Torres v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedFebruary 28, 2023
Docket3:21-cv-01393
StatusUnknown

This text of Torres v. Commissioner of Social Security (Torres v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Torres v. Commissioner of Social Security, (prd 2023).

Opinion

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO MARICELYS TORRES,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil No. 21-1393 (BJM)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant. OPINION AND ORDER Maricelys Torres (“Torres”) seeks review of the Commissioner’s finding that she is not disabled and thus not entitled to disability benefits under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). 42 U.S.C. § 423. Torres contends that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) step five findings were not supported by substantial evidence. ECF Nos. 1, 12. The Commissioner opposed. ECF No. 14. This case is before me on consent of the parties. ECF Nos. 4-5. After careful review of the administrative record and the briefs on file, and for the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. STANDARD OF REVIEW After reviewing the pleadings and record transcript, the court has “the power to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner.” 20 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner and her delegates employed the proper legal standards and found facts upon the proper quantum of evidence. Manso- Pizarro v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), but are not conclusive when derived by ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or judging matters entrusted to experts. Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999); Ortiz v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991). “Substantial evidence means ‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Visiting Nurse Association Gregoria Auffant, Inc. v. Thompson, 447 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). The court “must affirm the [Commissioner’s] resolution, even if the record arguably could justify a different conclusion, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.” Rodríguez Pagán v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987). A claimant is disabled under the Act if she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Under the statute, a claimant is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity when she “is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In determining whether a claimant is disabled, all of the evidence in the record must be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3). Generally, the Commissioner must employ a five-step evaluation process to decide whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140–42 (1987); Goodermote v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 690 F.2d 5, 6–7 (1st Cir. 1982). In step one, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). At step two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If not, the disability claim is denied. At step three, the Commissioner must decide whether the claimant’s impairment is equivalent to a specific list of impairments contained in the regulations’ Appendix 1, which the Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, she is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If not, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)1 and determines at step four whether the impairments prevent the claimant from doing the work she has performed in the past. If the claimant is able to perform her previous work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If she cannot perform this work, the fifth and final step asks whether the claimant is able to perform other work available in the national economy in

1 An individual’s residual functional capacity is her ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) and 404.1545(a)(1). view of her RFC, as well as her age, education, and work experience. If the claimant cannot, then she is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). At steps one through four, the claimant has the burden of proving that she cannot return to her former employment because of the alleged disability. Santiago v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 944 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1991). Once a claimant has demonstrated a severe impairment that prohibits return to her previous employment, the Commissioner has the burden under step five to prove the existence of other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Ortiz v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 890 F.2d 520, 524 (1st Cir. 1989).

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