BISTLINE, Justice.
The issue presented to us for determination in this controversy is whether an administrative agency may create or amend policy without being subject to rulemaking procedures. The Administrative Procedure Act (IDAPA) in effect at times pertinent to this controversy, I.C. § 67-5201 et seq., required all agency rules to be promulgated according to the procedural requirements set out in I.C. § 67-5203. The 1986 legislature amended IDAPA to exempt from the definition of a rule the interpretations of the agency relative to existing or proposed rules. I.C. § 67-5201(7) “1986 amendment.” 1 We conclude that Health & Welfare’s “hands-on” policy, the subject of Tomorrow’s Hope’s challenge, is an interpretation of an existing rule, IDAPA 16.03.-10253, which was duly promulgated by the agency and, accordingly, is enforceable against Tomorrow’s Hope.
BACKGROUND
Tomorrow’s Hope, Inc., is a non-profit intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR) which receives Medicaid funds under the reimbursement system administered by Health & Welfare under Title 56, Chapter 1, Idaho Code. In accordance with Title 56, Health & Welfare groups together participating facilities which offer similar services and divides their per diem costs by the number of patient days provided by the facility. Facilities are then ranked on the basis of per diem costs, and each facility’s allowable costs are then reimbursed up to a “percentile cap.” Certain costs are exempt from this percentile cap. Among these exemptions are certain costs “peculiar” to the care of the mentally retarded. I.C. § 56-110(a)(1).2
The statute states that peculiar costs are to be determined in accordance with the Provider Reimbursement Manual. I.C. § 56-110(a)(l). The manual, promulgated as a rule, accordingly provides that peculiar or “unique” costs are “direct care costs” of mentally retarded residents. IDAPA 16.03.10253. The rule then elaborates on what these costs are: direct care services required by law to be provided to ICF/MR residents, except direct physician care costs, services, and supplies which are [845]*845not unique to ICF/MR patients. Subsequently, as agency auditors questioned what costs were included within the definition of direct care, Health & Welfare issued an internal memorandum construing direct care as meaning “hands-on” services only.
In its final audit for Tomorrow’s Hope, Health & Welfare determined, pursuant to the policy declared in its internal memorandum, that Tomorrow’s Hope’s exempt costs included only hands-on costs. Tomorrow’s Hope challenged this determination, arguing that the hands-on interpretation was a rule and unenforceable unless promulgated pursuant to IDAPA. At a contested administrative hearing, the hearing officer recommended that Health & Welfare’s final audit determinations regarding Tomorrow’s Hope’s reimbursement be affirmed. Health & Welfare subsequently adopted in full the hearing officer’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended decision.
On appeal, the district court reversed because it found that Health & Welfare’s decision exempting only hands-on costs amounted to rulemaking which, under IDA-PA, is subject to rulemaking procedures which were not followed. In determining under what circumstances a departmental change in policy amounts to rulemaking, Judge Bail relied on her interpretation of two Supreme Court decisions, Bingham Memorial Hosp. v. Idaho Dep’t. of Health & Welfare, 112 Idaho 1094, 739 P.2d 393 (1987),3 and Minidoka Memorial Hosp. v. Idaho Dep’t. of Health & Welfare, 108 Idaho 344, 699 P.2d 1358 (1985),4 which address the issue of when agency action is subject to rulemaking procedures under IDAPA. The court below thus found that Health & Welfare’s denial of reimbursement for the disputed costs could not be enforced against Tomorrow’s Hope, because the agency had not complied with IDAPA.
DISCUSSION
The key question in this case is whether Health & Welfare’s hands-on policy is an interpretation of the statutory term “peculiar” or of the regulatory term “direct care costs.” If it is the latter, it is exempt from rulemaking requirements under I.C. § 67-5201(7) because it would be merely an interpretation of an existing rule. If, on the other hand, it is an attempt to redefine the legislative directive to exempt “peculiar” costs, Health & Welfare would be, in effect, creating a new rule without having properly promulgated it.
The trial court found that it is not the label which Health & Welfare places on the action which it takes, rather “it is the substance of what the Department has purported to do” which is decisive. Here, said the lower court, the hands-on policy actually serves to interpret the statutory language of “costs peculiar to such care” contained in I.C. § 56-110(a)(l). We do not agree that in this case Health & Welfare’s hands-on definition amounted to a fundamental, significant change in interpretation of “peculiar” costs. We find that the hands-on policy is merely a refinement of, and is essentially consistent with, its earlier direct care definition.
In reaching its conclusion that Health & Welfare’s action amounted to rulemaking, the district court employed principles of federal administrative law, following the analysis in Bingham and Minidoka. The court attempted to determine whether this was a “legislative” or an “interpretive” rule under the standard of the federal APA.5 The court concluded that, regard[846]*846less of its format, an agency interpretation which has a general and prospective effect is a legislative rule and must therefore be promulgated pursuant to the IDAPA.
The district court’s analogy to federal law is inapposite because the 1986 amendment to IDAPA addresses this precise subject. I.C. § 67-5201(7) states:
‘Rule’ means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or prescribes law or interprets a statute as the statement applies to the general public. The term ... does not include ... (C) intra-agency memoranda, or ... (E) any oral or written statement given by an agency which pertains to any interpretation of an existing or proposed rule ...
The amendment intentionally uses language different from the federal APA and instead of distinguishing “legislative” from “interpretive” rules, the 1986 amendment specifically exempts from the definition of a rule inter-agency memos and interpretations of existing or proposed rules. The amendment clearly eliminates the legislative rule/interpretive rule distinction and obviates the need for analogizing to federal administrative law as a means of statutory construction.
For the same reasons, we must disagree also with the district court’s reliance on Bingham and Minidoka. Although these cases were prior to the 1986 amendment, the district court reasoned that the 1986 amendment to IDAPA served to codify the results of Bingham and Minidoka. Bingham, 112 Idaho 1094, 739 P.2d 393, and Minidoka,
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BISTLINE, Justice.
The issue presented to us for determination in this controversy is whether an administrative agency may create or amend policy without being subject to rulemaking procedures. The Administrative Procedure Act (IDAPA) in effect at times pertinent to this controversy, I.C. § 67-5201 et seq., required all agency rules to be promulgated according to the procedural requirements set out in I.C. § 67-5203. The 1986 legislature amended IDAPA to exempt from the definition of a rule the interpretations of the agency relative to existing or proposed rules. I.C. § 67-5201(7) “1986 amendment.” 1 We conclude that Health & Welfare’s “hands-on” policy, the subject of Tomorrow’s Hope’s challenge, is an interpretation of an existing rule, IDAPA 16.03.-10253, which was duly promulgated by the agency and, accordingly, is enforceable against Tomorrow’s Hope.
BACKGROUND
Tomorrow’s Hope, Inc., is a non-profit intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR) which receives Medicaid funds under the reimbursement system administered by Health & Welfare under Title 56, Chapter 1, Idaho Code. In accordance with Title 56, Health & Welfare groups together participating facilities which offer similar services and divides their per diem costs by the number of patient days provided by the facility. Facilities are then ranked on the basis of per diem costs, and each facility’s allowable costs are then reimbursed up to a “percentile cap.” Certain costs are exempt from this percentile cap. Among these exemptions are certain costs “peculiar” to the care of the mentally retarded. I.C. § 56-110(a)(1).2
The statute states that peculiar costs are to be determined in accordance with the Provider Reimbursement Manual. I.C. § 56-110(a)(l). The manual, promulgated as a rule, accordingly provides that peculiar or “unique” costs are “direct care costs” of mentally retarded residents. IDAPA 16.03.10253. The rule then elaborates on what these costs are: direct care services required by law to be provided to ICF/MR residents, except direct physician care costs, services, and supplies which are [845]*845not unique to ICF/MR patients. Subsequently, as agency auditors questioned what costs were included within the definition of direct care, Health & Welfare issued an internal memorandum construing direct care as meaning “hands-on” services only.
In its final audit for Tomorrow’s Hope, Health & Welfare determined, pursuant to the policy declared in its internal memorandum, that Tomorrow’s Hope’s exempt costs included only hands-on costs. Tomorrow’s Hope challenged this determination, arguing that the hands-on interpretation was a rule and unenforceable unless promulgated pursuant to IDAPA. At a contested administrative hearing, the hearing officer recommended that Health & Welfare’s final audit determinations regarding Tomorrow’s Hope’s reimbursement be affirmed. Health & Welfare subsequently adopted in full the hearing officer’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended decision.
On appeal, the district court reversed because it found that Health & Welfare’s decision exempting only hands-on costs amounted to rulemaking which, under IDA-PA, is subject to rulemaking procedures which were not followed. In determining under what circumstances a departmental change in policy amounts to rulemaking, Judge Bail relied on her interpretation of two Supreme Court decisions, Bingham Memorial Hosp. v. Idaho Dep’t. of Health & Welfare, 112 Idaho 1094, 739 P.2d 393 (1987),3 and Minidoka Memorial Hosp. v. Idaho Dep’t. of Health & Welfare, 108 Idaho 344, 699 P.2d 1358 (1985),4 which address the issue of when agency action is subject to rulemaking procedures under IDAPA. The court below thus found that Health & Welfare’s denial of reimbursement for the disputed costs could not be enforced against Tomorrow’s Hope, because the agency had not complied with IDAPA.
DISCUSSION
The key question in this case is whether Health & Welfare’s hands-on policy is an interpretation of the statutory term “peculiar” or of the regulatory term “direct care costs.” If it is the latter, it is exempt from rulemaking requirements under I.C. § 67-5201(7) because it would be merely an interpretation of an existing rule. If, on the other hand, it is an attempt to redefine the legislative directive to exempt “peculiar” costs, Health & Welfare would be, in effect, creating a new rule without having properly promulgated it.
The trial court found that it is not the label which Health & Welfare places on the action which it takes, rather “it is the substance of what the Department has purported to do” which is decisive. Here, said the lower court, the hands-on policy actually serves to interpret the statutory language of “costs peculiar to such care” contained in I.C. § 56-110(a)(l). We do not agree that in this case Health & Welfare’s hands-on definition amounted to a fundamental, significant change in interpretation of “peculiar” costs. We find that the hands-on policy is merely a refinement of, and is essentially consistent with, its earlier direct care definition.
In reaching its conclusion that Health & Welfare’s action amounted to rulemaking, the district court employed principles of federal administrative law, following the analysis in Bingham and Minidoka. The court attempted to determine whether this was a “legislative” or an “interpretive” rule under the standard of the federal APA.5 The court concluded that, regard[846]*846less of its format, an agency interpretation which has a general and prospective effect is a legislative rule and must therefore be promulgated pursuant to the IDAPA.
The district court’s analogy to federal law is inapposite because the 1986 amendment to IDAPA addresses this precise subject. I.C. § 67-5201(7) states:
‘Rule’ means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or prescribes law or interprets a statute as the statement applies to the general public. The term ... does not include ... (C) intra-agency memoranda, or ... (E) any oral or written statement given by an agency which pertains to any interpretation of an existing or proposed rule ...
The amendment intentionally uses language different from the federal APA and instead of distinguishing “legislative” from “interpretive” rules, the 1986 amendment specifically exempts from the definition of a rule inter-agency memos and interpretations of existing or proposed rules. The amendment clearly eliminates the legislative rule/interpretive rule distinction and obviates the need for analogizing to federal administrative law as a means of statutory construction.
For the same reasons, we must disagree also with the district court’s reliance on Bingham and Minidoka. Although these cases were prior to the 1986 amendment, the district court reasoned that the 1986 amendment to IDAPA served to codify the results of Bingham and Minidoka. Bingham, 112 Idaho 1094, 739 P.2d 393, and Minidoka, 108 Idaho 344, 699 P.2d 1358. To the contrary, we believe that the 1986 amendment limited these cases. Had the legislature wanted to indicate its approval of the analysis used in Bingham and Mini-doka, it would have reiterated their approach by borrowing from the terminology of the federal APA as many states have done. We are persuaded that this was not its intention since it deliberately chose different language from the federal statute.
We acknowledge that the difficult problem which the 1986 amendment presents us with is determining when a purported interpretation of a rule actually amounts to a re-defining of the original statutory directive. Being unable at this point to isolate specific categories of agency interpretations which would amount to rules, we recognize that this issue will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that Health & Welfare’s hands-on interpretation did not effect a substantive change in direction from the agency’s existing direct care policy. Nor is it fundamentally inconsistent with the agency’s earlier accounting practices. We therefore find that the hands-on policy is a clarification of the term “direct care costs.” It is not an attempt to re-define “peculiar.” This is, then, an interpretation of an existing rule rather than promulgation of a new rule. As such, it falls directly within the definition of what is not a rule under the terms of the 1986 amendment, and accordingly, is not subject to the promulgation, requirements of I.C. § 67-5203.
Respondent’s request for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-1176 is denied. Costs to appellant.
McDEVITT, C.J., and JOHNSON and TROUT, JJ. concur.