Torrance Rogers v. The State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: March 13, 2024
• Docket: 2022-2047
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed March 13, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D22-2047 Lower Tribunal No. F05-12895 ________________

Torrance Rogers, Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida, Appellee.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Diana Vizcaino, Judge.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.

MILLER, J. In this Jimmy Ryce Act case, appellant, Torrance Rogers, a sexually

violent predator, challenges his involuntary civil commitment, imposed

pursuant to section 394.910, et seq., Florida Statutes (2022), after he was

found in violation of numerous provisions of his negotiated plea agreement.

Relying upon a myriad of reported decisions, Rogers contends the

commitment order is legally infirm because it is devoid of any express finding

his violations were willful. 1 The cases are inapplicable because they all

involve either probation violations based upon nonpayment of financial

obligations or so-called Quarterman agreements wherein the defendant

enters into a negotiated plea agreement but further agrees that if he or she

does not appear for sentencing, the trial court is authorized to impose a

greater lawful sentence than that specified in the plea agreement. See

Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380, 1381 (Fla. 1988); see also Johnson

v. State, 501 So. 2d 158, 160–61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (“[W]here timely

appearance for sentencing is made a condition of a plea agreement, a non-

willful failure to appear will not vitiate the agreement . . . .”); Selig v. State,

112 So. 3d 746, 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (holding defendant’s failure to

comply with probation conditions must be willful and not due to

1 We summarily reject the secondary assertion commitment was discretionary under the terms of the agreement.

2 “transportation, money, health, [or] housing problems”); King v. State, 268

So. 3d 936, 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (analyzing appellant’s challenge to

order finding him in violation of probation and reversing where “it was

undisputed that appellant failed to [comply] due to his lack of ability to pay”);

Faison v. State, 358 So. 3d 1274, 1277–78 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (reversing

where “no competent substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding

that [defendant] willfully violated his probation” when defendant testified that

he “did not have the funds”). In contrast, here, by the plain and unambiguous

terms of the plea agreement, the State agreed to suspend civil commitment

in exchange for the fulfillment of certain delineated requirements, including

participation in mentally disordered sex offender treatment and adherence to

reporting and disclosure obligations. Rogers, in turn, agreed that any

violation of the agreement would nullify the suspension. The agreement

contains an integration clause, and competent, substantial evidence

supports the finding that Rogers violated multiple material contractual

provisions. Accordingly, applying well-settled contractual principles, we are

dutybound to affirm the order under review. See Gering v. State, 252 So. 3d

334, 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“Jimmy Ryce proceedings are civil in nature

. . . .”); see also Garcia v. State, 722 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (“A

plea agreement is a contract and the rules of contract law are applicable to

3 plea agreements.”); Armstrong v. State, 985 So. 2d 1156, 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA

2008) (“Where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the

express terms control.”); Harrington v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 54 So. 3d

999, 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“Courts may not rewrite contracts, add

meaning that is not present, or otherwise reach results contrary to the

intentions of the parties.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State

Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 397, 403

(Fla. 4th DCA 1996)); S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hanft, 436 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla.

1983) (explaining intent is irrelevant in typical contract disputes unless

punitive damages are sought).

Affirmed.