Torres Hernandez v. Su

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 25, 2026
• Docket: 25-314
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 25 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAMON TORRES HERNANDEZ; No. 24-7365 FAMILIAS UNIDAS POR LA JUSTICIA, D.C. No. 1:20-cv-03241-TOR AFL-CIO, a labor organization,

Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM*

v.

JULIE A. SU, in her official capacity as United States Secretary of Labor; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT, named as Washington State Employment Security Department, CAMI L. FEEK, in her official capacity as Commissioner,

Defendants.

RAMON TORRES HERNANDEZ; No. 25-314 FAMILIAS UNIDAS POR LA JUSTICIA, AFL-CIO, D.C. No. 1:20-cv-03241-TOR

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. v.

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT, CAMI L. FEEK,

Defendants,

JULIE A. SU; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Defendants - Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 23, 2026 Seattle, Washington

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, W. FLETCHER, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Appellants Ramon Torres Hernandez and Familias Unidas por la Justicia

appeal from the district court’s order reducing their request for attorney fees under

the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The government

cross-appeals from the district court’s order finding that its position was not

substantially justified. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The parties

are familiar with the facts, so we do not recount them here.

I. Substantially Justified

Under the EAJA, prevailing parties are entitled to attorney fees unless “the

2 24-7365 position of the United States was substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(1)(A). The parties do not dispute that Appellants are prevailing parties.

Thus, the government bears the burden of showing that the agency’s underlying

conduct and its litigation position, even though not prevailing, were substantially

justified. Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 912 F.3d 1147, 1167–68 (9th

Cir. 2019). To establish substantial justification, the government needs to show

that its position was “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.”

Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).

The government failed to establish that its approach to the prevailing wage

survey was consistent with a reasonable interpretation of its own regulations and

was neither arbitrary nor capricious. See Meinhold v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 123 F.3d

1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1997) (“If the government’s position violates the Constitution,

a statute, or its own regulations, a finding that the government was substantially

justified would be an abuse of discretion.”). We affirm the district court’s holding

that the government’s position was not substantially justified.

II. Degree of Success

Where a prevailing party “obtained excellent results, [the] attorney should

recover a fully compensatory fee.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435

(1983). If, however, the party “achieved only partial or limited success,” the court

may reduce the requested fee award. Id. at 436. When analyzing the degree of

3 24-7365 success, the court must “focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by

the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id. at

435.

Appellants succeeded in obtaining relief on several of their claims and

secured injunctions against, and multiple amendments to, several years of

prevailing wage surveys. These outcomes protected millions of dollars in wages

for farmworkers. Appellants did not, however, achieve all of their stated goals, in

part due to the duplicative claims raised in their second motion for preliminary

injunction. Although Appellants may not have achieved the “excellent results”

necessary to receive a full fee award, their accomplishments were nevertheless

significant.

III. Fee Reduction

The district court is required “to provide a concise but clear explanation of

its reasons for the fee award.” Id. at 437. “[T]he larger the difference between the

fee requested and the fee awarded, the more specific articulation of the court’s

reasoning is expected.” Vargas v. Howell, 949 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 2020)

(citations and internal quotations omitted). Although we review the district court’s

fee determination for abuse of discretion, see Su v. Bowers, 89 F.4th 1169, 1177

(9th Cir. 2024), decisions applying “across-the-board percentage cuts” to “large fee

requests are subject to heightened scrutiny.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392,

4 24-7365 1399–400 (9th Cir. 1992). A clear explanation of a fee award is especially

important where the district court accepts the government’s recommended

percentage reduction. See id. at 1400.

Here, the government recommended, and the district court applied, an

across-the-board 75% reduction to Appellants’ $437,432.99 fee request, resulting

in a fee award of $109,358.25. The district court’s cursory, four-sentence

explanation was insufficient to support such a significant reduction, particularly in

light of the favorable results achieved. We conclude that a greater fee award is

justified, but we leave it to the district court to determine the amount in the first

instance.

We reverse and remand for an upward adjustment of the fee award and an

explanation that “consider[s] the relationship between the amount of the fee

awarded and the results obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. Costs are to be taxed

against the federal government parties.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.

5 24-7365