Torres v. State

976 S.W.2d 345, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 5394, 1998 WL 543936

Opinions

OPINION

RODRIGUEZ, Justice.

Appellant, Olga Maricela Torres, was charged, by two separate indictments, with the murder of one of her sons and the attempted murder of another. A jury found her guilty and assessed punishment at forty-five and fifteen years in prison, respectively. The sentences are to be served concurrently. By two points of error, Torres challenges her convictions, alleging she conclusively established the affirmative defense of insanity. We affirm.

In the early morning hours of August 7, 1995, Torres entered the bedroom of her nine-year-old son, Steven Ray Torres, and shot and killed him. She next entered the bedroom of her twelve-year-old son, Willie Joe Torres, and shot him. The gunshot to Willie Joe was not fatal. After discovering what she had done, Torres’s parents, with whom she lived, called 911. A police officer arrived, wrested the gun from Torres, and arrested her. Torres was charged with murder and attempted murder.

Concerned with Torres’s mental state, the trial court appointed Dr. David Moron to ascertain Torres’s competence to stand trial. He and another psychiatrist examined her and opined that she was incompetent. Thereafter, a hearing was held, where a jury determined she was incompetent to stand trial. After spending approximately two months in a state hospital, Torres was reexamined and deemed competent to stand trial.

At trial, the only contested issue was whether Torres was legally insane when she committed the offenses. By its guilty verdict, the jury implicitly found Torres was sane at the time of the shootings.

By two points of error, Torres challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s implicit rejection of her insanity defense.

In examining the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an affirmative defense, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and sustain the challenge only if there is no rational basis upon which the jury could have rejected the defense’s contention. Cooney v. State, 803 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1991, pet. ref'd); Moranza v. State, 918 S.W.2d 718, 723 (Tex.App. — Waco 1995, pet. ref'd); Cover v. State, 913 S.W.2d 611, 619(Tex.App. — Tyler 1995, pet. ref'd). The fact finder is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded their testimony. Cooney, 803 S.W.2d at 425. Any inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. Id.

When we examine the factual sufficiency of the evidence on an affirmative defense, we consider all the evidence relevant to the issue at hand to determine whether the judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 154-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). In reviewing a factual sufficiency point of error, we must remain appropriately deferential to the trial court so as to avoid this Court substituting its judgment for that of the factfinder. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). It is the trier of fact who judges the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and it may resolve or reconcile conflicts in the testimony as it sees fit. Tex.Code Crim. Proo. ANN. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1994); Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 133. This Court may only reverse a jury’s findings if the verdict is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is “manifestly unjust,” “shocks the conscience,” or “clearly demonstrates bias.” Meraz, 785 S.W.2d at 154 n. 2; see also Clewis 922 S.W.2d at 135.

“To establish an insanity defense, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the offense, the defendant, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.” Ward v. State, 787 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref'd). The record reveals two psychiatrists testified that, in their respective opinions, appellant did not know right from wrong at the time of the offense. However, both psychiatrists also admitted a person affected by depression similar to the way in which appellant was affected could still know right from wrong. Dr. Moron testified appellant denied having any delusions, hallucinations, or other symptoms of losing touch with reality. He further testified appellant exhibited signs of organizational skills at the time of the offense. There was evidence appellant was worried that because of her father’s failing health, she would be unable to provide for her sons and her ex-husband might obtain custody of them. In fact, Dr. Moron testified that appellant’s conduct could be a result of her wanting to prevent such an occurrence. There was evidence appellant’s friend, Aida Cano, believed her to be “doing fairly well” the day before the offense. There was evidence appellant believed her sons “got what they deserved.” Additionally, evidence- suggests appellant may have attempted to muffle the sound of the firearm with a pillow. Finally, when appellant’s father went to call for help, appellant pleaded with him: “don’t call the police, Dad.”

Expert testimony on the issue of appellant’s ability to determine right from wrong does not establish insanity as a matter of law. Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). In fact, while expert testimony may be helpful to a jury, the issue of insanity is outside the purview of medical experts and should be left the discretion of the trier of fact. Id. at 952-53. The trier of fact may consider such evidence as the appellant’s demeanor before and after the offense, Schuessler v. State 719 S.W.2d 320, 329 (Tex.Crim.App.1986, en banc), overruled on other grounds, Meraz, 785 S.W.2d at 155, appellant’s attempts to evade police, Murray v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. 474, 182 S.W.2d 475, 477 (1945), attempts to conceal incriminating evidence, Schuessler, 719 S.W.2d at 330, appellant’s expressions of regret or fear of the consequences of her ac tions, Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 952, other possible motives for the offense, Schuessler, 719 S.W.2d at 330, and other explanations for appellant’s behavior. Id. While no one piece of evidence is dispositive, the record clearly shows controverting evidence as to whether appellant knew the difference between right and wrong. We find that a rational trier of fact could have resolved the conflicting testimony regarding legal insanity against appellant. Furthermore, the jury’s decision to disbelieve the insanity testimony was not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it was “manifestly unjust,” “shocked the conscience,” or “clearly demonstrated bias.” Both of appellant’s points of error are overruled.

The judgments of the trial court are AFFIRMED.

YANEZ, J., dissents joined by DORSEY, J.