Torres-Mejia v. Howell

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 2, 2025
• Docket: 23-2344
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-2344 VICTOR TORRES-MEJIA, aka Victor Torrez-Mejia,* D.C. No. 2:18-cv-681 Petitioner-Appellee, MEMORANDUM** v.

JERRY HOWELL, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondents-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Richard Boulware, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 5, 2024*** San Francisco, California

Before: COLLINS, VANDYKE and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

* The Clerk is directed to correct the docket to reflect the correct spelling of Petitioner Torres-Mejia. ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 Respondents appeal the district court’s grant of Petitioner Victor Torres-

Mejia’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2253 and review de novo a district court’s decision to grant habeas

relief. Ochoa v. Davis, 50 F.4th 865, 876 (9th Cir. 2022). We reverse.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, governs our review of Torres-Mejia’s

petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322, 336 (1997). Under AEDPA’s

deferential standard, Torres-Mejia must demonstrate that the last reasoned state

court decision—here, the Nevada Supreme Court’s opinion—is “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). See Wilson v. Sellers,

584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018); Andrews v. Davis, 944 F.3d 1092, 1107 (9th Cir. 2019)

(en banc).

In this case, the district court concluded that the Nevada Supreme Court

unreasonably applied clearly established federal law regarding the right to counsel

when it affirmed the state court’s refusal to grant Torres-Mejia a continuance. A

state court’s decision unreasonably applies clearly established federal law if it

“correctly identifies the governing legal rule [from Supreme Court precedent] but

2 applies that rule unreasonably to the facts.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 426

(2014). “So long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree,’ with respect to a state

court’s determination that a claim lacks merit, federal habeas relief will not be

granted.” Dixon v. Ryan, 932 F.3d 789, 801 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)).

The federal law at issue here is the right to counsel of choice. The Supreme

Court has not outlined a precise rule for when the right to counsel of choice is

violated, but it has acknowledged that “[t]rial judges necessarily require a great

deal of latitude in scheduling trials.” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). A

trial court must “balanc[e] the right to counsel of choice against the needs of

fairness and against the demands of its calendar.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,

548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006) (internal citations omitted). “[O]nly an unreasoning and

arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for

delay’ violates the right to the assistance of counsel.” Morris, 461 U.S. at 11–12

(quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)).

Here, Torres-Mejia brought his request to continue the trial to substitute in

new counsel six days before trial. The state trial court considered more than mere

“expeditiousness,” noting that multiple attorneys had represented Torres-Mejia,

there had been many continuances, Torres-Mejia was represented by a competent

attorney, and the state had objected to the prior continuances. When the Nevada

3 Supreme Court affirmed, it identified the applicable Supreme Court precedent and

the state court’s reasons for denying the request.

Moreover, given the untimeliness of the request, it is not clear that the

request was “justifiable.” At a minimum, “fairminded jurists could disagree,”

Dixon, 932 F.3d at 801 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101), as to whether the

decision was “unreasoning and arbitrary,” id. at 805 (quoting Morris, 461 U.S. at

11–12). Accordingly, the Nevada Supreme Court’s rejection of Torres-Mejia’s

right-to-counsel-of-choice claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law, and thus the district court erred in granting Torres-Mejia’s

habeas petition.

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to deny the petition

for writ of habeas corpus.