Torres v. Support Collection Unit

159 Misc. 2d 629
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 5, 1993
StatusPublished

This text of 159 Misc. 2d 629 (Torres v. Support Collection Unit) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Torres v. Support Collection Unit, 159 Misc. 2d 629 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1993).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Jane S. Solomon, J.

In this CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioner contends that respondent has improperly failed to limit its income executions against him to the portion of his income which exceeds the "self-support reserve”, or 135% of the Federal poverty level, while respondent asserts that the self-support reserve is inapplicable to parents in arrears in their child support obligations. A review of the relevant statutes and their legislative history supports respondent’s position.

THE SUPPORT ORDERS

Petitioner, Wilson Torres, is the father of two children, Jessilyn, age 4, and Wilson, age 3, whose mothers obtained Family Court orders of support directing petitioner to contribute certain sums to the support of the children. Respondent, Support Collection Unit (SCU), an entity within the New York City Department of Social Services Human Resources Administration, was established, pursuant to Social Services Law § 111-h, "to collect, account for and disburse funds paid pursuant to any order of child support”, and is enforcing the Family Court orders against petitioner.

Jessilyn’s mother, Nancy Rodriguez (Rodriguez), commenced her support proceeding in 1988, and obtained an order directing petitioner to pay $15 per week. In 1991, Wilson’s mother, Susanna Villegas (Villegas), obtained an order directing payment of $280 per month, including $12 per month for arrears.

Petitioner failed to make payments (because of an alleged [631]*631drug problem) and, as a result, a Family Court Hearing Examiner found him to be in default of both support orders, and SCU served two income executions on petitioner’s employer pursuant to CPLR 5241 (b). In response, in October 1992, petitioner sought modification of both orders of support. On November 18, 1992, a Hearing Examiner amended the Villegas support order from $280 per month to $95 biweekly, including $3 for arrears. On February 8, 1993, the Rodriguez support order was altered only by the addition of $2 weekly for new arrears. As a result, on March 10, 1993, SCU served two new income executions on petitioner’s employer which directed deductions of $195 and $134 biweekly, based on the Villegas and Rodriguez support orders respectively; the extra $100 in each is to enable petitioner to catch up on his large arrears.

Petitioner challenges these income executions on the ground that their enforcement has impoverished him.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

As a preliminary matter, it must be determined whether petitioner is barred from seeking judicial review of the income executions because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. SCU argues that petitioner did not notify it of any errors to his detriment pursuant to Family Court Act § 440 (1) (b),1 or of a mistake of fact, within 15 days, as provided in CPLR 5241 (e). Under that section, a debtor may only seek relief from the execution if he can establish a "mistake of fact”, narrowly defined in subdivision (a) (8) as "an error in the amount of current support or arrears or in the identity of the debtor or that the order of support does not exist or has been vacated”.2

Petitioner counters that he did not seek SCU’s review [632]*632because he was not notified as provided under CPLR 5241 (d).3 Although the statute does not require that petitioner receive notice, service must be attempted, and SCU does not provide any proof of such an attempt. Courts have vacated income executions where the notice requirements of CPLR 5241 clearly have not been met. (See, Cramer v Cramer, 140 AD2d 990 [4th Dept 1988]; Smith v Bowen, 135 Misc 2d 855 [Sup Ct, Saratoga County 1987].)

In any event, as petitioner argues, SCU’s review would be futile here since, as indicated in its answer to the petition, SCU denies that it must consider petitioner’s needs in determining the amount of the income taken. Furthermore, the objection raised by petitioner is not a "mistake of fact” as defined by CPLR 5241 (e), and is not ministerial in nature. Therefore, the petition is reviewed more appropriately by the court rather than SCU. (Cf., Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Sealy, 139 Misc 2d 563, 568 [Fam Ct, NY County 1987] [finding that SCU, rather than the court, should review objections to various income executions "(which) do not clearly lie within the CPLR 5241 (e) 'mistake of fact’ process * * * because the actions complained of are largely ministerial in nature”].)

SCU ENFORCEMENT

CPLR 5241 gives SCU authority to issue and enforce an income execution, without court intervention, when a debtor is in default.4 Subdivision (a) (7) defines a default as the failure to make three full payments, or total arrears equal to, or greater than, one month’s full payment. CPLR 5241 (b) provides that the amount deducted from a debtor’s income "shall be sufficient to ensure compliance with the direction in the order of support, and shall include an additional amount to be applied to the reduction of arrears.” The statute also provides that the amounts deducted from income shall not exceed 55% [633]*633of a debtor’s disposable earnings (or the earnings of a debtor after deductions of any amounts required by law) where, as here, a debtor supports more than one spouse or dependant child and has over 12 weeks of accumulated arrears.

Petitioner asserts, without any evidentiary support, that his biweekly net income is $471 and that his rent is $546 per month. The deductions based on the Villegas and Rodriguez support orders total $329 or almost 70% of petitioner’s biweekly net income. Yet, petitioner alleges that the deductions from his income equal the 55% statutory maximum (or $259.05 biweekly). Although neither party says so, this apparent discrepancy can be explained by reference to CPLR 5241 (h).5 Under CPLR 5241 (h), petitioner’s employer cannot withhold the full $329 from his paycheck but must apportion the amounts taken among petitioner’s creditors on a pro rata basis, up to the 55% statutory maximum. Accordingly, SCU’s income executions comply with the provisions of CPLR 5241, which permit it to take amounts beyond the orders of support to pay arrears, subject to the máximums contained in CPLR 5241 (g).

SELF-SUPPORT RESERVE

Petitioner asserts that SCU must consider his ability to pay whether or not the amount of income withheld falls within the statutory limits. In particular, petitioner argues that the income executions are invalid because the amount withheld leaves him with an income below the self-support reserve, defined in Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (b) (6) and Family Court Act § 413 (1) (b) (6) as 135% of the Federal poverty level or a net biweekly salary of $353.60 for 1992 and $361.88 for 1993. As applied to petitioner, no more than about $110 could now be withheld from his biweekly pay, or close to the base support obligations set by the Hearing Examiners before arrears are included. Petitioner’s argument is based on an interpretation of the legislative intent of the statutes at issue.

The New York State Support Enforcement Act of 1985, [634]*634which enacted CPLR 5241, was intended "[t]o improve child support enforcement and to comply with the Federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984[6

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

208 East 30th Street Corp. v. Town of North Salem
88 A.D.2d 281 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1982)
Cramer v. Cramer
140 A.D.2d 990 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1988)
Di Marco v. Hudson Valley Blood Services
147 A.D.2d 156 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1989)
Smith v. Bowen
135 Misc. 2d 855 (New York Supreme Court, 1987)
Commissioner of Social Services ex rel. Sealy v. Sealy
139 Misc. 2d 563 (NYC Family Court, 1987)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
159 Misc. 2d 629, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/torres-v-support-collection-unit-nysupct-1993.