Tonzip Maritime Ltd. v. Coral Energy Pte. Ltd.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedOctober 26, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-02283
StatusUnknown

This text of Tonzip Maritime Ltd. v. Coral Energy Pte. Ltd. (Tonzip Maritime Ltd. v. Coral Energy Pte. Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tonzip Maritime Ltd. v. Coral Energy Pte. Ltd., (E.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 TONZIP MARITIME LTD., No. 2:23-cv-02283-DJC-AC

12 Plaintiff, v. 13 ORDER CORAL ENERGY PTE. LTD., 14 Defendant, 15 and 16 ING BANK N.V., 17 Garnishee. 18

20 Pending before this Court is Plaintiff Tonzip Maritime Ltd.’s renewed ex parte

21 application for an order authorizing issuance of process of maritime attachment and

22 garnishment. (Re newed Appl. Maritime Attach. (ECF No. 12).) For the reasons set 23 forth below, the Court hereby DENIES this renewed application. 24 BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for a writ of maritime attachment and 26 garnishment on October 10, 2023, seeking to attach Defendant Coral Energy Pte. 27 Ltd.’s bank accounts allegedly held by Garnishee ING Bank N.V. in the Eastern District 28 of California (“District”). (See generally Appl. Maritime Attach. (ECF No. 5).) Plaintiff 1 sought attachment of Defendant’s assets in order to secure its claims brought against

2 Defendant on or about January 25, 2023 in the United Kingdom High Court of Justice

3 for breach of an agreement between the Parties under which Defendant chartered

4 Plaintiff’s vessel, a crude oil tanker, for a voyage from Russia to Turkey carrying at least

5 100,000 metric tons of oil (the “Charterparty Agreement”). (See Compl. (ECF No. 1).)

6 Plaintiff alleged that attachment was proper under Rule B of the Federal Rules of Civil

7 Procedure, Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims (“Rule B”)

8 because: (1) Plaintiff has a valid prima facie admiralty claim against Defendant for

9 breach of the Charterparty Agreement,1 (2) Defendant cannot be found within the

10 District, (3) Defendant has a bank account held by Garnishee who has an agent

11 located in the District, and (4) there is no statutory or maritime bar to the attachment.

12 (Appl. Maritime Attach. ¶¶ 1–6.) Plaintiff also filed accompanying applications for

13 appointment of a special process server (ECF No. 6), immediate issue of the

14 attachment order (ECF No. 7), and expedited judicial review (ECF No. 8).

15 On October 12, 2023, the Court denied Plaintiff’s applications via a Minute

16 Order because Plaintiff “failed to provide the Court with any evidence of Defendant's

17 accounts, or proof that Garnishee has an agent located in the Eastern District.” (ECF

18 No. 11.) Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiff’s “allegations alone have failed to

19 satisfy the Court that Defendant, a Singapore company, has accounts held with

20 Garnishee, an international bank, that ‘can be found within the district’ as required by

21 Rule B.” (Id.) The Court denied Plaintiff’s application, however, without prejudice to

22 renewal of the application if accompanied by additional evidence as described in the

23 Minute Order. (Id.)

24 1 The Charterparty Agreement is maritime in nature. Fednav, Ltd. v. Isoramar, S.A., 925 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir. 1991) (“It is well -established that a charter party agreement is a maritime contract.” (citations 25 omitted)). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), federal district courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.” As the Charterparty Agreement is a maritime 26 contract, the Court is satisfied that it has admiralty jurisdiction over this matter. See Jack Neilson, Inc. v. Tug Peggy, 428 F.2d 54, 55–57 (5th Cir. 1970); Flota Maritima Browning De Cuba v. Snobl, 363 F.2d 27 733, 735–36 (4th Cir. 1966); Natasha, Inc. v. Evita Marine Charters, Inc., 763 F.2d 468, 470 (1st Cir. 1985); Cary Marine, Inc. v. Motorvessel Papillon, 872 F.2d 751, 754–55 (6th Cir. 1989). 28 1 Plaintiff renewed their ex parte application for a writ of maritime attachment

2 and garnishment on October 17, 2023, providing additional evidence in the form of

3 (1) a letter from Garnishee to Plaintiff confirming that Defendant holds accounts with

4 them, and (2) a current search of Garnishee on the Office of the California Secretary of

5 State website confirming that Garnishee has an agent located within the District.

6 (Renewed Appl. Maritime Attach., Ex. A (ECF No. 12-1); id., Ex. B. (ECF No. 12-2).)

7 Plaintiff also renewed their applications for appointment of a special process server

8 (ECF No. 12-5) and immediate issue of the attachment order (ECF No. 12-6).

9 LEGAL STANDARD

10 “The power to grant maritime attachments in admiralty is an inherent

11 component of the admiralty jurisdiction given to the federal courts under Article III of

12 the Constitution.” Transportes Navieros Y Terrestes, S.A. de D.V. v. Fairmount Heavy

13 Transp. N.V., No. 07-cv-3076-LAP, 2007 WL 1989309, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2007). In

14 order to secure attachment of a maritime defendant's property under Rule B, the

15 plaintiff must establish each of the following: (1) the plaintiff has a valid prima facie

16 admiralty claim against the defendant; (2) the defendant cannot be found within the

17 district; (3) the defendant's property may be found within the district; and (4) there is

18 no statutory or maritime law bar to the attachment. See Equatorial Marine Fuel Mgmt.

19 Servs. PTE v. MISC Berhad, 591 F.3d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 2010). Through attachment

20 of a defendant's property in the district, a court gains jurisdiction over the defendant's

21 person, and the plaintiff can gain a judgment against the defendant up to the value of

22 the property attached. See Limonium Mar., S.A. v. Mizushima Marinera, S.A., 961 F.

23 Supp. 600, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). “The rule is a formal recognition of the common law

24 principle that attachment of a defendant's property was often the only way to gain

25 jurisdiction over an admiralty or maritime defendant.” Id.

26 Thus, a Rule B attachment has a dual purpose: obtaining personal jurisdiction

27 over an absent defendant and securing collateral for a potential judgment in plaintiff's

28 favor. See Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd. v. Gardner Smith Pty Ltd., 460 F.3d 434, 437 (2d 1 Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi

2 Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. mini en banc 2009). Because jurisdiction

3 over the person is gained only through the attached property, courts have recognized

4 that Rule B jurisdiction properly is characterized as quasi in rem. See Teyseer Cement

5 Co. v. Halla Maritime Corp., 794 F.2d 472, 476–77 (9th Cir. 1986) (collecting cases). It

6 is well established that a district court can obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over

7 property situated within its geographical borders.

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Tonzip Maritime Ltd. v. Coral Energy Pte. Ltd., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tonzip-maritime-ltd-v-coral-energy-pte-ltd-caed-2023.