Tonnesha Kidd v. Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington, Etc.

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3424-23

TONNESHA KIDD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LOURDES MEDICAL CENTER OF BURLINGTON, LOURDES TRADING AS VIRTUAL WILLINGBORO HOSPITAL,

Defendant-Respondent. ___________________________

Argued May 5, 2026 – Decided July 24, 2026

Before Judges Sumners and Augostini.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-0786-23.

Tonnesha Kidd, appellant, argued the cause on appellant's behalf.

Janice G. Dubler argued the cause for respondent (Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, PC, attorneys; Janice G. Dubler, on the brief).

PER CURIAM In September 2018, self-represented Tonnesha Kidd sued Lourdes

Medical Center at Burlington and Lourdes Trading As Virtual Willingboro

Hospital (collectively Lourdes) for claims arising from her termination of

employment.1 A year later, the parties reached a settlement and release

agreement providing that Lourdes pay Kidd $14,000 in exchange for her

"releas[ing] and discharg[ing] [Lourdes] . . . of any and all claims, charges,

causes of action, or liabilities of any nature whatsoever . . . as of the date of this

[a]greement" including but not limited to claims such as breach of contract,

discrimination, harassment or retaliation, and injunctive relief; Kidd agreed to

not seek future employment with Lourdes Medical Center; the parties agreed to

keep the terms and monetary amounts of the agreement confidential; Kidd

agreed to "not disparage [Lourdes] including any of [its] employees"; and both

parties agreed that the settlement agreement was "the entire [a]greement

concerning the settlement of the disputes described above, and that no

representations or inducements" had been used to secure the agreement.

1 Lourdes removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. On May 3, 2019, the district court dismissed Kidd's federal retaliation claim, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state law claims, denied her motion to remand, and closed the federal action. See Kidd v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cty., No. 18-16250, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74771 at *2, *10-11 (D.N.J May 3, 2019). A-3424-23 2 In April 2023, Kidd, again self-represented, sued Lourdes alleging claims

of: (1) promissory estoppel, (2) breach of contract, (3) breach of the covenant

of good faith and fair dealing, (4) fraud, (5) intentional infliction of emotional

distress (IIED), (6) and "retaliation pursuant to New Jersey statu[t]e." She also

requested injunctive relief for these violations. Two months later, Kidd

amended her complaint to include claims of: (1) breach of oral contract, (2)

fraudulent inducement, (3) fraudulent misrepresentation, (4) invasion of

privacy, and (5) retaliation in violation of the New Jersey Law Against

Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to - 50, and "Section 19812 under [New Jersey]

. . . law." Kidd's claims related to the settlement agreement. Lourdes

subsequently moved under Rule 4:6-2(e) to dismiss the first amended complaint

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

On September 13, after hearing argument on September 8, the motion

judge entered an order granting Lourdes' motion to dismiss without prejudice

and allowing Kidd to file a second amended complaint no later than December

2 Kidd does not cite the state law. Based on her past federal actions against Lourdes, she is likely referring to Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Kidd v. Lourdes Med. Ctr., No. 19-12115, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134850, at *1-2 (D.N.J. July 20, 2021).

A-3424-23 3 8. Kidd complied by filing a second amended complaint, adding claims of unjust

enrichment and intrusion upon seclusion.

Lourdes responded by moving under Rule 4:6-2(e) to dismiss the second

amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Kidd opposed the motion and cross-moved for leave to file a third amended

complaint. A day after argument and rendering his bench decision, the judge

issued orders on April 26, 2024, granting Lourdes' motion to dismiss Kidd's

second amended complaint with prejudice and dismissing Kidd's cross-motion.

Kidd moved for reconsideration. On June 11, the motion judge decided the

motion on the papers, issuing an order denying reconsideration.

Before us, Kidd argues the motion judge erred in granting Lourdes' motion

to dismiss her second amended complaint because she made "multiple

cognizable claims" supported by a "paramount of probative evidence" after the

judge held that she needed to provide more specific information in a third

amended complaint. She also avers that, contrary to Rule 4:6-2(e), the judge

improperly considered evidence outside the pleadings, such as documents and

affidavits that Lourdes attached to its motion. In doing so, she contends the

judge should have applied the summary judgment standard and permitted her to

conduct discovery.

A-3424-23 4 Deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim "is limited to

examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint."

Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451 (2013) (quoting Printing Mart-

Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). "'[T]he

complaint [is searched] in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the

fundament[al] . . . cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure

statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary. '" Printing

Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746 (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l

Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)). Based upon our de novo review

of the motion to dismiss, State by Comm'r of Transp. v. Cherry Hill Mitsubishi,

Inc., 439 N.J. Super. 462, 467 (App. Div. 2015), we disagree with Kidd's

contentions and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the motion

judge.

Initially, we stress that, when deciding Lourdes' motion to dismiss, the

motion judge applied the proper standard in considering documents and facts

that are a matter of public record and the litigation's history. As the judge

correctly explained at oral argument, the motion to dismiss was not converted

into a summary judgment motion because the settlement agreement, which

Lourdes submitted with its certification, was "something that is in the complaint

A-3424-23 5 and . . . case law . . . indicates that when . . . you're talking about a document

that's . . . undisputed as to its existence, it doesn't change the standard of review ."

See Myska v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458, 482 (App. Div. 2015)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (holding that "a [motion judge]

may consider documents specifically referenced in the complaint without

converting the motion into one for summary judgment" and "matters of public

record, and documents that form the basis of a claim"). Likewise, the judge

fittingly reasoned that Lourdes' submission of the September 8, 2023 argument

transcript didn't change the standard because it was "not a new document that is

extraneous to the case."

As to Kidd's second amended complaint claims, the judge properly found

that she failed to set forth claims upon which relief can be granted. Regarding

her breach of contract claim, it lacked merit because nowhere in the settlement

agreement did Lourdes agree to cease harassing or discriminating against her.

In fact, the settlement agreement provided that for receiving $14,000, Kidd

agreed to "forever release and discharge" Lourdes from any harassment,

discrimination, and defamation claims, among other legal claims. Considering

that Lourdes did not agree to cease harassment or discrimination, it did not

breach any settlement agreement terms. Similarly, Kidd's oral contract claim

A-3424-23 6 fails as the settlement agreement was an integrated agreement; any prior oral

statements that contradict the terms of the agreement are irrelevant. Restatement

(Second) of Conts. § 213, cmt. a (A.L.I. 1981).

Kidd's promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims were properly

dismissed. "'[Q]uasi-contract liability [should] not be imposed . . . if an express

contract exists concerning the identical subject matter.'" Shalita v. Twp. of

Washington, 270 N.J. Super. 84, 90 (App. Div. 1994) (second alteration and

omission in original) (quoting Suburban Transfer Serv. v. Beech Holdings, Inc.,

716 F.2d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 1983)). Under the settlement agreement's clear

terms, Kidd released Lourdes from any further harassment or discrimination

claims. Kidd's unjust enrichment claim contradicts the facts—she benefited

from this settlement agreement to the tune of $14,000 in exchange for releasing

Lourdes from future legal claims—and fails to show how Lourdes received a

benefit and how retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust.

Moreover, Kidd's promissory estoppel allegations are conclusory. She fails to

specify who represented to her that an anti-harassment provision would be

included in the settlement agreement, when Lourdes made these representations,

or any facts that could support her assertions. Permitting Kidd to conduct

discovery to formulate a factual basis for her claims is not grounds to defeat

A-3424-23 7 dismissal. See Camden Cty. Energy Recovery Assocs. L.P. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't

Prot., 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (App. Div. 1999) ("Discovery is intended to lead

to facts supporting or opposing an asserted legal theory; it is not designed to

lead to formulation of a legal theory."). Thus, without a factual basis for her

promissory estoppel claim, Kidd's arguments fail to overcome the motion to

dismiss threshold. See Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co. Inc., 317 N.J. Super.

574, 582 (App. Div. 1998) ("[P]leadings reciting mere conclusions without

facts . . . do not justify a lawsuit.").

Kidd's claims for violation of the good faith and fair dealing covenant

were properly dismissed for similar reasons. She argues that "[Lourdes] acted

in bad faith by misleading [her] into entering negotiations by promising no

further harassment" but fails to explain how and on what occasions Lourdes

acted in bad faith in securing the settlement agreement. As the motion judge

aptly observed, "there's nothing esoteric or so complicated in settling a case for

$14,000" and Kidd failed to show how "the requirement of paying out $14,000

in exchange for release was not performed in good faith." Therefore, the judge

properly dismissed these claims as conclusory.

Kidd's fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation claims lack merit

despite the additional facts she pleads. She contended that Lourdes induced her

A-3424-23 8 to sign the settlement agreement by representing it would include an anti-

harassment provision and only settle state claims. However, she fails to

articulate who made these representations and whether the representations were

oral or written. Furthermore, Kidd fails to show how Lourdes even caused the

harassment that she allegedly experienced. We agree with the judge that "the

causation is completely lacking and no amount of further pleading is going to

improve the speculative quality of why Lourdes is somehow arranging for

[Kidd's] parking tickets in Philadelphia." 3

Kidd's claims for invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, and IIED

were properly dismissed by the motion judge. Regarding her privacy claim,

Kidd fails to identify specific private information that Lourdes disseminated to

the public—merely alleging that Lourdes hired a private investigator is

insufficient. Her intrusion upon seclusion and IIED allegations are also

conclusory, alleging no facts as to how Lourdes committed the torts, and fails to

articulate a causal connection between the Lourdes' conduct and her emotional

distress.

3 Kidd alleged that Lourdes continued to harass her after the settlement agreement by causing her to incur one hundred parking tickets in Philadelphia. A-3424-23 9 The motion judge properly dismissed Kidd's discrimination claims. The

settlement agreement specifically precludes these claims as Kidd agreed to

release Lourdes from any future claims including harassment, discrimination,

and retaliation. As to its merits, Kidd fails to draw a causal connection between

Lourdes' conduct and her one hundred parking tickets, housing issues, issues

with creditors, and other "misfortunes" purportedly caused by Lourdes.

Kidd's demand for injunctive relief is without merit. Such relief is only

ordered where there is an "extraordinary equitable remedy" based on clear and

convincing proof. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Sparta Tp. v. Serv. Elec. Cable

Television of New Jersey, Inc., 198 N.J. Super. 370, 379 (App. Div. 1985).

Kidd's conclusory allegations that "[Lourdes] continue[d] to harass [her]" after

the settlement agreement and "irreparable injury will continue" in the absence

of an injunction, is not supported by any factual assertions.

Kidd also seeks reversal of the orders denying her leave to file a third

amended complaint. The judge did not abuse his discretion in issuing either

order. See Port Liberte II Condo. Ass'n, Inc., v. New Liberty Residential Urb.

Renewal Co., LLC, 435 N.J. Super. 51, 62 (App. Div. 2014) ("[A] [motion

judge's] decision to grant or deny a motion to amend the complaint" is reviewed

"for abuse of discretion.").

A-3424-23 10 Rule 4:9-1 requires that a motion for leave to amend be granted

"'liberally'" by considering "whether the non-moving party will be prejudiced,

and whether granting the amendment would nonetheless be futile." Notte v.

Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 501 (2006) (internal citation omitted). The

judge thoroughly detailed the complaint's deficiencies and allowed Kidd to

submit a second amended complaint. Yet, Kidd's second amended complaint

was largely similar to her first amended complaint and, as noted, contained

conclusory allegations. At the motion argument to dismiss her second amended

complaint, it was evident that Kidd failed to set forth a factual basis showing a

causal connection between her alleged injuries and Lourdes' conduct.

Lastly, Kidd argues the judge erred in denying reconsideration of the

dismissal of her second amended complaint. The judge did not abuse his

discretion in denying her relief. See Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J.

567, 582 (2021) ("[Motion judge's] denial of plaintiff's motion for

reconsideration" is reviewed under the "abuse of discretion" standard). Rule

4:49-2 provides that "a motion for . . . reconsideration . . . shall state with

specificity . . . the matters or controlling decisions that counsel believes the

[judge] has overlooked or as to which it has erred . . . ." Kidd repeated the same

arguments that were unsuccessfully advanced in opposition to the motion to

A-3424-23 11 dismiss. Because she failed to show any law or facts that the judge overlooked,

there was no basis to reconsider his ruling.

To the extent we have not addressed any of Kidd's arguments, it is because

they lack sufficient merit to be discussed in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-3424-23 12