Cite as 2022 Ark. App. 232 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-21-306
TODD HALL OPINION DELIVERED MAY 18, 2022 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 04CR-19-2323]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE BRAD KARREN, JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Todd Matthew Hall appeals his conviction in the Benton County Circuit Court on
one count of failure to comply with registration, a Class C felony, in violation of Arkansas
Code Annotated section 12-12-904 (Supp. 2021), for failure to report a social-media
application and as a habitual offender pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-
501(b)(1) (Supp. 2021). He argues that (1) when strictly construed in harmony, Arkansas
Code Annotated sections 12-12-904(a)(1)(A)(i), -906 (Supp. 2021), -908(b) (Supp. 2021), and
-909(b)(1)(D) (Supp. 2021) of the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997 (the “Act”) only
require a lifetime sex offender or a sexually dangerous sex offender to submit to the social-
media-reporting rules; (2) those same sections of the Act lack sufficient definiteness to
provide notice and, therefore, are void for vagueness; and (3) the circuit court committed clear error when denying Hall’s motion to suppress evidence based on an illegal search and
seizure of his cell phone. We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On June 29, 2006, Hall pleaded no contest to second-degree sexual assault in Benton
County case number 04CR-05-666; consequently, he was required to register as a sex
offender. Hall subsequently was convicted of multiple offenses in Washington County, and
he was released on parole for those convictions on May 24, 2018. 1 As a condition of his
release, Hall signed a waiver giving Arkansas Community Correction officers permission to
search his person, property, vehicle, or residence without a search warrant. He also signed a
warrantless search waiver giving parole officers and certified law enforcement officers the
ability to search his person, residence, or vehicle without a search warrant. Hall signed “Sex
Offender Acknowledgement Forms” on May 29, 2018; May 20, 2019; July 15, 2019; and
August 26, 2019, acknowledging the requirement that pursuant to Arkansas Code
Annotated section 12-12-906, Arkansas state law requires the offender to report any changes
in . . . social network information IN Person to the local law enforcement agency having
jurisdiction at that time of the change. Hall registered and verified another social-media
platform—“Facebook”—on the “Sex Offender Verification Form” signed on May 29, 2018,
and August 26, 2019.
1 Hall was convicted of failure to comply with sex-offender registration in case number 72CR-16-1717, second-degree forgery in case number 72CR-17-74, and possession of a controlled substance in case number 72CR-16-2371.
2 Hall’s assigned parole officer was Allishia Mace, and one of his parole conditions was
to meet with Officer Mace twice monthly. Hall reported to Officer Mace on September 4,
2019, and she scheduled the next meeting for September 19. An automated text-message
reminder was generated for the September 19 scheduled meeting. Officer Mace later called
Hall on September 12 to reschedule the meeting for September 18 due to a conflict. Hall
confirmed the new date over the phone, and Officer Mace entered the new date into the
system. On September 18, however, Hall failed to report to Officer Mace as required. He
reported to Officer Mace the following day, at which time Officer Mace asked why he failed
to report on the 18th. Hall explained that he had received a text-message reminder stating
that his scheduled visit was September 19.
Fellow parole officer, Lacey Maybee, overheard the conversation from her office
located across the hall from Officer Mace’s office. Officer Maybee walked across the hall to
verify Harp’s assertion that he had received a text-message notification and asked for his
phone. Hall informed the parole officers that his cell phone was in his vehicle and handed
Officer Maybee his keys to retrieve the cell phone from the vehicle. When Officer Maybee
returned, Hall unlocked his cell phone and handed it back to Officer Maybee to look
through his text messages for the text-message reminder.
Regarding what Hall claims was an extensive search of his cell phone and its contents,
including various installed applications, Officer Maybee testified:
[A]t the time, th[ese] text message reminders were very new to us. We don’t know who they’re coming from, neither do the parolees. So, they’re confused. They think that they’re coming from us, and we don’t know what numbers they’re coming
3 from. So, I’m looking through the text messages to find this random number. And so, I’m looking through the text messages and at that point I’m—as I’m looking, I see other parole violations and then proceed from there.
As Officer Maybee was looking through Hall’s text messages to find the reminder, she
saw evidence of other possible parole violations, including the social-media app called
Tinder, downloaded on his phone. Officer Mace did not think that the Tinder account had
been registered in the sex-offender system as required. Officer Maybee found the text-message
reminder, gave the cell phone to Officer Mace, and explained that she may have found
evidence of parole violations on Hall’s phone, which prompted further examination.
Officer Mace then verified with Detective Paul Newell that Hall had not registered
his Tinder account on either the initial form or the ones submitted on the subsequent dates
previously listed, despite the fact that Hall was required to report to him twice yearly to verify
the required sex-offender information, including Hall’s social-media accounts. Officer Mace
gave Hall’s phone to the Benton County Sheriff’s Office for further examination, and the
extraction report indicated activity on Hall’s Tinder account dating back to 2017.
On November 1, 2019, the State charged Hall, a registered sex offender, with failing
to comply with reporting requirements, specifically alleging that Hall had failed to register
or verify his Tinder social-media account.
On October 7, 2020, Hall filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered on his
cell phone during the warrantless search of his cell phone during the October 19, 2019
meeting at Officer Mace’s office. The parties agreed to allow the circuit court to consider
Hall’s motion to suppress during the bench trial because the witnesses and evidence to be
4 considered would be the same. On November 30, a hearing was held, and the circuit court
determined that Hall’s constitutional rights were not violated by the warrantless cell phone
search conducted by Officer Maybee because at that time, Hall was both a registered sex
offender and a parolee.
During the bench trial, Hall stipulated that he was required to register as a sex
offender and that he was required to verify his sex-offender status. He further stipulated that
the Tinder account found on his cell phone was his.
According to Hall, he signed a limited warrantless search waiver as a condition of his
parole, which permitted law enforcement to search only his person, residence, or motor
vehicle. He claimed that his personal property, i.e., his cell phone, was not included in the
warrantless search waiver. Hall asserted that the signed conditions of release did not notify
him that evidence seized from a warrantless search could be used to convict him of a new
criminal offense.
The State explained in response that when Hall was placed on parole in 2018, he
signed conditions of release permitting a parole officer to search his person, property, vehicle,
or residence at any time without a warrant. The circuit court rejected Hall’s arguments and
denied his motion to suppress, reasoning that he “was clearly notified by his condition of
release that he [was] subject to warrantless searches of his person, property, place of residence,
and motor vehicle.”
After the State rested, Hall moved to dismiss, arguing that the State had failed to
prove that he was guilty of failing to comply with registration requirements because (1) under
5 section 12-12-906, only sex offenders subject to lifetime registration are required to verify
their social-media accounts; (2) section 12-12-908 likewise +does not impose a requirement
for him to verify his social-media accounts; and (3) without elaboration, the sex-offender
statutes are void for vagueness. When asked by the circuit court, Hall admitted that he had
failed to notify the Arkansas Attorney General that he was challenging the constitutionality
of the sex-offender-registration statutes.
The defense rested without presenting evidence or witnesses, and Hall renewed his
motion to dismiss. He again mentioned that the sex-offender-registration statutes are “void
for vagueness” because “it’s not a crime for [a sex offender] not to report a social media app.”
The circuit court “cut and paste[d] [its] earlier ruling” and did not include a substantive
ruling on Hall’s void-for-vagueness argument. The circuit court reasoned that it lacked
jurisdiction to decide the issue because Hall had failed to notify the Attorney General of his
challenge to the constitutionality of the statute.
The circuit court found Hall guilty of failing to comply with reporting requirements
and sentenced him as a habitual offender to thirty-six months’ imprisonment pursuant to a
sentencing order filed on December 3. An amended sentencing order was filed on December
7 to correct the box checked for Hall’s gender. On December 17, Hall filed a timely notice
of appeal.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
In bench trials, the standard of review on appeal is not whether there is substantial
evidence to support the finding of the circuit court but whether the court’s findings were
6 clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Baugh v. State, 2021
Ark. App. 400, at 2, 635 S.W.3d 9, 11. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a firm
conviction that an error has been committed. Id. Facts in dispute and determinations of
credibility are within the province of the fact-finder. Id. However, questions of statutory
construction and application are reviewed de novo because it is for the appellate courts to
decide the meaning of a statute. Krol v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 512, at 6, 563 S.W.3d 586,
589.
When an appellate court construes a criminal statute, it must be strictly construed
resolving all doubts in favor of the defendant. Smith v. State, 2020 Ark. 410, at 5–6. But even
a criminal statute must not be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious legislative intent.
Id. Additionally, when construing any statute, the court places it beside statutes relating to
the same subject to be construed together and in harmony, if possible, to derive the meaning
and effect from the whole. Id.
III. Discussion
A. Applicability of Arkansas Social-Media-Reporting Statutes
Hall submits that the plain and ordinary meaning of the text of Arkansas Code
Annotated sections 12-12-904(a)(1)(A)(i), -906, -908(b), and -909(b)(1)(D) of the Act provide
that only a lifetime or sexually dangerous sex offender is subject to the social-media-reporting
requirements. He argues that the circuit court’s ruling that those requirements apply to him
should be reversed because those statutes do not apply to an offender of Hall’s status.
7 Arkansas Code Annotated section 12-12-904(a)(1)(A)(i) states: “A person is guilty of
a Class C felony who: (i) Fails to register or verify registration as required under this
subchapter.” Section 12-12-906 outlines the duty to register or verify registration generally.
Section 12-12-906(g) is the only section that addresses registration of social-media-account
information:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (h) of this section, a sex offender subject to lifetime registration under § 12-12-919 shall report in person every six (6) months after registration to the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction to verify registration.
....
(3) Registration verification shall include reporting in person any change to the following information concerning the sex offender:
(T) All social media account information.
(Emphasis added.)
Section 12-12-908(b) outlines the format requirements for registration, stating: “The
registration file required by this subchapter shall include: . . . . (22) All social media account
information.” And section 12-12-909(b)(1)(D) outlines the verification form required for a
change of address for a sex offender:
Other than a change of address as provided in subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section, a sex offender shall report a change of any other information required to be reported at registration under § 12-12-908 or required to be reported at the time of verification under § 12-12-909.
8 Hall contends that when placed together, giving these statues their plain and ordinary
meaning, only a sex offender subject to lifetime registration is required to report “all social
media account information.” Ark. Code Ann. §§ 12-12-906, -908(b). Additionally, he
maintains that they require a verification form for a “change of any other information at the
time of verification.” Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-909(b)(1)(D) (emphasis added).
Hall maintains that he was not required to report his social-media information at the
time of verification because he was not subject to lifetime registration or deemed a sexually
dangerous offender. Rather, as a lower-level offender subject to standard reporting
requirements, he need only report a change of address and other information that was
reported at the time of verification, which does not include social-media applications.
Moreover, Hall argues that the circuit court’s ruling should be reversed because when
the applicable statutes are viewed through the lens of legislative intent, they should apply
only to lifetime or sexually dangerous offenders. Hall submits that as the Act has been
amended, the legislature has intentionally added the language “lifetime” and “sexually
dangerous offender” to the social-media-registration requirements, indicating a clear intent
to narrow the application to only the most serious of offenders. He notes that in 2013, the
legislature amended section 12-12-906 to change the language “violent predator” to “sexually
dangerous.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-906 (Supp. 2013). And in 2017, the legislature
amended section 12-12-906(h)(7) to add the language “sexually dangerous” to the in-person-
reporting requirement. See Ark. Code Ann. §12-12-906(h)(7) (Supp. 2017).
9 It is undisputed that Hall was not required to report as a lifetime or sexually
dangerous offender; accordingly, he urges that he was not required to report his social-media
applications at either the initial or subsequent verifications. And he argues that his
conviction for failing to comply with registration should be reversed because he was not
charged with failing to report an address change, merely his Tinder social-media application.
We disagree and hold that the circuit court did not commit reversible error in finding
that the sex-offender-registration statutes did require Hall to register and verify his social-
media-account information. At trial, Hall acknowledged that (1) he is a convicted sex
offender; (2) he is required to register and verify his status; and (3) the Tinder account in
question belongs to him. Detective Newell and Officer Mace testified that Hall had never
registered or verified his Tinder account at any time since his release from incarceration in
May 2018.
Pursuant to the Act, a person who has been adjudicated guilty of a sex offense must
register as a sex offender using a registration form prepared by the Arkansas Crime
Information Center. See Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-906(a)(1)(A)(ii); Adkins v. State, 371 Ark.
159, 161, 264 S.W.3d 523, 524 (2007). A sex offender who “[f]ails to register or verify
registration as required under this subchapter” is guilty of a Class C felony. Ark. Code Ann.
§ 12-12-904(a)(1)(A)(i). The sex-offender-registration requirements are mandatory, and the
failure to comply with registration is a strict-liability offense. E.g., Blanton v. State, 2022 Ark.
App. 44, at 2.
10 Hall’s argument completely ignores section 12-12-908, which applies to all sex
offenders required to register, not solely to those offenders subject to lifetime registration.
He was neither charged with nor convicted of failing to comply with the requirements for a
sex offender subject to lifetime registration under section 12-12-906(g), (h); rather, he failed
to comply with section 12-12-908. Any offender required to register as a sex offender,
regardless of whether the offender is subject to lifetime registration, must register the
information listed in section 12-12-908 to the appropriate agency. See Ark. Code Ann. § 12-
12-906(a)(1)(A)(ii). Section 12-12-908(b)(22) requires every sex offender to register the
offender’s “social media account information” at the time of registration. Every six months,
the offender is then required to “verify” his or her registration information, see Ark. Code
Ann. § 12-12-909(a)(1), including any social-media accounts. Thus, because Hall was
undisputedly subject to registration requirements, he was required to register his social-
media-account information at the time of registration and, subsequently, to verify the
information every six months. Because Hall failed to do so, we affirm the circuit court’s
finding that he violated Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-904 for failure to report a social-media
application and as a habitual offender, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(b)(1).
B. Void-for-Vagueness Argument
With respect to Hall’s constitutional argument that the statutes in question are void
for vagueness, this court recently held:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
11 discriminatory enforcement. Anderson v. State, 2017 Ark. 357, 533 S.W.3d 64. When challenging the constitutionality of a statute on grounds of vagueness, the individual challenging the statute must be one of the “entrapped innocent” who has not received fair warning that certain conduct has been prohibited. Id. However, if, by his action, that individual clearly falls within the conduct prohibited by the statute, he cannot be heard to complain. Id.
See, e.g., Howton v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 86, at 10–11, 619 S.W.3d 29, 37 (citing Anderson v.
State, 2017 Ark. 357, at 4, 533 S.W.3d 64, 67); see also Bynum v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 201,
at 9–10, 546 S.W.3d 533, 540–41. A statute should be definite so that it does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Howton, supra.
Hall submits that he qualifies as one of the “entrapped innocents” because he
followed and completed the proper initial registration and subsequent verification
requirements imposed on him as a sexual offender and did not have proper notice that he
was required to follow any social-media-reporting requirements specifically imposed on
lifetime or sexually dangerous offenders. Hall maintains that he did not attempt to hide any
information because he was unaware that any of his actions were prohibited by his status as
a sexual offender.
Hall submits that the relevant statutes lack consistency as to what subsections apply
to various levels of offenders and, specifically, whether the social-media subsection applies to
all sexual offenders required to register or only lifetime or sexually dangerous offenders. Hall
argues that this lack of definiteness creates speculation because the language in the statutes
switches back and forth between “sex offender” and “lifetime and sexually dangerous
persons” when referencing social-media applications and reporting changes of initial
12 verification requirements. Hall argues that the failure to provide clear and definite notice as
to which subsection(s) a sex offender is subject to creates a danger that these requirements
will be applied on a case-by-case basis rather than consistently among registering sex
offenders. Accordingly, Hall submits that the circuit court’s ruling should be reversed.
We disagree. We first address the State’s argument that this issue was not properly
preserved for our review because the circuit court declined to rule on the merits of Hall’s
argument, finding only that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue because Hall had not
notified the Attorney General that he was challenging the constitutionality of the statutes.
See, e.g., Newman v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 38, at 6, 567 S.W.3d 110, 113; Anderson, 2017 Ark.
357, at 3–4, 533 S.W.3d 64, 67.
Despite the circuit court’s stating that it did not have proper jurisdiction to decide
the vagueness issue because Hall failed to notify the Attorney General, it specifically
addressed the void-for-vagueness argument before it and did provide a ruling.
MR. MILLER: And last, the void for vagueness argument because we do believe our reading is reasonable, and a reasonable reading of the statute would indicate that somebody that’s not guilty—that’s only guilty of a sex offense can’t be––it’s not a crime for them to not report a social media app.
THE COURT: Got you. All right, the Court has already made—and I’m going to ask the Court Reporter to cut and paste my earlier ruling.
.... But I do want to add a couple of things as to the void for vagueness argument. I have given the defense and opportunity to continue this trial, which they rejected and did not, which would allow them to contact the Attorney General’s Office if
13 they wanted to do an issue as concerning a constitutional argument on the statute. Also, as to—Go ahead, Mr. Miller.
.... All right, let me go—let me go read about this Attorney General thing because to be honest with you I just don’t recall.
.... I’ve had an opportunity to go back and consider my—your motion, Mr. Miller, about continuing this trial. The Arkansas Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction on whether to hear whether a statute is constitutional. In cases challenging the constitutionality of a statute, the Arkansas Attorney General is a required party. The Arkansas Attorney General has not been made a party to this action. This court does not have jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality on whether this statute is void for vagueness. Your motion for a continuance for Defendant to modify—I’m sorry, as to the motion for continuance for Defendant to notify the AG, this court finds the defendant was not diligent in notifying the AG of its void for vagueness argument, that testimony and evidence has concluded, that both parties have rested. Even if the AG were allowed to be a party to this action, they would be prohibited to present any evidence as to the issue. Your motion is denied.
Hall notes that the circuit court deliberated over the issue and erroneously ruled that
it did not have jurisdiction on the issue because there was no notification to the Attorney
General’s office. He cites Carney v. State, 305 Ark. 431, 434–35, 808 S.W.2d 755, 756–57
(1991), for the propositions that because this was a criminal matter rather than a civil case,
notification to the Attorney General’s office was not required because the State was
automatically a party to the action and was represented by the prosecuting attorney. Carney,
305 Ark. App. at 434–35, 808 S.W.2d at 756–57.
14 We hold that Hall has failed to meet his burden of proof related to the constitutional
challenge to the statutes in question. In considering the constitutionality of a statute, this
court presumes that the statute is constitutional, and the burden of proving otherwise is on
the challenger of the statute. E.g., Howton, 2021 Ark. App. 86, at 3, 619 S.W.3d at 34. “An
act should be struck down only when there is a clear incompatibility between the act and the
constitution.” Clingmon v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 107, at 5, 620 S.W.3d 184, 187. If possible,
this court will construe a statute so that it is constitutional. E.g., Anderson, 2017 Ark. 357, at
3, 533 S.W.3d at 67.
A statute will pass constitutional scrutiny if the language conveys sufficient warning
when measured by common understanding and practice. E.g., Reinert v. State, 348 Ark. 1, 4,
71 S.W.3d 52, 54 (2002). The constitutionality of a statutory provision being attacked as
void for vagueness is determined by the statute’s applicability to the facts at issue. E.g.,
Anderson, 2017 Ark. 357, at 4, 533 S.W.3d at 67.
Contrary to his assertion, Hall’s failure to register or verify his social-media account
falls within that proscribed by the statutes. Moreover, Hall received actual notice, in addition
to the statutes, that he was required to register and verify his social-media account. On May
29, 2018, Hall signed a sex-offender-acknowledgment form, which listed reporting and
verification requirements for sex offenders. Paragraph 2 states: “Pursuant to § 12-12-906,
Arkansas state law requires the offender to report any changes in residence, mailing address,
temporary domicile, employment, email, social network information IN Person to the local law
enforcement agency having jurisdiction at the time of the change.” (Bold emphasis in
15 original, italics added.) Hall signed similar acknowledgment forms requiring the disclosure
of social-media accounts on three subsequent occasions—May 20, July 15, and August 26,
2019. These signed acknowledgment forms put Hall on notice that he was required to
register and verify his social-media-account information. Moreover, he did, in fact, register
and verify one of his social-media accounts, a Facebook account, and provided a related email
address. He, however, specifically failed to ever register or verify his Tinder social-media
account. Because Hall failed to meet the requisite burden of proof regarding his
constitutional void-for-vagueness challenge to the sex-offender social-media-registration
statutes, we hold no reversible error was committed by the circuit court on this issue.
C. Denial of Hall’s Motion to Suppress
Hall also argues that the circuit court committed clear error when it denied his
motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the illegal search and seizure of his cell
phone. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we conduct a de novo
review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts for
clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable
cause, giving due weight to inferences drawn by the circuit court and proper deference to the
circuit court’s findings. Colen v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 148, at 8, __ S.W.3d __, __. Arkansas
appellate courts defer to the superior position of the circuit court to evaluate the credibility
of witnesses, and we will reverse the denial of a motion to suppress only if the ruling is clearly
against the preponderance of the evidence. See id.
16 Hall’s motion to suppress was based on the warrantless search of his cell phone by
Officer Maybee. Hall maintains that the signed waivers relied on by Officer Maybee were
overly vague and thus failed to provide proper notice of the rights he was waiving. Hall
specifically relies on the search waiver stating that he consents to “a warrantless search of my
person, place of residence, or motor vehicle at any time.” He notes that nothing in that
particular waiver states that he was waiving his constitutional right for all property, and
specifically, nothing states that his cell phone may be searched at any time without specific
consent. Additionally, Hall maintains that the other conditions-of-release form that he
signed as a condition of parole was overly vague, stating that “[y]ou must submit your person
and/or property, place of residence, and motor vehicles to search and seizure at any time,
day or night, with or without a search warrant.” Hall argues that this language likewise is not
sufficiently specific to clarify that his cell phone may be searched without restriction and
without probable cause. He urges that when taken in concert with the other search waiver,
the conditions-of-release form fails to clarify the constitutional rights he was waiving.
Hall also argues that Officer Maybee lacked proper reasonable suspicion to search his
cell phone beyond the limited scope of consent provided by Hall. Hall acknowledges that he
permitted Officer Maybee to search his cell phone for the limited purpose of confirming the
text message he received regarding the rescheduled date of his meeting with Officer Mace.
But Hall denies providing consent to Officer Maybee to conduct a full-access search of his
cell phone. Hall claims that neither Officer Maybee nor Officer Mace had reasonable
suspicion that a search of his cell phone was necessary for any other reason. He submits that
17 because the preponderance of the evidence indicates that the circuit court ignored the
vagueness of the search waivers, the limited scope of his consent, and the parole officers’ lack
of reasonable suspicion, the denial of his motion to suppress should be reversed.
We disagree and hold that the circuit court did not err by denying Hall’s motion to
suppress. The United States Supreme Court has held that parolees can be subject to
suspicionless, warrantless searches at any time without violating the Fourth Amendment.
See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006). Moreover, a parolee “has a
diminished expectation of privacy, as legally he is still in custody of the penal institution
from which he was released.” Clingmon v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 107, at 5, 620 S.W.3d 184,
187 (citing Cherry v. State, 302 Ark. 462, 467, 791 S.W.2d 354, 357 (1990), and Ark. Code
Ann. § 16-93-701(b)(3)). This court has held that the special needs of the parole process call
for intensive supervision of the parolee, making the warrant requirement impractical.
Clingmon, 2021 Ark. App. 107, at 5, 620 S.W.3d at 187. Moreover, a warrantless search
conducted with valid consent does not violate the Fourth Amendment. E.g., Hatcher v. State,
2009 Ark. App. 481, at 3, 324 S.W.3d 366, 367.
It is undisputed that as a condition of his release on parole, Hall signed conditions
of his release that he “must submit [his] person and/or property, place of residence, and motor
vehicles to search and seizure at any time, day or night, with or without a search warrant by
any Arkansas Department of Community Correction officer.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover,
Hall, as a parolee, had a diminished expectation of privacy; however, we are mindful that
“[m]odern cell phones are not just another technological convenience,” see Riley v. California,
18 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014), and that “[w]ith all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold
for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’” Id.
Under these particular facts and circumstances, and even absent his conditions of
release for parole and the signed waivers, the evidence before us supports the conclusion that
Hall specifically and voluntarily consented to Officer Maybee’s search of his cell phone to
find the text-message reminder and unlocked the phone for her without restriction. While
Officer Maybee was searching for the message pursuant to Hall’s consent, she noticed
evidence of possible parole violations that gave rise to the additional investigation that led
to the charge and ultimate conviction for failing to comply with registration requirements.
Because a warrantless search made with consent does not violate the Fourth Amendment,
see Blackwell v. State, 338 Ark. 671, 678, 1 S.W.3d 399, 403 (1999), we hold that the circuit
court did not err by denying Hall’s motion to suppress, and we affirm.
Affirmed.
KLAPPENBACH and HIXSON, JJ., agree.
Miller Butler Schneider Pawlik Rozzell PLLC, by: Alicia M. Canfield, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.