d 682, 693 (E.D. Va. 2004) facility. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 1375 (4th Cir. 1993)), as can leaving a (1979) (internal citation omitted). pretrial detainee confined with human waste, see Clark v. In considering a conditions of Daddysman, No. 16-cv-0621, 2018 confinement claim, courts employ the WL 1453333, at *10 (D. Md. Mar. 22, two-pronged deliberate indifference 2018) (citing Williams v. Griffin, 952 test, considering first, whether there F.2d 820, 825 (4th Cir. 1991)); Burkey was deprivation of a basic human v. Baltimore Cnty., No. GJH-20- need that was objectively sufficiently 2006, 2021 WL 3857814, at *7 (D. serious, see Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d Md. Aug. 30, 2021); Webb v. Deboo, 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995). In so doing, 423 F. App’x 299, 301 (4th Cir. 2011); courts should determine whether Fletcher v. Dykes, No. 17-cv-0914- there was “a serious or significant TDC, 2018 WL 3785143, at *7 (D. Md. physical or emotional injury resulting Aug. 9, 2018); see also Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 127 (2d Cir. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 477 (1986)). 2013). A single decision may create an official policy “so long as that V. DISCUSSION governmental unit possessed ‘final authority to create official policy.’” Id. A. The Court should grant (quoting Semple v. City of summary judgment to Page in Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 712 (4th his official capacity on the Cir. 1999)). basis of sovereign immunity. “‘The question of who possesses final At the time of the incident, Page was policymaking authority is one of state an employee of Rockingham County. law.’” Id. at 555 (quoting Riddick v. And official capacity lawsuits Sch. Bd., 238 F.3d 518, 523 (4th Cir. “’generally represent only another 2000)). Courts “‘must look to the way of pleading an action against an relevant legal materials, including entity of which an officer is an agent.’” state and local positive law, as well as Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, custom or usage having the force of 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of law.’” Id. (quoting Riddick, 238 F.3d Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, at 523). A “municipality may delegate 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). its final policymaking authority to other officials or governing bodies.” And “[f]or purposes of Section 1983, a Id. municipality is considered a ‘person’ and thus is subject to suit.” Hunter v. Here, there are no genuine issues of Town of Mocksville, 897 F.3d 538, material fact wherein a reasonable 553 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Monell, jury could find that Page, as an agent 436 U.S. at 690). However, a city of the municipality, was acting cannot be vicariously liable for the according to an official municipal acts of its employees. Id. at 553-54. policy of some nature. Accordingly, “Rather, ‘it is when execution of a the Court should dismiss the claim government’s policy or custom, against him in his official capacity. whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly B. The Court should grant be said to represent official policy, summary judgment to Cpt. Mr. inflicts the injury that the government Brown and Cpl. Ellis in their as an entity is responsible under § individual capacities. 1983.’” Id. at 554 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Government officials may be liable under § 1983 “only for their personal In other words, “municipal liability wrongdoing or supervisory actions under Section 1983 attaches only to that violated constitutional norms.” ‘action [taken] pursuant to official Timpson ex rel. Timpson v. Anderson municipal policy of some nature.’” Id. Cnty. Disabilities & Special Needs (quoting Pembaur v. City of Bd., 31 F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir. 2022); used on several different occasions see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 and that the conduct engaged in by (“Government officials may not be the subordinate poses an held liable for the unconstitutional unreasonable risk of harm of conduct of their subordinates under a constitutional injury.” See id. theory of respondeat superior.”). In other words, liability under § 1983 is Here, defendant Captain Brown “personal, based upon each (versus Officer C.G. Brown) was Sgt. defendant’s own constitutional Rodgers’s supervisor and was not violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d present at the time that Sgt. Rodgers 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). tased Williamson. And the record is devoid of facts a reasonable jury could However, a plaintiff can prevail on a rely upon to find that, assuming claim against a supervisor with facts arguendo Williamson was acting in a wherein a reasonable jury could find: manner that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional (1) that the supervisor had injury” to Williamson, Captain Brown actual or constructive had actual or constructive knowledge knowledge that his subordinate of it, let alone a causal link between was engaged in conduct that his inaction and the conduct. The posed a pervasive and Section 1983 claim against Captain unreasonable risk of Brown in his individual capacity constitutional injury to citizens should therefore be dismissed. like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s The undisputed facts also show that response to that knowledge was named defendants Cpt. Jennifer so inadequate as to show Brown and Cpl. Ellis were not deliberate indifference to or involved in any manner in any alleged tacit authorization of the use of excessive force (the tasing alleged offensive practices; and incident), the conditions of (3) that there was an confinement (the odiferous toilet) or affirmative causal link between deliberate indifference to medical the supervisor’s inaction and needs (the follow-up care). the particular constitutional Accordingly, the Court should dismiss injury suffered by the plaintiff. the claims against them in their individual capacities. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and C. The Court should deny Officers citations omitted). As to the C.G. Brown and Dillon, Cpl. “pervasive and unreasonable risk” element, there must be facts wherein a reasonable jury could find that it was “widespread, or at least has been Kluk, and Sgt. Rodgers’s And “if testimony of a nonmovant is motion for summary judgment. based on personal knowledge or firsthand experience, it can be As the moving party seeking summary evidence of disputed material facts, judgment, these defendants bear the even if it is uncorroborated and self- initial burden of demonstrating the serving.” See Nalls v. Baltimore absence of a genuine issue of material Cnty., Maryland, No. CV ELH-23- fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. 0183, 2026 WL 885716, at *22 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2026) (citing Lovett v. There is no dispute that Rodgers tased Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Williamson twice, that Officer Dillon Inc., 700 F. App’x 209, 212 (4th Cir. struck Williamson multiple times in 2017) (unpublished)). In fact, “a great the arm and once to the side of the deal of perfectly admissible testimony head, and that Officers C.G. Brown fits the description” of self-serving. and Dillon subdued him immediately Cowgill v. First Data Technologies, thereafter. There is no dispute that Inc., 41 F.4th 370, 383 (4th Cir. 2022) Cpl. Kluk was present in the cell at the (citation modified). time of the tasing and assisted officers in subduing Williamson after the fact. Sgt. Rodgers does represent in his affidavit that prior to deploying his To meet their burden as the moving taser, “I stepped over [sic] Mr. parties that the manner in which the Williamson and placed my arm on his defendants tased and/or subdued right arm to try to talk him into Williamson did not amount to complying but he told me [sic] step excessive force, these defendants away from him. I asked Mr. represent, as to the facts, that prior to Williamson again to comply, but he the first taser strike, “Plaintiff actively refused.” See Rodgers Aff. ¶¶ 7-8. But resisted” Sgt. Rodgers when he put “[w]hen there is contrary evidence, a hands on him to gain compliance. See court may not simply accept what may Docket Entry 53, at 11. But be a self-serving account by the police significantly, they cite to no record officer.” Jackson v. Carin, 128 F.4th evidence to support that assertion. By 525, 535 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting contrast, Williamson affirmatively Ingle ex rel. Est. of Ingle v. Yelton, represents that he was defenseless, 439 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2006)) hands in the air, when Rodgers (internal quotation marks omitted). deployed his taser: “Sgt. Rodgers …

drew his taser … I stopped packing my The Supreme Court in Kingsley things, faced Sgt. Rodgers, and put my directed courts to consider, in hands strait [sic] up to submit,” see weighing excessive force claims under Williamson Aff. ¶¶ 11-12, and “I never the Fourteenth Amendment, “the fought back or resisted in any way. I relationship between the need for the never showed any aggression. I never use of force and the amount of force tried to take the taser from the used; the extent of the plaintiff’s officers.” Id. ¶ 17. injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of having any reason to believe that a force; the severity of the security lesser amount of force—or a verbal problem at issue; the threat command—could not exact reasonably perceived by the officer; compliance.”). This weighs against and whether the plaintiff was actively granting summary judgment. resisting.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). In terms of the extent of Williamson’s injuries, it is undisputed that the first As a threshold matter, it is well- strike made contact with his settled in this Circuit that abdomen. See Peach Aff. ¶ 14; “[d]eploying a taser is a serious use of Williamson Aff. ¶ 13. It is also force. The weapon is designed to undisputed that he had the caus[e] ... excruciating pain[.]” See wherewithal to remove the taser Est. of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong probes immediately thereafter. See v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, Rodgers Aff. ¶ 8; Williamson Aff. ¶ 13; 902 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal Kluk Aff. ¶ 4. And, while the record is quotation and citation omitted) replete with Williamson’s sick call (alteration in original). And the requests related to the second taser Fourth Circuit has determined that strike, there is very little record “tasers are proportional force only evidence regarding the effects of the when deployed in response to a first, which weighs in favor of situation in which a reasonable officer granting the motion. As to the security would perceive some immediate threat, it is undisputed that there were danger that could be mitigated by three other officers present in the cell using the taser.” See id. at 902. to assist Sgt. Rodgers in gaining Williamson’s compliance even if he Here, regarding the first taser strike, was physically resisting. This weighs there is a dispute as to whether against granting the motion. Williamson was physically resisting the officers’ directive, implicating the As to the second taser strike, there first Kingsley factor of the necessity of again is a dispute as to what happened the force. Williamson maintains that immediately beforehand: whether not only was he not physically Williamson was the aggressor in the resisting, he was actively compliant – physical contact with Officers Dillon packing up his belongings to move and C.G. Brown or whether they acted and raising his hands in surrender. unprovoked. Williamson states: “Ofc. Thus, there would have been no need G. Brown grabbed me and I was to exert the level of force that Sgt. slammed on the floor. Ofc. Cl. Dillon Rodgers did and its use was not began to punch me with closed fist proportional. See Casey v. City of Fed. [sic].” See Williamson Aff. ¶ 14. Sgt. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Rodgers maintains: “Officers Dillon Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is excessive to use a and Brown grabbed [Williamson].” Taser to control a target without See Rodgers Aff. ¶ 8. And Officer C.G. Brown states: “Williamson began to FDW, 2017 WL 581324, at *5 fight myself and Officer Dillon.” See (W.D.N.C. Feb. 13, 2017) (Kingsley C.G. Brown Aff. ¶ 4. injury prong not satisfied where the plaintiff “suffered only minimal It is undisputed, though, that Sgt. injuries from the use of the TASER, Rodgers tased Williamson in the neck including a hole where the barb of the area. See Williamson Aff. ¶ 15; TASER pricked him and the pain ... Rodgers Aff. ¶ 9 (“I went to apply the from getting electrocuted. Plaintiff taser to his left arm, but he dropped did not require any medication from his head as he approached me, these injuries.”) (internal quotation causing the taser to catch him in the and citation omitted). left side of the neck area.”).5 Finally, as to the security threat And the record contains far more posed, the same issues of material fact information about the extent of the bubble up there as to the necessity of injury Williamson suffered from the the force exerted: it depends on second strike: he submitted ten sick whether Officers C.G. Brown and call requests between March 11 (the Dillon and Cpl. Kluk laid hands on a date of the taser strike) and April 11, passive or resistant detainee. This is a recounting symptoms related thereto. credibility issue that cannot be See Peach Aff. ¶¶ 17, 19, 21-22, 27, 31, resolved at this stage in the 33, 40, 42, 46. He also had two visits proceedings, and weighs against with Dr. Robinson during that same granting the motion for summary stretch wherein he recounted pain judgment as to Sgt. Rodgers and and numbness in the left side of his Officers C.G. Brown and Dillon. face related to the second taser strike and pain in his ankle (presumably In sum, construing the facts in the related to the way that Officers C.G. light most favorable to Williamson, a Brown and Dillon and Cpl. Kluk reasonable jury could return a verdict brought him to the ground). See in his favor on his § 1983 claim Peach Aff. ¶¶ 36, 44. Thus, while the against these three defendants. The care that Peach provided was Court should deny Sgt. Rodgers, responsive to his pain and Officer Dillon, and Officer C.G. constitutionally sound (as set forth Brown’s motion for summary infra), the sustained nature of judgment. Williamson’s complaints about the There remains the issue of Cpl. Kluk’s effects of this strike weighs against liability in his individual capacity. It is granting summary judgment. undisputed that he was present for Compare with Jones v. Henderson both tasing incidents, and that he Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 1:15-CV-132-

5 In her affidavit, Peach states that she Aff. ¶ 16. However, both Williamson and saw Williamson on March 11 and did not Sgt. Rodgers agree that the taser struck recall seeing any evidence that he the left side of his neck area at the very sustained injuries to his face. See Peach least. participated in bringing Williamson Robinette, 105 F.4th 99, 124 (4th Cir. to the ground by holding onto his foot. 2024) (quoting and citing Randall v. Williamson’s sick call requests often Prince George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, made reference to pain in his ankle, 204 and n.24). such that it was x-rayed. See Peach There remain factual disputes as to Aff. ¶¶ 33, 38, 44. whether Williamson physically Thus, while Williamson does not resisted officers attempting to move articulate the legal theory supporting him from one cell to the other. If a jury his claim against Cpl. Kluk, it could be accepted Williamson’s version of based upon participation in an events, Sgt. Rodgers tased Williamson unlawful assault and/or bystander unprovoked, and then tased him a liability. Williamson has alleged very second time after two other officers few facts as to the first theory of (Officers C.G. Brown and Dillon) liability, but the Court need not make assaulted him. Again, accepting a determination as to its viability Williamson’s account, Cpl. Kluk then because genuine issues of material still laid hands on him to bring him to fact remain under the bystander the ground. theory. A reasonable jury could thus find that To that end, the Fourth Circuit has Sgt. Rodgers violated Williamson’s recognized, as an outgrowth of constitutional right under the supervisory liability in Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment to be free of cases, that “in certain circumstances, excessive force as a pretrial detainee liability may attach to one who did not and that Cpl. Kluk had a reasonable personally inflict the excessive force.” opportunity to prevent that harm, See Wetherington v. Keil, 2025 WL specifically Sgt. Rodgers’s second 3035172, at *11 (E.D. Va. Oct. 30, deployment of the taser. And not only 2025) (citing Johnson v. Robinette, would that set of facts show that Cpl. 105 F.4th 99, 123–24 (4th Cir. 2024)). Kluk failed to act to intercede, but that “‘[A]n officer may be liable under § he participated in assaulting a passive 1983, on a theory of bystander detainee. liability, if he: (1) knows that a fellow Accordingly, because those issues of officer is violating an individual’s material fact remain as to Cpl. Kluk, constitutional rights; (2) has a the Court should deny his motion for reasonable opportunity to prevent the summary judgment as to him in his harm; and (3) chooses not to act.’ The individual capacity. ‘bystanding officer must know of his fellow officer’s misconduct .... If the D. The Court should grant Peach’s bystander lacks such specific motion for summary judgment. knowledge, he cannot be a participant Finally, Williamson alleges that Peach in the unlawful acts, and the violated his constitutional rights by imposition of personal liability is showing deliberate indifference to his impermissible.’” Johnson v. medical needs arising from the tasing incidents and ensuing scuffle that 2009) (finding, on summary took place on March 11. Because there judgment, that ulcer caused by taser are no genuine issues of material fact burn was not an “objectively serious as to this claim, the Court should medical need”), report and grant summary judgment in Peach’s recommendation adopted, 2009 WL favor, as she is entitled to relief as a 2045923 (S.D. Ga. July 13, 2009)). matter of law. The Court need not make a finding as As referenced above, for Williamson to whether the tasing and its to prevail on a deliberate indifference aftermath meet the Kingsley claim under the Fourteenth standard, though, because the Amendment, a jury would need to undisputed facts show that Peach did find that he had an injury that posed a not act intentionally, knowingly, or substantial risk of harm, Peach acted recklessly in failing to address intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly Williamson’s complaints. His medical in failing to act appropriately to records tell the opposite tale: every address it, she knew or should have time he submitted a sick call request, known that her inaction posed an it was answered, and both Peach and “unjustifiably high risk of harm,” and Dr. Robinson took multiple steps, that Williamson was, in fact, harmed. including examinations and the See generally Short v. Hartman, 87 prescription of painkillers, to address F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023). Williamson’s stated ailments. See, e.g., Richards v. Glover, No. 2:16-CV- A serious medical need is one that has 707-ALB, 2019 WL 2608366, at *11 been “diagnosed by a physician as (M.D. Ala. May 29, 2019), report and mandating treatment” or is “so recommendation adopted, No. 2:16- obvious that even a lay person would CV-707-ALB, 2019 WL 2606931 easily recognize the necessity for a (M.D. Ala. June 25, 2019) (granting doctor’s attention.” Scinto v. summary judgment to medical Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th providers on deliberate indifference Cir. 2016). Other courts have claim for care provided after prison determined that “minor burns and attack where providers “evaluated associated scarring” from tasing do [the plaintiff] after the … attack, not constitute a serious medical need prescribed medication to him in to support a deliberate indifference accordance with their professional claim. See Roebling v. City of judgment, and ordered x-rays to assist Tuscaloosa, Alabama, No. 7:14-CV- in their assessment and treatment of 151-SGC, 2015 WL 7433147, at *5 his injuries”). (N.D. Ala. Oct. 30, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 7:14- And Williamson’s “self-serving CV-151-RDP, 2015 WL 7424120 (N.D. assertion of deliberate indifference Ala. Nov. 23, 2015) (citing Hayward does not create a question of fact in v. Kile, No. CIV.A CV607-68, 2009 the face of contradictory, WL 2045925, at *8 (S.D. Ga. June 12, contemporaneously created medical requisite objective test. Accordingly, records.” See id. at *11 (citation to the extent that he would advance a omitted). This is because it is well- conditions of confinement claim settled that “[w]hen opposing parties against any of the defendants, in their tell two different stories, one of which individual or official capacities, the is blatantly contradicted by the defendants would be entitled to record, so that no reasonable jury judgment on those claims as a matter could believe it, a court should not of law. adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for F. Peach has not made a sufficient summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, showing to support her motion 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). to seal. Accordingly, because no reasonable Contemporaneous to filing her jury could conclude that Peach acted motion for summary judgment, Peach intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly filed a motion to seal the medical in failing to act appropriately to records associated therewith. See address the aftermath of the tasing Docket Entry 57. In support thereof, incidents, the Court should grant Peach notes the Court’s authority to summary judgment to Peach. seal materials pursuant to Local Rule 5.4, and her desire to present them as E. Any deliberate indifference exhibits to her motion without conditions of confinement violating federal and state claim fails as a matter of law. confidentiality statutes. Finally, a word about the toilet: The public has a long-established Williamson maintains in his sworn right of access to judicial records. affidavit, filed in opposition to the Nixon v. Warner, Commc’ns, Inc., defendants’ respective motions for 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Va. Dep’t of summary judgment, that the toilet in State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d the next-door cell, H-118, had been 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004). The right broken for approximately eight derives from two sources, the months prior to March 11. See Docket common law and the First Entry 61-1, ¶ 3. Amendment. United States ex rel. Oberg v. Nelnet, Inc., 105 F.4th 161, But Williamson sets forth no facts 170–71 (4th Cir. 2024). However, the indicating that the smell emanating right of access is not absolute and can from the toilet into his cell risked “a be rebutted. Rushford v. New Yorker, serious or significant physical or Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th emotional injury … or ... a substantial Cir. 1988). The burden of establishing risk of such serious harm resulting a right to limit public access is on the from ... exposure[,]” see Scinto v. party claiming the need for Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 229 n.3 confidentiality. Id. (4th Cir. 2016), that would satisfy the The common law right of access his or her medical information or applies to all judicial records but can status into issue, it is more difficult to be rebutted if “countervailing find that the party’s privacy interests interests heavily outweigh the public constitute a compelling interest that interests in access.” Id. The First outweighs the First Amendment right Amendment right of access is of access to documents, even if the narrower and applies only to documents are medical records.” See particular judicial records and Johnson v. City of Fayetteville, No. documents. Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 12–cv–456, 2014 WL 7151147, at *11– F.3d 246, 266 (4th Cir. 2014). To 12 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2014). As the overcome the right of access based on court noted in Musgrove in denying the First Amendment, a party must such a motion to seal in a deliberate show “a compelling governmental indifference case: interest” and that the restriction is “narrowly tailored.” Id. While the Court recognizes that medical records are ordinarily When documents are filed in kept confidential, that is not connection with a dispositive motion, always the case when those the “more rigorous First Amendment records are important to a standard ... appl[ies].” Va. Dep’t of lawsuit the patient himself has State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d brought. Mr. Musgrove has 567, 576 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining neither joined in the motion to that once documents produced in seal nor expressed any discovery are “made part of a concerns about the dispositive motion, they [have] lost confidentiality of the materials, their status as being raw fruits of indicating he has no discovery.”) (internal quotation and confidentiality concerns about citation omitted). Thus, Peach “must the limited records at issue. present specific reasons in support of [her] position.” See id. at 575. 2022 WL 19977408, at *2. This she does not do. See Musgrove v. Like Musgrove, Williamson has Moore, No. 1:19-CV-164, 2022 WL placed his medical condition squarely 19977408, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 20, at issue in his claim against Peach. He 2022) (“The defendants’ conclusory has not joined in her motion to seal, references to an assortment of and she has not identified, with the statutes and regulations does not specificity required, the justification establish these records are therefor. Accordingly, the motion to confidential or show a compelling seal is denied. interest to justify sealing.”) (citing Va. G. Williamson’s motion for a Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at 575). subpoena is denied. And “[f]ederal courts have recognized ... that where a party voluntarily puts Williamson has also filed a motion (W.D.N.C. 2002) (“[A] Rule 45 requesting that this Court issue a subpoena does in fact constitute subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of discovery.”) (citing cases). Civil Procedure 34 for Central Prison in Raleigh to produce his While courts have recognized that psychological records generated parties may occasionally use Rule 45 between November 19, 2025 and to “itemize[e] specific documents January 19, 2026. See Docket Entry necessary for use as exhibits at trial,” 60. In support thereof, Williamson see id., such is not the case here, states only the need “to substantiate where summary judgment motions findings of material fact.” See id. The were pending and Williamson North Carolina Department of Adult indicated his need for the subpoena to Corrections, which manages Central shed light on material facts, Prison, is not a party to this suit and presumably related to the motions for thus, service pursuant to Federal Rule summary judgment that were filed of Civil Procedure 45 would apply. See shortly before his motion.6 And “when Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c). a plaintiff ... is aware of the existence of documents before the discovery Both the moving defendants and cutoff date and issues discovery Peach oppose the motion. See Docket requests including subpoenas after Entries 62, 63. In so doing, the the discovery deadline has passed, moving defendants correctly note that then the subpoenas and discovery this Court entered a scheduling order requests should be denied.” See governing all discovery in the matter, McNerney v. Archer Daniels Midland including the date it would close, Co., 164 F.R.D. 584, 588 (W.D.N.Y. December 30, 2025. See Docket Entry 1995); see also Fleetwood Transp. dated 06/30/2025. Williamson filed Corp. v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. the instant motion on February 17, 1:11MC45, 2011 WL 6151479, at *2 2026, well over a month past that (M.D.N.C. Dec. 12, 2011) (“Upon the date, and after the defendants moved determination that a Rule 45 for summary judgment. As such, they subpoena constitutes discovery, argue that Williamson’s attempted courts have routinely held that said service of such a subpoena is subpoenas served outside of the untimely. And there is case law to discovery period are untimely.”). support that proposition. See Mortgage Info. Servs., Inc. v. Here, Williamson seeks a subpoena Kitchens, 210 F.R.D. 562, 566 for his own medical records starting

6 Williamson, in his reply to the fact,” phraseology that smacks of the defendants’ respective oppositions to his summary judgment standard. This motion for the subpoena, headlines one cursory reference to trial is an of his arguments as “Trial Preparation insufficient basis for the Court to grant Materials,” but had, in the original his motion. motion, referenced “findings of material in November 2025, prior to the the Local Rule and does not assist the December 30, 2025 conclusion of Court in its analysis. Accordingly, discovery. As such, he was “aware of Williamson’s surreply is struck. the existence of documents before the discovery cutoff date,” see McNerney, VI. CONCLUSION 164 F.R.D. at 588. Because IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED Williamson seeks discovery in this that the Court GRANT IN PART motion and that deadline has long AND DENY IN PART the motion since passed, his motion is denied. for summary judgment filed under Docket Entry 52 in that the Court H. The moving defendants’ DENY the motion as to defendants motion to strike Williamson’s Sgt. Rodgers, Officer C.G. Brown, surreply is granted. Officer Dillon, and Cpl. Kluk in their individual capacities and GRANT the After the defendants filed their motion as to all remaining respective replies to Williamson’s defendants. opposition to their motions for

summary judgment, he filed a IT IS FURTHER surreply. See Docket Entry 70. The moving defendants move to strike it. RECOMMENDED that the Court See Docket Entry 71. The Court will GRANT Joanna Peach’s motion for grant the motion. summary judgment filed under Docket Entry 54. Local Rules 7.3 and 56.1 govern motion practice as it relates to IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that summary judgment. Local Rule 7.6 Peach’s motion to seal, Docket Entry authorizes surreplies in limited 57, is DENIED. circumstances, arising from objections to evidence referenced in IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that replies supporting motions for Williamson’s motion for issuance of a summary judgment. If a moving party subpoena, Docket Entry 60, is raises such an objection in its reply DENIED. memorandum, the non-moving party may file a surreply addressing only IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the the evidentiary objection. See L.R. defendants’ motion to strike 7.6. Williamson’s surreply, Docket Entry 71, is GRANTED. Here, the defendants did not raise evidentiary objections in their reply briefs, and yet Williamson has filed an 18-page surreply, repeating the same factual allegations as his response in opposition to the respective motions for summary judgment. This violates The clerk is directed to unseal all sealed materials, Docket Entries 55, 55-1, and 55-2.

J it Gibson United States Magistrate Judge August 7, 2026