Toledo T. R. Co. v. Commissioner

13 T.C. 64, 1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 128
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJuly 14, 1949
DocketDocket No. 16526
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 13 T.C. 64 (Toledo T. R. Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Toledo T. R. Co. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 64, 1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 128 (tax 1949).

Opinion

OPINION.

Arundell, Judge:

The sole question herein concerns the proper amount deductible by petitioner as depreciation on its rolling stock in the calendar years 1942, 1943, and 1944. The parties agree that the method we prescribe herein for determining depreciation in those years will be followed in 1945 and 1946 and will be determinative of a net operating loss in 1946 and a net operating loss carry-back from that year to 1944.

Petitioner had used a composite system of determining its annual allowance for depreciation from its inception in 1907 until 1935. From 1907 to 1920 it used a rate of 2 per cent and from 1920 to 1935 a rate of 4 per cent on its rolling stock as a class. In 1935, pursuant to an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, it adopted a method whereby it depreciated its rolling stock according to five separate classifications, each with a separate rate.

In accord with the Commission’s rules and regulations, petitioner maintained in its general ledger a “control” account, numbered 701, for all its rolling stock, which disclosed the aggregate cost basis and accrued depreciation on all classes of rolling stock. It also kept in its general ledger and subsidiary accounts, records pertaining to each class of equipment which disclosed the cost, composite rate, and accrued depreciation on each class of property. In addition to the above accounts, which were required by the Interstate Commerce Commission, it kept “side” or collateral records which showed, for its own management purposes, the amounts of depreciation attributable to each individual item of equipment.

It appears that in each year petitioner would compute the allowable depreciation under the rate fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission for each class of equipment and carry over the aggregate to the over-all depreciation reserve in its “control” account. When a unit of its equipment was retired, the investment account was decreased by the original cost of the unit, the salvage realized was credited to an appropriate asset account, and the difference between cost and salvage was eliminated from its depreciation reserve. No gains or losses with respect to such retirements have ever been claimed by petitioner in its Federal tax returns. This system appears to have complied with the procedure for depreciable property account set out in Bulletin “F.”1

Respondent bad tacitly approved this method of computing depreciation for tax purposes prior to 1942, and even now does not appear seriously to challenge its propriety for a business such as petitioner conducts. The difference between the parties is essentially over the extent to which such a procedure may be carried.

The principal controversy herein arises from the fact that under the method used by petitioner at least two classes of its equipment, namely, “steam locomotives” and “miscellaneous equipment” would by the end of 1946 be overdepreciated in that petitioner would by that time, applying the rates prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, have recovered by way of depreciation more than the original cost of the equipment in these accounts.

For this reason respondent, on the basis of petitioner’s collateral records which disclosed the amount of depreciation attributed by petitioner to each piece of equipment, recomputed the allowable depreciation for the years 1942 to 1944, inclusive, by determining for each individual item of its rolling stock the remaining or unrecovered cost, an estimated salvage value, and an estimated remaining life. In short, - respondent completely abandoned the composite system and based depreciation in those years on the straight-line unit or ‘item method of depreciation. In this respect, we believe respondent was clearly in error. A recognized system, once established and operative over a long period of years, should not be abandoned unless there is a cogent reason for a change. Lake Charles Naval Stores, 25 B. T. A. 173; Copifyer Lithograph Corporation, 12 T. C. 728. In our opinion, any adjustments to depreciation necessary in the instant case may be accomplished by a determination of new rates for the respective groups, a procedure which is in harmony with the system used by petitioner.

Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that it may properly recover more than its original cost on its various classes of equipment so long as in its “control” account its depreciation reserve, representing the accrued depreciation on all classes, does not exceed the original cost of its entire rolling stock. Petitioner bases this argument on the premise that the depreciation accounts it has maintained since 1935 are of the type characterized as “composite accounts”2 by Bulletin “F.” However, a distinction exists between petitioner’s system and “composite accounts” in that all of its depreciable assets were not included in one account and no over-all composite rate was applied to the cost or other basis of petitioner’s entire depreciable property. Petitioner computed its depreciation by simply adding the depreciation computed under the separate rate for each of its five classes of equipment and on its general ledger credited the aggregate to its over-all depreciation reserve. Under our interpretation of the language of Bulletin “F” outlining the various depreciable property accounts available to taxpayers, petitioner’s method more closely conforms to the so-called “group accounts.”3

Petitioner, citing Union Co., 14 B. T. A. 1310, states that “it is implicit in composite depreciation accounting that the composite rate is an average rate, and that if such rate would be applied to the longer-lived individual units in the composite category, such units would be fully depreciated prior to the termination of their actual useful life, while conversely the shorter-lived assets would no longer be in use at a time when depreciation would still continue to be taken on them. It is the experience of the group which is important * * *.”

Insofar as the principle stated by petitioner is concerned, we have no doubt that it is correct. However, we find that as of the end of 1946 “Steam Locomotives” and “Miscellaneous Equipment,” as groups, have been overdepreciated, petitioner on that date having recovered, by way of deductions for depreciation on its tax returns, amounts in excess of the original cost of the assets in each group.

Within the group it is possible, in fact necessary if an average life instead of a maximum life is used in computing the rate, that some individual items are “over-depreciated” to compensate for similar items in the class which are retired prior to the estimated average useful life of the group. It is for this reason that where a rate is based on an average life of the group, no loss is allowed on a premature retirement. However, we do not believe that a class of assets may be overdepreciated merely because many of its composite units remain in service after the original cost of the class has been completely recovered or because there exist other groups or classes depreciated at different rates where complete cost has not yet been recovered. Alpin J. Cameron, 8 B. T. A. 120, 129; affd., Cameron v. Commissioner, 56 Fed. (2d) 1021. Cf. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 37 B. T. A. 439; reversed on another point, 107 Fed. (2d) 155.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Equitable Savings & Loan Ass'n v. State Tax Commission
444 P.2d 916 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1968)
Equitable Savings & Loan Ass'n v. State Tax Commission
3 Or. Tax 1 (Oregon Tax Court, 1967)
Toledo T. R. Co. v. Commissioner
13 T.C. 64 (U.S. Tax Court, 1949)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
13 T.C. 64, 1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 128, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/toledo-t-r-co-v-commissioner-tax-1949.