Garcia v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Garcia v. State

704 So. 2d 1133, 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 429, 1998 WL 17473

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJanuary 21, 1998

DocketNo. 97-0348

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 704 So. 2d 1133 (Garcia v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Garcia v. State, 704 So. 2d 1133, 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 429, 1998 WL 17473 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998).

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Opinion

STONE, Chief Judge.

We affirm Appellant’s conviction and sentence for trafficking in cocaine. The sole issue is the trial court’s denial of a request for a special jury instruction on “guilty knowledge.”

In a prosecution for possession of illegal substances, the state must prove that the defendant knew the illicit nature of the substance possessed. Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996). Accordingly, the supreme court held that the defendant is entitled to a special jury instruction upon request, because the standard instruction does not specifically address guilty knowledge. Id. at 746.

Unlike the standard jury instruction for possession, the standard instruction for [1134]*1134trafficking in cocaine sufficiently charges the jury with the element of scienter. It instructs the jury that the defendant must have knowingly possessed a certain quantity of cocaine and intended to possess cocaine or a mixture containing cocaine. Therefore, it was not error to deny the requested additional instruction. See Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 697 So.2d 84, 86-87 (Fla.1997) (amending the standard instruction for possession to conform to Chicone, but not amending the trafficking instruction); see also Soirelus v. State, 698 So.2d 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Because Appellant was convicted of the higher offense, any error as to the instruction given for simple possession is harmless as moot.

GUNTHER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.

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STONE, Chief Judge.

We affirm Appellant’s conviction and sentence for trafficking in cocaine. The sole issue is the trial court’s denial of a request for a special jury instruction on “guilty knowledge.”

In a prosecution for possession of illegal substances, the state must prove that the defendant knew the illicit nature of the substance possessed. Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996). Accordingly, the supreme court held that the defendant is entitled to a special jury instruction upon request, because the standard instruction does not specifically address guilty knowledge. Id. at 746.

Unlike the standard jury instruction for possession, the standard instruction for [1134]*1134trafficking in cocaine sufficiently charges the jury with the element of scienter. It instructs the jury that the defendant must have knowingly possessed a certain quantity of cocaine and intended to possess cocaine or a mixture containing cocaine. Therefore, it was not error to deny the requested additional instruction. See Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 697 So.2d 84, 86-87 (Fla.1997) (amending the standard instruction for possession to conform to Chicone, but not amending the trafficking instruction); see also Soirelus v. State, 698 So.2d 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Because Appellant was convicted of the higher offense, any error as to the instruction given for simple possession is harmless as moot.

GUNTHER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.

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704 So. 2d 1133, 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 429, 1998 WL 17473, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garcia-v-state-fladistctapp-1998.

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