Tobin v. Kansas Milling Co.

195 F.2d 282, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 3719, 21 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 66,797
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 22, 1952
Docket4329_1
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 195 F.2d 282 (Tobin v. Kansas Milling Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tobin v. Kansas Milling Co., 195 F.2d 282, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 3719, 21 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 66,797 (10th Cir. 1952).

Opinions

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.

W. R. MoComb, Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor, brought this action against the Kansas Milling Company1 seeking a judgment enjoining the Milling Company from violating the provisions of § 15(a)(1), (2), and (5) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,2 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201 et seq. The complaint was filed April 28, 1949. The case came on for trial March 7,1950.

The Milling Company is engaged in the operation of an elevator and flour mill at Cherryvale, Kansas, where it purchases and stores wheat and manufactures flour and feed. It also operates like plants at other points in Kansas. The Cherryvale plant has an elevator department, a flour mill department, and a warehouse department. The elevator department and the flour mill department are distinct and separate operating departments. The Milling Company employs approximately 26 employees at its Cherryvale plant, among whom are an elevator foreman and three second millers. At the commencement of the trial, it was stipulated that the elevator foreman and the three second millers were engaged in the production of goods for commerce and that “during the period from beginning in December, 1946, and particularly to December, 1948,” the three second millers and the elevator foreman worked in certain weeks in excess of 40 hours and in certain other weeks less than 40 hours, [284]*284and that they were compensated on a monthly salary, which was the same whether they worked more or less than 40 hours. There was no proof that the number of hours worked weekly by such employees after December, 1948, was in excess of 40 hours. Following the stipulation, the Administrator rested.

The Administrator promulgated regulations, effective October 24, 1940, defining the term “employee employed in a bona fide executive * * * capacity” in § 13(a) of the Act. The provisions of such regulations here material read as follows:

“Executive. The term ‘employee employed in a bona fide executive * * * capacity’ in section 13(a)(1) of the Act shall mean any employee

“(a) whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which he is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof, and

“(b) who customarily and regularly directs the work of other employees therein, and

“(c) who has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring or firing and as to the advancement and promotion or any other change of status of other employees will be given particular weight, and

“(d) who customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers, and

“(e) who is compensated for his services on a salary basis at not less than $30 per week (exclusive of board, lodging, or other facilities), and

“(f) whose hours of work of the same nature as that performed by nonexempt employees do not exceed 20 per cent of the number of hours worked in the workweek by the nonexempt employees under his direction: Provided, That this paragraph shall not apply in the case of an employee who is in sole charge of an independent establishment or a physically separated branch establishment.”

Thereafter, the Administrator promulgated amended regulations, effective January 25, 1950, defining the term “employee employed in a bona fide executive * * * capacity.” The provisions of the amended regulations which changed the former regulation and are here material read as follows:

“(a) Whose primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise in which he is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof; and

“(b) Who customarily 'and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees therein; and ******

“(e) Who does not devote more than 20 per cent to his hours worked in' the workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section: Provided, That' this paragraph .shall not apply in the case of an employee who is in sole charge of an independent establishment or a physically separated branch establishment, or who owns at least a 20-percent interest in the enterprise in which he.is employed; and

“(f) Who is compensated for his services on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $55 per week (or $30 per week if employed in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands) exclusive of board, lodging, or other facilities:

“Provided, That an employee who is compensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $100 per week (exclusive of board, lodging, or other facilities), and whose primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise in which he is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof, and includes the customary and regular direction of the work of two or more other employees therein, shall be deemed to meet all of the requirements of this section.”

The Milling Company introduced evidence undertaking to< establish that the elevator foreman and the three second millers were employed in a bona fide executive capacity and were, therefore, exempt under. § 13(a)(1) of the Act.

[285]*285The trial court made findings of fact which brought the elevator foreman and the three second millers within the term “bona fide executive * * * capacity” as defined in both regulations, and entered a judgment for the Milling Company. Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor, was substituted as party plaintiff and has appealed from such judgment.

The appeal involves only the elevator foreman, Archie Hatcher, and one second miller, Fred Honeywell, and is predicated on the contention that as to those two employees the findings are clearly erroneous.

The elevator department has a wheat storage capacity of 150,000 bushels. Wheat is delivered to the elevator by railroad box car, motor truck, and wagon. Wheat delivered by box car is unloaded into a dump by employees called shovelers. Wheat arriving by motor truck is unloaded at a truck dump and by wagon at a wagon dump. After the wheat is unloaded, it is elevated to the elevator by machinery and is binned according to various characteristics of the wheat. Wheat in the elevator is maintained in proper condition, fumigated, turned, aerated, separated, and mixed for the mill. Records are kept and weekly inventories are made of the amount and qualities of wheat in the elevator.

Hatcher, as elevator foreman, is in complete charge of the maintenance and operation of the elevator department at the Cherryvale plant. He participates in management conferences and he customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers in the preformance of his duties. He supervises an elaborate operation requiring skill, knowledge, experience, and; judgment. He is qualified for the position he holds. He performs a negligible amount of manual labor, and, with minor exceptions, does not perform any service similar to that performed by employees under him. He has power to hire and discharge employees and regularly exercises such powe'r. After the wheat is unloaded at the elevator, Hatcher, in the exercise of judgment, determines its moisture, protein, and fragment content, its baking quality, and other important characteristics. During the periods when wheat is moving to the elevator, it is ordinarily operated 24 hours a day.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
195 F.2d 282, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 3719, 21 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 66,797, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tobin-v-kansas-milling-co-ca10-1952.