Torie G. Richardson v. Ricky D. Dixon, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Florida
DecidedOctober 2, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00243
StatusUnknown

This text of Torie G. Richardson v. Ricky D. Dixon, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (Torie G. Richardson v. Ricky D. Dixon, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Torie G. Richardson v. Ricky D. Dixon, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections, (N.D. Fla. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA GAINESVILLE DIVISION

TORIE G. RICHARDSON,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 1:25cv243-MW-HTC

RICKY D. DIXON, SECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

___________________________/

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Torie G. Richardson, proceeding pro se, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction in the Eighth Judicial Circuit in Alachua County Case Number 2018-CF-4263A. Doc. 1. Upon review of the petition and Memorandum of Law (Doc. 5), and after taking judicial notice of the relevant state court documents, the undersigned sua sponte recommends the petition be DISMISSED without an evidentiary hearing as UNTIMELY. It was filed almost two (2) years after the statute of limitations expired. I. STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 4 Under Habeas Rule 4, “[t]he clerk must promptly forward the petition to a judge under the court’s assignment procedure, and the judge must promptly examine it. If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rule 4 requires district courts to dismiss

§ 2254 petitions without ordering a response “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 651 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Paez v. Inch, 141 S. Ct. 309 (2020).

This preliminary review calls on a district court to screen the petition prior to service and dismiss the petition, sua sponte, upon a determination that it contains no meritorious claim for relief. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, R. 4 advisory committee notes (“it is the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications”).

The procedure serves to “eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer.” Id. A dismissal under Rule 4 may be appropriate both on the merits and upon a

finding that the petition is procedurally barred. Paez, 947 F.3d at 649. Specifically, a district court may sua sponte dismiss a § 2254 petition if it is clear the petition is untimely. Kilgore v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 519 F.3d 1084, 1089 (10th Cir. 2008); Jackson v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 292 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002) (per

curiam) (“even though the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the district court may review sua sponte the timeliness of the section 2254 petition”). II. THE PETITION IS UNTIMELY

Pursuant to the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a § 2254 petition must be filed within one year of “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1 However, the one-year period is tolled for “[t]he time

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). As discussed below, Richardson’s federal petition is untimely because the one-year statute of limitations period began to run in 2022 and expired in October

2023. Based on the electronic docket for Alachua County Case Number 2018-CF- 4263A2 and the petition, Richardson was convicted in March 2021, after a jury trial,

of lewd and lascivious conduct on a victim less than 12 years of age and battery. Doc. 1 at 1-2. On August 8, 2025, he submitted the instant federal petition to prison mail officials for filing. Doc. 1. In the petition, Richardson raises three challenges to the judgment and conviction: (1) the trial court erred in allowing child

1 Although there are other “trigger” dates under the AEDPA, none of those apply here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). 2 A federal court may properly take judicial notice of state court dockets. Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 652 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Paez v. Inch, 141 S. Ct. 309 (2020); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Thus, the undersigned will take judicial notice of Richardson’s state court records, available at https://www.alachuaclerk.org/lindas and https://acis.flcourts.gov. hearsay statements through the mother; (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve that issue for appeal; and (3) the prosecutor committed a Giglio / Brady violation by not providing the transcript of the mother’s deposition to defense until

the eve of trial. Id. The petition, however, is untimely. According to the petition and the state court dockets, Richardson filed a direct appeal of the judgment and conviction to the

First District Court of Appeal (“First DCA”) on August 31, 2021. See Doc. 1 at 3; First DCA number 2021-1022. On July 13, 2022, the First DCA issued a per curiam opinion affirming the judgment without written opinion. See id. Richardson admits he did not file a petition for rehearing, seek review with the Florida Supreme Court,

or seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Doc. 1 at 3-4. Therefore, Richardson’s conviction became final ninety (90) days later, on October 11, 2022. See Chamblee v. Florida, 905 F.3d 1192, 1198 (11th Cir. 2018) (“judgment

was final for purposes of triggering the AEDPA’s limitations period … when the 90- day window for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court seeking direct review of the First District Court of Appeal’s decision affirming his convictions and sentence expired”).

The AEDPA one-year limit began running the next day and expired on October 12, 2023. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Richardson states in the petition that he filed a Florida Rule 3.850 post-conviction motion on December 22, 2022,

that was denied on December 28, 2022. Doc. 1 at 4-5. Richardson is incorrect about those dates. A review of the state court dockets show that Richardson did not file any post-conviction motions between October 11, 2022, and October 12, 2023. The dockets do not show that Richardson filed any motion on December 22, 2022.3

Instead, according to the state court dockets, the first and only post-conviction motion Richardson filed was docketed on December 22, 2023,4 more than two months after the one-year statute of limitations period had expired, and was denied

on December 28, 2023. See Exhibit A, electronic docket sheet for Case No. 2018 CF 4263.

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Schriro v. Landrigan
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Kilgore v. Attorney General of Colorado
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Bluebook (online)
Torie G. Richardson v. Ricky D. Dixon, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/torie-g-richardson-v-ricky-d-dixon-secretary-of-the-florida-department-flnd-2025.