Torres v. Licon-Vitale

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 9, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-03787·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JONATHAN TORRES, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-3787 (LLS) WARDEN M. LICON VITALE; A.W. ORDER TO AMEND SKIPPER-SCOTT; CAPT. BIEZ; “JOHN DOE” MCC OFFICER WHO BROUGHT THE GUN TO UNIT 7 NORTH, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently detained at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (“MCC”), brings this pro se action, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights. The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). By order dated June 17, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 The Court grants Plaintiff leave to submit an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the

Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action using the Court’s prisoner complaint form for actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The following facts and assertions are taken from the complaint. On an unspecified date, a correction officer brought a gun into the facility and gave it to an inmate who was “a known gang member.” (ECF No. 1, at 4.) Because of the gun, MCC instituted a lockdown from March 2, to March 6, 2020, which ended when correction officers found the loaded gun. (Id.) “[E]veryone’s life was clearly in danger due to the officer bringing the gun in,” and

Plaintiff, who is “mentally [distraught],” traumatized, and “constantly thinking of [his] safety,” became even more traumatized. (Id.) He could not sleep and became “anti-social,” “think[ing] the worse of anyone next to” him. (Id. at 5.) Additionally, as a result of the lockdown, Plaintiff did not have “showers or cleaning supplies” for five days and had only “[one] hot meal a day.” (Id.) He was “housed with inmates who were sick and taken to hospitals with possible symptoms of COVID-19.” (Id.) Plaintiff also tried and failed for two months to obtain treatment for several injuries, including “back pains,” a “swollen jaw,” and a “broken tooth,” resulting from a fall off his bunk bed, which has no ladder. (Id.) Plaintiff sues four Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) officers: (1) Warden M. Licon-

Vitale, (2) former Acting Warden Shirley Skipper-Scott, (3) MCC Captain Biez, and (4) the John Doe officer who brought the gun into the jail. Plaintiff does not ask for a specific type of relief, but asserts, “I would have to speak to a lawyer before I state what I would like to happen.” (Id. at 5.) DISCUSSION The Court liberally construes the complaint as asserting that (1) Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated when a correction officer brought a gun into the facility, leaving Plaintiff “traumatized”; (2) the conditions of his confinement during the subsequent lockdown violated his constitutional rights; and (3) he was denied adequate medical care for his back pain, jaw, and broken tooth. (ECF No. 1, at 5.) A. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics Because Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by employees of the federal government, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (“[Bivens] is the federal analog to suits brought

against state officials under [§ 1983].”); Morales v. City of New York, 752 F.3d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that district court properly construed § 1983 claims brought against federal employee as arising under Bivens). To state a claim for relief under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege facts that plausibly show that: (1) the challenged action was attributable to an officer acting under color of federal law, and (2) such conduct deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution. See Thomas v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Torres v. Licon-Vitale, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Torres v. Licon-Vitale (Torres v. Licon-Vitale) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Davis v. Passman
442 U.S. 228 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Carlson v. Green
446 U.S. 14 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
A.Q.C. Ex Rel. Castillo v. United States
715 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Darnell v. City of New York
849 F.3d 17 (Second Circuit, 2017)
Ziglar v. Abbasi
582 U.S. 120 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Thomas v. Ashcroft
470 F.3d 491 (Second Circuit, 2006)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Morales v. City of New York
752 F.3d 234 (Second Circuit, 2014)
Turkmen v. Hasty
789 F.3d 218 (Second Circuit, 2015)