Topp's Mechanical, Inc.

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedNovember 23, 2021
Docket21-40038
StatusUnknown

This text of Topp's Mechanical, Inc. (Topp's Mechanical, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Topp's Mechanical, Inc., (Neb. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

IN THE MATTER OF: CASE NO. BK21-40038-TLS TOPP'S MECHANICAL, INC., CHAPTER 11 Debtor(s).

ORDER

This matter is before the court on the Subchapter V Trustee’s objection (Fil. No. 78) to confirmation of the debtor’s second amended Chapter 11 plan (Fil. No. 73). Hearing was held on September 22, 2021. Justin Eichmann and Ryan Dougherty appeared for the debtor; Trev Peterson appeared for American Exchange Bank; and James Overcash appeared as the Chapter 11 Subchapter V Trustee. The parties have now briefed the legal question at issue, and the matter is ready to be decided.

For the reasons set forth below, the trustee’s objection is sustained and confirmation is denied.

The issue presented to the court concerns the debtor’s proposed treatment of American Exchange Bank’s § 1111(b) election to have its under-secured claim treated as secured. The Subchapter V Trustee asserts that the plan is overly generous on the bank’s deficiency claim at the expense of other unsecured creditors.1 The parties agree that there are no factual issues in dispute and that all other confirmation requirements have been met. Further, the only objection to confirmation is the one filed by the Subchapter V Trustee.

The statutory basis for the trustee’s objection is 11 U.S.C. § 1191(b) which governs confirmation standards when a class of claims — here, the unsecured creditor class — has not accepted the plan and is impaired under the plan. Specifically, one of the standards in such a situation is that the court can confirm a plan only if it does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and equitable with respect to each impaired class that has not accepted the plan.2 11 U.S.C. §1191(c) defines the “fair and equitable” confirmation requirement. With respect to a non-consenting class of secured creditors, § 1191(c)(1) mandates that in order to be fair and equitable the plan must meet the requirements of § 1129(b)(2)(A), which includes the requirement that the non-consenting secured creditor receive payments totaling at least the allowed amount of its claim of a value that

1 The Subchapter V Trustee has standing to object to confirmation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1183(b)(3)(B), which provides that the trustee shall appear and be heard at any hearing that concerns confirmation of a plan.

2 The ballot report submitted by the debtor indicates that no member of the unsecured creditor class under the plan submitted a ballot. Therefore, the plan has not been accepted by the unsecured creditor class which is impaired under the plan. is at least the present value of its collateral. Here, however, the secured creditor has accepted the plan. Therefore, this confirmation standard is not directly applicable, although it is a factor in the trustee’s objection.

Instead, the non-consenting class here is the class of unsecured creditors for which 11 U.S.C. §1191(c)(2) defines “fair and equitable” to include the requirement that the debtor apply all of its disposable income for at least a three (3) year period for making payments under the plan and that the value of the plan distributions is not less than the debtor’s disposable income. The trustee believes that the debtor’s disposable income — and, therefore, distributions to unsecured creditors — is artificially low as a result of the debtor paying the bank’s claim more than is necessary under §§ 1111(b), 1191(c)(1), and 1129(b)(2)(A).

Section 1111(b)

Section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides in pertinent part:

(b)(1)(A) A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be allowed or disallowed under section 502 of this title the same as if the holder of such claim had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not such holder has such recourse, unless—

(i) the class of which such claim is a part elects, by at least two-thirds in amount and more than half in number of allowed claims of such class, application of paragraph (2) of this subsection;

* * *

(2) If such an election is made, then notwithstanding section 506(a) of this title, such claim is a secured claim to the extent that such claim is allowed.

(Emphasis added.)

Section 1111(b)(2) allows holders of certain partially secured claims to waive their unsecured deficiency claims and – § 506 notwithstanding – have their entire debt treated as a secured claim.

That statute is not as straightforward as it might seem, and courts continue to wrestle with it. In contrast to United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989), where the Supreme Court said a “’natural reading’ of § 506(b) of the Code expressed ‘Congress' intent . . . with sufficient precision so that reference to legislative history . . . is hardly necessary,’” § 1111(b)’s meaning is less readily ascertainable on its face. In re 222 Liberty Assocs., 108 B.R. 971, 978 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).

The fact that commentators such as Collier and other courts interpreting § 1111(b) all refer to the legislative history when construing the section, supports our belief that the language, or the “natural reading,” of the section is not so clear that reference to the legislative history is not necessary. See In re Realty Investments, Ltd. V, 72 B.R. 143, 145 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (the court “struggled with the language of § 1111(b)(1)(B)(ii) . . .”); and In re Woodridge North Apts., Ltd., 71 B.R. 189, 191 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987) (discussing § 1111(b), the court states that “[t]he language of the Bankruptcy Code does not provide a clear answer.”).

Id. at 978-79.

The legislative history of this section shows that when the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, Congress wanted to ensure that the value of a secured creditor’s claim was protected regardless of volatility in the value of the collateral.

. . . if a creditor loaned $15,000,000 to a debtor secured by real property worth $18,000,000 and the value of the real property had dropped to $12,000,000 by the date when the debtor commenced a proceeding under chapter 11, the plan could be confirmed notwithstanding the dissent of the creditor as long as the lien remains on the collateral to secure a $15,000,000 debt, the face amount of present or extended payments to be made to the creditor under the plan is at least $15,000,000 and the present value of the present or deferred payment is not less than $12,000,000 . . .

In re S. Missouri Towing Serv., Inc., 35 B.R. 313, 314 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (quoting Congressional Record, September 28, 1978, at H11104 reprinted in App 2 Collier on Bankruptcy IX–117 (15th ed.)).

The real benefit of the election is that it protects the creditor against a quick sale of its collateral. The amount of the creditor's secured claim may be determined at a time when the value of the collateral is temporarily depressed. Without the election, the debtor could sell the collateral when its value quickly rebounds and net a considerable gain. By making the election, the creditor guards against such an opportunistic sale because it retains a lien on the collateral equal to the full amount of its claim, albeit without interest.

First Fed. Bank of Cal. v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 227 B.R. 284, 295 n.12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998).

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Related

United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.
489 U.S. 235 (Supreme Court, 1989)
In Re Realty Investments, Ltd. V
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In Re Bloomingdale Partners
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In Re 222 Liberty Associates
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In Re Southern Missouri Towing Service, Inc.
35 B.R. 313 (W.D. Missouri, 1983)
In Re Woodridge North Apts., Ltd.
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In Re Pamplico Highway Development, LLC
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