Tom and Sally's Handmade Chocolates, Inc. v. Gasworks, Inc.

977 F. Supp. 297, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14251, 1997 WL 574933
CourtDistrict Court, D. Vermont
DecidedAugust 19, 1997
Docket2:97-cv-00113
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 977 F. Supp. 297 (Tom and Sally's Handmade Chocolates, Inc. v. Gasworks, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Tom and Sally's Handmade Chocolates, Inc. v. Gasworks, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 297, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14251, 1997 WL 574933 (D. Vt. 1997).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

SESSIONS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Tom and Sally’s Handmade Chocolates, Inc. (“Tom and Sally’s”) brings this action for trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 et seq. Defendant Gasworks, Inc. (“Gasworks”) filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or alternatively, to transfer the case to the Southern District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are assumed to be true for purposes of the pending motion. Tom and Sally’s is a Vermont corporation based in *299 Brattleboro, Vermont, which has manufactured and distributed specialty chocolates and chocolate products since 1989. The company has a retail store and also manufactures products for sale at wholesale. Tom and Sally’s exhibits its products at trade shows throughout the United States and also sells by mail order. Since May 11,1993, Tom and Sally’s has held the registered trademark No. 1,770,301, for “Chocolate Body Paint” chocolate sauce.

Defendant Gasworks is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida, with its principal place of business in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. The company distributes, through national trade shows and by mail order, a variety of novelty products and food items, most of which are sexually suggestive in nature. Gasworks recently began marketing its own “Chocolate Body Paint” and “Bebes Chocolate Body Paint” products.

Tom and Sally’s alleges that Gasworks is infringing on its “Chocolate Body Paint” trademark by offering for sale an apparently identical product. It further alleges that Gasworks copied Tom and Sally’s label design and packaging technique, and paraphrased its label directions. 1 Finally, the complaint alleges that Gasworks’ paint is of inferior quality to Tom and Sally’s product, 2 and that Tom and Sally’s reputation and image will be tarnished by Gasworks’ marketing of its allegedly inferior infringing product as part of an erotic product line.

Gasworks’ total sales for the three year period from August, 1994 through April, 1997 were in excess of $2.5 million. 3 Sales in Vermont for this period were $982.57, although none of these sales included the Chocolate Body Paint. 4 At the present time, out of approximately 600 wholesale and mail order customers in the United States, two are located in Vermont. Approximately three mail order catalogs have been distributed to potential customers in Vermont. ’

In addition, sales of Gasworks’ Chocolate Body Paint were made to a representative of Tom and Sally’s in Vermont. In January, 1997, Kathryn Williams (“Williams”), a sales associate for Tom and Sally’s, telephoned two of Gasworks’ distributors, in New Jersey and California, and ordered six jars and 24 tubes of Gasworks’ Chocolate Body Paint product. Shortly thereafter, she received the shipments from each company at her residentiál address in Vermont. Also in January, 1997, H. Kenneth Merritt, counsél for Tom and Sally’s, telephoned Gasworks in Florida and, using a pseudonym, requested a 1996-97 mail order catalog. He received the catalog at his Vermont home shortly afterward. 5

DISCUSSION

I. Personal Jurisdiction

In considering a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 12(b)(2), the Plaintiffs factual allegations are assumed to be true for purposes of the motion. Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (1990),. However, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating contacts with the forum state sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir.1981); Sol- *300 linger v. Nasco Int’l., Inc., 655 F.Supp. 1385, 1386 (D.Vt.1987). Where, as here, there has been limited discovery and the motion is being decided without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, through its own affidavits and supporting materials. Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir.1985); Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d at 904.

To decide whether this Court has jurisdiction over the Defendant on the facts presented here, the Court must look first to the state long arm statute which provides for jurisdiction over out-of-state citizens. Braman v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hosp., 631 F.2d 6, 7-8 (2d Cir.1980); Northern Aircraft, Inc. v. Reed, 154 Vt. 36, 40, 572 A.2d 1382 (1990). If the Vermont statute indicates that jurisdiction is proper, the Court must then determine whether the exercise of the state’s long arm statute offends due process. Braman, 631 F.2d at 7; Northern Aircraft, 154 Vt. at 40, 572 A.2d at 1385.

The relevant Vermont long arm statute, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 913(b) (1971) provides:

Upon the service [of process on a party outside the state], and -if it appears that the contact with the state by the party or the activity in the state by the party or the contact or activity imputable to him is sufficient to support a personal judgment against him, the same proceedings may be had for a personal' judgment against him as if the process or pleading had been served on him in the state.

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 913(b).

The Vermont Supreme Court has held that this language allows a Vermont court to exercise jurisdiction over defendants to the “full extent permitted by the due process clause.” Northern Aircraft, 154 Vt. at 40, 572 A.2d at 1386. Therefore, this Court must now determine whether due process permits a Vermont court to exercise jurisdiction over Gasworks on these facts.

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977 F. Supp. 297, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14251, 1997 WL 574933, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tom-and-sallys-handmade-chocolates-inc-v-gasworks-inc-vtd-1997.