Torrence v. Blue

Opinion

2026 WL 2655158

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION

NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. A party wishing to cite such a decision in a brief or at oral argument should review Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Patrick H. TORRENCE, Appellant,

v.

Tyler BLUE, Appellee.

Supreme Court No. S-19303

September 9, 2026

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, Jason M. Gist, Judge. Superior Court No. 3SW-22-00031 CI

Attorneys and Law Firms

Patrick H. Torrence, pro se, Palmer, Appellant.

Tyler Blue, pro se, Seward, Appellee.

Before: Borghesan, Henderson, Pate, and Oravec, Justices. [Carney, Chief Justice, not participating.]

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT^*

I. INTRODUCTION

Star page 1*1 An inmate brought a civil claim for battery against another inmate almost three years after the events at issue took place. The defendant moved to dismiss the civil claim based on the two-year statute of limitations applicable to civil battery claims. The superior court granted the motion.

The suing inmate appeals, arguing that (1) the statute of limitations did not begin to run until he was notified of the availability of civil damages during the other inmate's criminal change-of-plea hearing; (2) AS 12.10.040(b) tolled the statute of limitations for the civil battery claim during the criminal prosecution of the other inmate; and (3) allowing the statute of limitations period to run before the suing inmate was aware of his claim violated his due process rights.

Concluding that the superior court did not err in applying the two-year statute of limitations, we affirm.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Facts

Patrick Torrence alleges that he was assaulted by Tyler Blue on or about July 15, 2019.¹ Both Torrence and Blue were inmates at Spring Creek Correctional Center at the time. Torrence received medical treatment for his injuries, including abrasions, bruising, and a concussion, and he reported the aggravation of a preexisting hip injury. Blue was criminally charged by the State of Alaska with assault in the fourth degree and pled guilty to the charge in October 2020.

B. Proceedings

Torrence filed a civil complaint against Blue on May 9, 2022. Torrence sued Blue for the crime of assault in the fourth degree under AS 11.41.230, seeking actual and punitive damages. He claimed that Blue “intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly caused physical injury to [Torrence].” Torrence stated the events at issue occurred “on or about” July 15, 2019.

In March 2023, Blue moved to dismiss the case. The superior court granted the motion, reasoning that the criminal statute Torrence cited as the basis of his complaint did not provide a private cause of action. Torrence appealed that decision, and we reversed, holding that Torrence's 2022 complaint set out the elements of the civil tort of battery, even if the complaint cited to the criminal assault statute.² We therefore remanded the case to the superior court.³

In accordance with the superior court's order following remand, Torrence filed an amended complaint on September 25, 2024 alleging the tort claim of battery. Blue filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that the two-year statute of limitations for a tort claim had lapsed prior to Torrence's original complaint. Torrence opposed the motion, arguing that he had been “litigating this case since July 2019” and any delay in filing was no fault of his own.

Star page 2*2 The superior court concluded that Torrence's claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations set out in AS 09.10.070⁴ and granted Blue's motion to dismiss. The court noted that Torrence's assertion that he had been “litigating this case since July 2019” was inaccurate because Torrence was not a plaintiff in the criminal case against Blue, which was brought by the State of Alaska. The court further concluded that Torrence was on notice of his civil claim for battery when he was assaulted by Blue in July 2019. Therefore, the court found that the two-year statute of limitations period began to run on July 15, 2019, and expired on July 15, 2021. Because Torrence did not file his civil claim until May 9, 2022, approximately ten months after the statute of limitations period had expired, the court granted Blue's motion to dismiss.

Torrence moved for reconsideration, arguing that the motion to dismiss was based on “incorrect dates and material facts” and that he was only notified of the possibility of filing for civil damages when the court informed him such a claim was available during Blue's criminal sentencing on October 29, 2020. The superior court denied Torrence's motion for reconsideration, reasoning that “a personal injury claim ordinarily accrues on the date the alleged injury occurs,” and therefore Torrence could not claim that the statute of limitations should instead have begun to run when Blue was sentenced in the criminal assault case.

Torrence appeals.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with the statute of limitations de novo.⁵ “We construe the complaint liberally, treating all factual allegations as true and ‘[making] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.’ ”⁶ Additionally, we “look upon the defense of statute of limitations with disfavor and will strain neither the law nor the facts in its aid.”⁷ A complaint should not be dismissed on the basis of the statute of limitations “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to some form of relief.”⁸

IV. DISCUSSION

Torrence raises three arguments on appeal: first, that the statute of limitations should have begun to run when he was informed of the availability of civil damages at the time of Blue's sentencing; second, that AS 12.10.040(b) provides for the tolling of the statute of limitations for his civil battery claim during Blue's prosecution for assault arising from the same conduct; and finally, that allowing the statute of limitations period to begin before Torrence was aware of his claim would violate his due process rights.

We evaluate each of these arguments and conclude that Torrence's claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in AS 09.10.070(a).

A. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Determining That The Statute Of Limitations Began To Run On July 15, 2019.

Torrence argues that he should be deemed on notice of his civil damages claim against Blue not on the date of the events at issue, July 15, 2019, but rather, on October 29, 2020, the date on which Blue pled guilty to assault and the sentencing magistrate informed Torrence that he could pursue a civil claim against Blue. Because Torrence was aware of the basic elements of his claim for battery when the events took place, though, we conclude that the superior court did not err in determining that the statute of limitations began to run at that time.

Star page 3*3 We evaluate questions regarding when the statute of limitations begins to run in light of the discovery rule.⁹ Under the discovery rule, “a cause of action accrues when a person discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the existence of all elements essential to the cause of action.”¹⁰ “[A] person reasonably should know of his cause of action when he has sufficient information to prompt an inquiry into the cause of action, if all of the essential elements of the cause of action may reasonably be discovered within the statutory period at a point when a reasonable time remains within which to file suit.”¹¹ “We adopted the discovery rule to protect plaintiffs from losing their cause of action when they have an injury that remained undiscovered or reasonably undiscoverable for longer than the limitations period.”¹²

Torrence essentially argues that he did not discover his civil claim for damages until he was explicitly notified that such a claim may be available. But we have applied the discovery rule in instances where a plaintiff was not aware, and should not reasonably have been aware, of the elements of the plaintiff's claim, not where a plaintiff simply did not ascertain the availability of civil damages.¹³ And we have held that “the discovery rule delays the start of the limitations period only until the plaintiff learns of ‘information sufficient to alert a reasonable person to the fact that he has a potential cause of action.’ ”¹⁴ The elements of a claim for civil battery are met “when an actor intends to cause harmful or offensive contact with another and an offensive contact results.”¹⁵ Torrence does not argue that he lacked notice of any of these elements in July 2019, but rather that he was not aware of the availability of civil damages until the magistrate judge presiding over Blue's change-of-plea and sentencing notified Torrence they may be available.

Because these facts viewed in the light most favorable to Torrence indicate he discovered that Blue intentionally acted to cause harmful contact with him in July 2019, we conclude that the superior court did not err in determining that the statute of limitations period began to run at that time.¹⁶ Therefore, because the statute of limitations period for the tort claim of battery is two years,¹⁷ and Torrence did not file his complaint until May 2022, his battery claim is barred.

B. The Statute Of Limitations Was Not Tolled During Blue's Prosecution For Assault.

Torrence next argues that under AS 12.10.040(b), Blue's prosecution for assault tolled the statute of limitations for his civil battery claim arising from the same conduct. However, because AS 12.10.040(b) pertains to the period of limitations for criminal prosecutions, not civil tort claims, it does not provide for the tolling of the statute of limitations for Torrence's civil battery claim.

Star page 4*4 Alaska Statute 12.10.040(b) states that “[t]he period of limitation does not run during any time when a prosecution against the accused for the same conduct is pending in this state.”¹⁸ However, we do not read the text of a statutory provision in isolation from the surrounding provisions.¹⁹ When interpreting the words of a statute, we “look to the particular language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”²⁰ “And ‘[w]hen a statute or regulation is part of a larger framework or regulatory scheme, even a seemingly unambiguous statute must be interpreted in light of the other portions of the regulatory whole.’ ”²¹

The text of AS 12.10.040(b) may appear unambiguous, but we must nonetheless interpret the provision “in light of the other portions of the regulatory whole.”²² Alaska Statute 12.10.040(b) is found in Title 12, Alaska's code of criminal procedure.²³ In Title 12's applicability provision, the legislature specified that “[t]he provisions of this title apply to all criminal actions and proceedings in all courts except where specific provision is otherwise made or where the Rules of Criminal Procedure adopted by the supreme court under its constitutional authority apply.”²⁴ In addition, the provisions immediately surrounding Alaska Statute 12.10.040(b) refer specifically to criminal prosecutions by the state.²⁵

The legislature specified that Title 12 applies to “criminal actions and proceedings,”²⁶ and the provisions surrounding AS 12.10.040(b) pertain exclusively to criminal proceedings,²⁷ so we conclude that AS 12.10.040(b) applies only to criminal proceedings as well. The statute does not provide for the tolling of the statute of limitations for Torrence's civil battery claim.

C. Torrence Did Not Suffer A Deprivation Of Due Process.

Torrence also cursorily argues that the superior court's dismissal of his complaint violated his due process rights. However, he did not develop any theory demonstrating that his due process rights were violated. We have previously explained that we will consider the pleadings of self-represented parties “liberally in an effort to determine what legal claims have been raised.”²⁸ But a self-represented party's argument will still be waived if the briefing does not allow this court to discern the party's argument, if it fails to cite authority for its assertions, or if it fails to provide a legal theory.²⁹ Torrence's brief due process argument fails to cite authority or to advance any particular legal theory.

Star page 5*5 Even if Torrence's due process argument was not waived, we see no basis in the record for an argument that he suffered a due process violation. The determination of when the statute of limitations begins to run is a decision made as a matter of law if there is no genuine factual dispute.³⁰ Here, the dates in question are not disputed. There are no disputes of fact impacting the application of the statute of limitations. And so no additional process was required for the superior court to determine when the statute of limitations began to run.³¹

And to the extent Torrence argues that the two-year statute of limitations in itself deprives him of due process, that argument also fails. We have previously held that the right to access the courts in order to pursue a personal injury claim is “important but not fundamental.”³² We have further held that a requirement restricting this right only violates due process when it “erects a direct and insurmountable barrier in front of the courthouse doors,”³³ such as direct prohibitions on filing suit or prohibitively high filing fees.³⁴ Here, Torrence presents no evidence that the two-year statute of limitations created such an “insurmountable barrier.”³⁵ Torrence does not dispute his awareness that Blue had injured him as of July 2019, when the events at issue took place. While he does indicate that he faced hardship in representing himself and managing the demands of other matters, he does not specify how this hardship prevented him from filing his civil case within the two-year period of limitation. We thus reject Torrence's argument that his due process rights were violated by the application of the two-year statute of limitations to his battery claim.

V. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the dismissal of Torrence's battery claim as barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in AS 09.10.070(a).

Footnotes

*

Entered under Alaska Appellate Rule 214.

1

For purposes of evaluating the motion are dismiss, the factual allegations in Torrence's complaint are presumed to be true and viewed in the light most favorable to Torrence, the nonmoving party. See Jackson v. Mun. of Anchorage, 375 P.3d 1166, 1170-71 (Alaska 2016).

2

Torrence v. Blue, 552 P.3d 489, 492 (Alaska 2024).

3

Id. at 495.

4

Alaska Statute 09.10.070(a) states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a person may not bring an action ... for ... battery ... unless the action is commenced within two years of the accrual of the cause of action.”

5

Jackson, 375 P.3d at 1170.

6

Id. at 1170 (alteration in original) (quoting Kaiser v. Umialik Ins., 108 P.3d 876, 879 (Alaska 2005)).

7

Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Solomon v. Interior Reg'l Hous. Auth., 140 P.3d 882, 883 (Alaska 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

8

Id. (quoting Larson v. State, Dep't of Corr., 284 P.3d 1, 6 (Alaska 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

9

Cameron v. State, 822 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Alaska 1991).

10

Id.

11

Id

12

Sopko v. Dowell Schlumberger, Inc., 21 P.3d 1265, 1270 (Alaska 2001).

13

See, e.g., Reasner v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 394 P.3d 610, 615-16 (Alaska 2017) (holding it was inappropriate to dismiss claim as barred by statute of limitations where there was material issue of fact regarding when plaintiff actually learned defendant's negligence possibly contributed to her injuries).

14

Sheldon-Lee v. Birch Horton Bittner, Inc., 565 P.3d 985, 995 (Alaska 2025) (“A plaintiff's ignorance of the law does not toll the statute of limitations; holding otherwise would allow plaintiffs to sue based upon stale facts so long as they only recently consulted an attorney.”).

15

Maddox v. Hardy, 187 P.3d 486, 498 (Alaska 2008).

16

See Sheldon-Lee, 565 P.3d at 995 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that she did not discover the elements of her malpractice cause of action until she met with malpractice attorney).

17

AS 09.10.070(a).

18

AS 12.10.040(b).

19

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 21 P.3d 344, 351 (Alaska 2001), overruled on other grounds by Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595, 598 n.4 (Alaska 2021); see also Millman v. State, 841 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska App. 1992).

20

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 21 P.3d at 351 (emphasis added) (quoting Homer Elec. Ass'n v. Towsley, 841 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Alaska 1992) (Compton, J., dissenting)).

21

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Millman, 841 P.2d at 194).

22

See id. (quoting Millman, 841 P.2d at 194).

23

See AS 12.05.010-12.85.020.

24

AS 12.85.010 (emphasis added).

25

See, e.g., AS 12.10.010 (providing time limitations applicable to prosecution of various offenses including murder, certain sexual offenses, and kidnapping); AS 12.10.020 (providing exceptions to general time limitations for prosecution of certain offenses); AS 12.10.030 (describing when period of limitations for criminal offenses begins to run and when prosecution has commenced).

26

AS 12.85.010.

27

See AS 12.10.010-030.

28

Toliver v. Alaska State Comm'n for Hum. Rts., 279 P.3d 619, 622 (Alaska 2012).

29

Casciola v. F.S. Air Serv., Inc., 120 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 2005).

30

Maness v. Gordon, 325 P.3d 522, 525 (Alaska 2014).

31

See id.; Jackson v. Mun. of Anchorage, 375 P.3d 1166, 1170 (Alaska 2016).

32

Maness, 325 P.3d at 527.

33

Id. at 528 (quoting Sands ex rel. Sands v. Green, 156 P.3d 1130, 1134 Alaska (2007)).

34

Id.

35

See id.

End of Document