F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 19 2000 TENTH CIRCUIT __________________________ PATRICK FISHER Clerk
MELISSA TORRES; CLIFFORD TORRES,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 98-1412 (D. Colo.) PUEBLO BOARD OF COUNTY (D.Ct. No. 97-S-1613) COMMISSIONERS,
Defendant-Appellee. ____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Clifford and Melissa Torres, husband and wife, brought suit alleging
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Colorado Constitution. 1 They contend
Mrs. Torres was terminated from her employment as a benefits specialist with the
County of Pueblo in retaliation for their union organizing activities and Mrs.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1 Defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado based on federal question jurisdiction. Torres’ marital association with Mr. Torres – rights protected by the First
Amendment. The Torreses appeal (1) the district court order dismissing Mr.
Torres’ First Amendment claims and Mrs. Torres’ claim against defendant
Jeanette O’Quin, and (2) the district court order granting the Board of County
Commissioners (“the Board”) summary judgment against Mrs. Torres’ First
Amendment claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm
both orders.
BACKGROUND
Mrs. Torres began working for Pueblo County in January 1991. When
terminated in October 1996, Mrs. Torres was the benefits specialist, responsible
for processing health insurance bills and administering the life insurance and
other benefit programs for county employees. Her supervisor was defendant
Jeanette O’Quin, the Director of the Department of Human Resources.
Mr. Torres has been a Pueblo County employee since July 1991. He works
in the Facilities Department as a maintenance worker. Id. Mr. Torres was the
principal organizer in unionizing that department in 1996, with encouragement
and assistance from Mrs. Torres. The Torreses allege Mrs. Torres was terminated
in retaliation for her and Mr. Torres’ union organizing activities. Defendants
-2- counter that Mrs. Torres’ employment was terminated for “11 occurrences of
falsifying telephone logs for long distance calls and 17 occurrences of placing
unauthorized personal long distance calls.”
ANALYSIS
Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal of Mr. Torres’ Claims
The district court dismissed Mr. Torres from this case in light of the
Torreses’ concession their complaint failed to allege a valid claim against either
defendant for the disciplinary action against Mr. Torres. 2 In their motion for
reconsideration before the district court, and now on appeal, the Torreses argue
the district court misconstrued the complaint as well as the intended scope of
their concession. The Torreses maintain that Mr. Torres pleaded and has not
conceded a First Amendment claim vis-à-vis his marital association with Mrs.
Torres and the financial injury he suffered as a result of her termination in
retaliation for his union organizing activities.
2 The Board approved a six-day suspension of Mr. Torres for allegedly taking forms from the Arts Center budget office without permission from his supervisor, for not following the proper chain of command “by discussing Capital request forms with [the] County Budget office,” and for failing “to properly call off work.” The Board ultimately rescinded Mr. Torres’ suspension for lack of a factual basis.
-3- We review the legal sufficiency of a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) de novo. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind , 173 F.3d 1226,
1236 (10th Cir. 1999.) “A 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 1236 (quotation marks and
citations omitted). We must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint
as true and view them in the light most favorable to the Torreses. Id. While we
must accept reasonable inferences derived from well-pleaded facts, we need not
accept mere conclusions characterizing pleaded facts or “unwarranted inferences
drawn from the facts or footless conclusions of law predicated upon them.”
Bryson v. City of Edmond , 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
The Torreses unequivocally conceded “the complaint does not allege a
valid claim against either Defendant for the disciplinary action against Clifford
Torres.” Moreover, the law is well settled Mr. Torres cannot utilize § 1983 as a
vehicle for derivative liability stemming from alleged discrimination directed at
Mrs. Torres. Trujillo v. Board of County Comm’rs , 768 F.2d 1186, 1187 (10th
Cir. 1985); cf. Horstkoetter v. Department of Pub. Safety , 159 F.3d 1265, 1279-
80 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating wives of highway patrol troopers ordered to remove
-4- political signs from private residence yards had standing only to raise the same
claims as their husbands, not independent claims). Consequently, the only
cognizable claim Mr. Torres could assert under the circumstances would be one
of marital association, see Trujillo , 768 F.2d at 1188-90; cf. Adler v. Pataki , 185
F.3d 35, 44 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding public employee could maintain claim based
on allegation that he was fired because of his wife’s employment discrimination
lawsuit against state, in violation of his First Amendment right of intimate
association) – a claim we believe Mr. Torres fully articulated for the first time on
appeal. Nevertheless, even liberally construing the Torreses’ complaint to
vaguely assert a marital association claim, we hold Mr. Torres utterly failed to
allege facts sufficient to support such claim. In this circuit “an allegation of
intent to interfere with a particular relationship protected by the freedom of
intimate association is required to state a claim under section 1983.” Trujillo ,
768 F.2d at 1190; see also Bryson , 905 F.2d at 1394 (“Nowhere in the complaint
is there an allegation that any claimed acts or omissions, however intentional,
occurred with the specific intent on the part of the defendants to deprive the
plaintiffs of their rights of association with the victims.”). The Torreses’
complaint does not allege intent on the part of defendants to deprive them of
their protected marital relationship. Therefore, the district court properly
-5- dismissed Mr. Torres’ claims. 3
Mrs. Torres’ First Amendment Claims
The district court granted summary judgment to the Board on Mrs. Torres’
First Amendment claims, applying the four-step analysis derived from Pickering
v. Board of Educ. , 391 U.S. 563 (1968), to her free association as well as her free
speech claims. The district court concluded (1) neither Mr. nor Mrs. Torres’
speech involved matters of public concern; (2) the defendants’ interests in
confidentiality and the propriety of Human Resources Department employees’
conduct outweighed Mrs. Torres’ alleged First Amendment interest in
participating in her husband’s union organizing activities; (3) Mrs. Torres failed
3 Mr. Torres argues if we uphold the dismissal of his claims, the district court should have allowed him to amend his complaint. We disagree. “After a responsive pleading, a party must seek leave of the court to amend by filing a motion.” Calderon v. Kansas Dep’t of Social & Rehabilitation Serv., 181 F.3d 1180, 1185 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). Mr. Torres’ statement at the end of his Motion for Reconsideration seeking “[i]n the alternative ... leave to amend the complaint to plead with greater specificity the causal relationship between the Plaintiffs’ protected activities and [Ms. O’Quin’s] motive for causing Melissa Torres to be terminated from her employment,” stated no grounds, let alone any particular grounds, for the request, and made no reference to a claim for interference with Mr. Torres’ right of marital association. Accordingly, that statement did not constitute a motion as contemplated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). Id. at 1186. Because a motion for leave to amend was never properly before it, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to address the Torreses’ request for leave to cure deficiencies in their complaint. See id. at 1187.
-6- to show her speech was a substantial or motivating factor for her discharge; and
(4) the Board sufficiently demonstrated it would have taken the same action
against Mrs. Torres even in the absence of her union organizing activities.
The Torreses argue the district court misapplied the Pickering test,
overlooked Mrs. Torres’ marital association claim, and failed to allow a jury to
weigh the evidence and make appropriate credibility assessments.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard as did the district court. In First Amendment cases, an appellate court has an obligation to make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriately granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Barker v. City of Del City , 215 F.3d 1134, 1137(10th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks
and citations omitted). Applying this standard, we affirm, albeit for slightly
different reasons than those articulated by the district court in granting summary
judgment. Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States , 724 F.2d 871, 880
(10th Cir. 1984) (explaining this court may affirm district court’s judgment on
grounds not relied on by district court if supported by the record), cert. denied ,
-7- 476 U.S. 482 (1986).
Associational Rights
Mrs. Torres asserts claims of retaliation in violation of her First
Amendment right of free association, citing specifically her right to participate in
union-related activities and her right to marital association. It is true the
Constitution protects an individual’s right to associate both “expressively” and
“intimately.” See City of Dallas v. Stanglin , 490 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1989). It is
also true courts are split as to whether the Pickering analysis applies to freedom
of association claims. Balton v. City of Milwaukee , 133 F.3d 1036, 1039-40 (7th
Cir. 1998); Gregorich v. Lund , 54 F.3d 410, 414 n.4 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
Schalk v. Gallemore , 906 F.2d 491, 498 n.6 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying public
concern test to identical free speech/free association claims in context of this
case, but recognizing that the public concern test “may be an inapt tool of
analysis” in other public employee/free association contexts). We need not
decide that issue here, however, because Mrs. Torres’ political association claim
as it pertains to her “union activity” 4 suffers a more fundamental flaw. Namely,
4 In mid-March 1996, Mrs. Torres suggested that Mr. Torres form a union of Facilities Department employees. In May 1996, Mrs. Torres called the local office of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (“the Union”) to inquire about the procedures for forming a union and relayed the information she received to her husband. Mrs. Torres later attended a union rally. On August 7 and 13, Mrs. Torres went
-8- Mrs. Torres was not organizing or joining a union on her own behalf. She simply
was assisting her husband’s efforts. Indeed, Mrs. Torres claims no membership
in or personal affiliation with the Union, except insofar as she is married to Mr.
Torres.
We agree Mrs. Torres has a right not to be discriminated against because of
her husband’s association with the Union. That right, however, is better asserted
in the context of a marital association or free-speech claim. See Adler , 185 F.3d
at 44. Any “association” Mrs. Torres has with Mr. Torres’ union is simply too
attenuated to warrant the protection she seeks. Cf. Stanglin , 490 U.S. at 25
(ruling the Constitution does not protect a “generalized right of ‘social
association’”); Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte , 481
U.S. 537, 545-50 (1987) (discussing the scope of associational rights protected
by the First Amendment vis-à-vis membership in Rotary International). We
decline the apparent invitation to consider any union-related activity per se
deserving of First Amendment/free association protection. On the record
presented here, we hold Mrs. Torres has failed to identify a union-related
to the Clerk and Recorder’s office, during office hours, to listen to tapes of public Board meetings to determine if the Board had discussed the Union’s request for an election. Here again, she simply intended to pass the information along to her husband.
-9- associational right protected under the First Amendment.
With regard to the alleged violation of Mrs. Torres’ right to marital
association, Mrs. Torres argues that she need prove nothing more than she was
terminated because of her marital relationship with Mr. Torres, and that she has
presented sufficient evidence of animosity toward Mr. Torres’ union activities to
create an inference she was terminated due to her marital relationship with her
husband. Such is not the law of this circuit. As noted above, a requisite element
of a marital association claim is the allegation and proof of a specific intent to
deprive the plaintiffs of their marital relationship. See Trujillo , 768 F.2d at 1190.
As further noted, the Torreses made no such allegation. Nor did Mrs. Torres
provide any evidence on summary judgment to demonstrate the defendants
intended to interfere with her marriage. Her marital association claim therefore
fails.
Free Speech Rights
To the extent Mrs. Torres might avoid the flaws in her free association
claims by characterizing her conduct as an exercise of free speech, the Pickering
-10- analysis clearly controls. 5 See Barker , 215 F.3d at 1137 (“Where a government
employer takes adverse action because of an employee’s exercise of his or her
right of free speech, we apply the balancing test from Pickering v. Board of
Educ .” (quotation marks and citations omitted).). Applying Pickering , we agree
with the district court that Mrs. Torres’ speech did not involve a matter of public
concern. If the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern,
there is no First Amendment violation and we need not examine the reasons for
Mrs. Torres’ termination. See Connick v. Myers , 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
Mrs. Torres points to the following activities as constitutionally protected
expression: “recommending (advocating) to her husband that he contact a union,
gathering information on how to start a union, gathering information from public
records (tapes) about why a union election had not been scheduled, and
expressing support for the union to her supervisor.” She argues her interest in
unionizing the Facilities Department was broader than a narrow self-interest
5 The Pickering analysis prescribes four inquiries: (1) does the speech in question involve a matter of public concern; (2) if so, does the employee’s interest in the expression outweigh the government’s interest in regulating the speech of its employees so that it can carry on an efficient and effective workplace; (3) was the speech a substantial factor driving the challenged governmental action; and (4) if so, can the employer show it would have taken the same employment action against the employee even in the absence of the protected speech. Barker, 215 F.3d at 1137.
-11- because she did not work in that department. She further claims she was
concerned for all the employees in that department, not just her husband. The
real crux of Mrs. Torres’ argument is her belief union organizing activity or
expression, by definition, touches on matters of public concern, and therefore
deserves First Amendment protection.
We are unwilling to hold that an employee’s speech or activity touches on
a matter of public concern merely because it is union-related. See Boals v. Gray ,
775 F.2d 686, 693 (6th Cir. 1985). Instead, we apply well-established precedent
defining “matter[s] of public concern” as those matters which can be “fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community.” Connick , 461 U.S. at 146. “To be protected speech, the expression
must sufficiently inform the issue as to be helpful to the public in evaluating the
conduct of government.” Withiam v. Baptist Health Care of Okla., Inc. , 98 F.3d
581, 583 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Stated
differently, “speech that seeks to expose improper operations of the government
or questions the integrity of government officials clearly concerns vital public
interests.” Curtis v. Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. , 147 F.3d 1200, 1212
(10th Cir. 1998) (quotation marks, citations and alteration omitted). “Speech
concerning individual personnel disputes or internal policies will typically not
-12- involve public concern.” Id. (citation omitted). The content of the speech is the
crux of our public concern inquiry. See Withiam , 98 F.3d at 583.
Considering, as we must, the content, form, motive and context of Mrs.
Torres’ communications, as revealed by the whole record, see David v. City &
County of Denver , 101 F.3d 1344, 1355 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied , 522 U.S.
858 (1997), we conclude the “speech” she claims is protected did not inform
public debate concerning government conduct or otherwise address matters of
political or social concern to the community. As the district court aptly noted,
Mr. and Mrs. Torreses’ concerns and union-related speech pertained specifically
to the management and working conditions in the Facilities Department. Their
union organizing effort was motivated by their desire, as county employees, to
change Mr. Torres’ working conditions. Mr. and Mrs. Torres made no allegation
and presented no evidence to suggest the Facilities Department was guilty of
wrongdoing or malfeasance, or was neglecting its responsibilities to the public.
Accordingly, Mrs. Torres’ First Amendment/free speech claim fails.
Qualified Immunity
The district court determined Ms. O’Quin enjoyed qualified immunity from
the Torreses’ claims because, applying a heightened pleading standard, the
-13- Torreses failed to allege facts sufficient to “sustain a conclusion that Defendant
O’Quin violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” As the district court noted, the complaint
alleged only that defendant O’Quin “requested approval from the Board of
County Commissioners to terminate” Mrs. Torres and “gave notice to” Mrs.
Torres regarding her termination.
The Torreses argue (1) the heightened pleading standard “cannot be
squared with the notice pleading requirement in [Fed.] R. Civ. P. 8(a) and
Supreme Court precedent, especially Crawford-El v. Britton , 523 U.S. 574
(1998)”; (2) the complaint alleged facts sufficient to establish a causal
connection between Ms. O’Quin’s conduct and the alleged discrimination; and
(3) the district court alternatively should have provided the Torreses an
opportunity to amend their complaint.
Ultimately, to overcome Ms. O’Quin’s claim of qualified immunity the
Torreses must establish (1) Ms. O’Quin’s actions violated a federal constitutional
or statutory right, and (2) the right violated was clearly established at the time of
the violation. See Ramirez v. Department of Corrections , ___ F.3d ___, 2000
WL 1140251, *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000). As we held above, Mrs. Torres’
-14- allegations of constitutional violations do not survive summary judgment.
Because Ms. O’Quin did not commit a constitutional violation, she could not be
denied qualified immunity. It is therefore unnecessary for us to further review
the propriety of the district court’s ruling concerning qualified immunity for Ms.
O’Quin, or further address the Torreses’ arguments regarding pleading
requirements. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833, 841-42 n.5
(1998) (“the better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified
immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged a
deprivation of a constitutional right at all”).
For all the foregoing reasons, the Torreses’ First Amendment claims fail
against both defendants as a matter of law.
AFFIRMED .
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY United States Circuit Judge
-15-