Toombs v. Fortson

277 F. Supp. 821, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7508
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedDecember 8, 1967
DocketCiv. A. No. 7883
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 277 F. Supp. 821 (Toombs v. Fortson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Toombs v. Fortson, 277 F. Supp. 821, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7508 (N.D. Ga. 1967).

Opinion

ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

PER CURIAM.

The motion filed February 6, 1967, by the defendant Honorable Ben W. Fortson, Jr., for a “pre-trial conference” in this state of these proceedings is hereby denied.

This motion appears to be directed to a desire on behalf of defendant Fortson to provide an opportunity for the State Senate, as one of two chambers of the Georgia General Assembly, once more to justify its present method of apportionment.

In our order of April 1, 1965, we held, “the present plan of Senate apportionment in Georgia and the proposed plan of apportionment for the House of Representatives, separately and collectively, fall short of the mandate of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as construed by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, and related cases.” This order was not appealed by the defendants, and is final and binding both upon this court and upon all parties.

The most recent case by the Supreme Court dealing with the Florida legislature, Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 87 S.Ct. 569, 17 L.Ed.2d 501, #136, October Term, 1966, again makes plain the standard that was first announced in Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 84 S.Ct. 1449, 12 L.Ed.2d 620, in which the Court stated:

“The proper judicial approach is to ascertain whether, under the particular circumstances existing in the individual state whose legislative apportionment is at issue, there has been a faithful adherence to a plan of population based representation, with such minor deviations only as may occur in recognizing certain factors that are free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.” (Emphasis added.)

This court cannot give an advisory opinion in advance of the action of the General Assembly in carrying out the previous mandate of the court. However, we think it appropriate to state again that emphasis should be placed upon attaining as nearly mathematically equal representation as is practicable rather than upon seeking to justify deviations within certain arbitrary percentage tolerances.

GRIFFIN B. BELL, Circuit Judge:

OPINION AND ORDER

This court must again consider the question of the apportionment of the General Assembly of Georgia. This time we deal with final reapportionment. The details and past history of the problem will be found in our previous opinions: Toombs v. Fortson, N.D.Ga., 1962, 205 F.Supp. 248; Toombs v. Fortson, N.D. Ga., 1965, 241 F.Supp. 65; Toombs v. Fortson, N.D.Ga., 1966, 275 F.Supp. 128 [823]*823[opinion dated March 25, 1966], affirmed, Toombs v. Fortson, 1966, 384 U.S. 210, 86 S.Ct. 1464, 16 L.Ed.2d 482.

Our opinion and order of April 1,1965, as amended by the opinion and order of March 25, 1966, required that the Senate and House be apportioned in accordance with federal constitutional standards not later than May 1, 1967 with the apportionment to be effective for the 1968 primaries and general election for members of the Senate and House. In those decisions we approved interim reapportionment which had been accomplished in the Senate in 1962, Ga.Laws, 1962, extra sess., pp. 7, 14; and in the House in 1965, Ga.Laws, 1965, p. 127.

Faithful to our orders, the General Assembly modified both Senate and House apportionment at the regular 1967 legislative session, Ga.Laws, 1967, pp. 159, 187, in an effort to comply with federal constitutional standards. Secretary of State Fortson, acting through the Attorney General of Georgia, promptly moved for approval of the reapportionment plans provided in the legislation. Plaintiffs objected, contending that the legislation fails to comply with the court’s orders and fails to meet constitutional standards. Subsequently, we allowed two interventions, one on behalf of citizens of Douglas County and the other on behalf of citizens of Burke County. After a full hearing in which evidence was introduced in justification of the apportionment plans and after briefs and oral argument, the issue was submitted to the court.1

By way of preliminary summary we approve the proposed reapportionment in substantial degree. Some changes, however, will be necessary in both the Senate and House plans and these can be made at the 1968 regular session of the General Assembly. The changes in the senate plan will involve shifting four counties, Bryan, Effingham, Jones, and Rockdale. In the House, three additional seats must be found for DeKalb County and one seat for Douglas County which will be constituted as a separate district. Some shifting and recombination of counties will be necessary to provide these four seats and also to reduce population variances in other districts.

The suggested changes will provide apportionment plans whereunder the citizens of Georgia will be afforded substantial equality in legislative representation based on the 1960 census as adjusted to unusual population growth situations. We believe that the apportionment plans, as changed, will meet the equal protection of the law standard of the Constitution. They will then be approved for use pending receipt of the 1970 census which means, as a practical matter, until the 1972 primaries and general election. As we have made clear previously, the General Assembly must be reapportioned after each decennial census.

The disposition of the issues presented is somewhat complicated by the difference in the approaches to reapportionment taken by the Senate and House. The Senate based its reapportionment on 1960 population data but gave some weight to population trends and current population estimates. The House relied entirely on the 1960 census. Both, no doubt, had in mind our previous statement that a variance of more than 15 per cent,would hardly be justifiable. We were searching for a mathematical formula to be used in testing apportionment plans. We were careful then to say that a deliberate built-in variance of 15 per cent would not be proper. We stated the rule to be followed as “ * * * a good faith effort to meet the average [or norm] with departure only where necessary to afford individual representation to as many counties as possible.” Toombs v. Fortson, 241 F.Supp. at 70. We find that such a good faith effort has been made and that there is no deliberate built-in variance in either plan.

[824]*824No mathematical formula has been set by the Supreme Court in its supervening decisions by way of an allowable tolerance or variance from the one man-one vote doctrine. Rather the requirement continues to be that an apportionment plan must meet the norm as near as practicable and any substantial departure from the norm must be justified. Reynolds v. Sims, 1964, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506; Swann v. Adams, 1967, 385 U.S. 440, 87 S.Ct. 569, 17 L.Ed.2d 501; and Kilgarlin v. Hill, 1967, 386 U.S. 120, 87 S.Ct. 820, 17 L.Ed. 2d 771. We find no departure from the teaching of Roman v. Sincock, 1964, 377 U.S. 695, 84 S.Ct. 1449, 12 L.Ed.2d 620, where the court said:

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United States v. State of Georgia
351 F. Supp. 444 (N.D. Georgia, 1972)
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Bluebook (online)
277 F. Supp. 821, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7508, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/toombs-v-fortson-gand-1967.