T.O., a minor through his Guardian Ad Litem Hannah Morris, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of AMY WAYNE MORRIS, Deceased, and S.O., a minor through his Guardian Ad Litem Hannah Morris, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of AMY WAYNE MORRIS v. Defendants

Opinion

1 2

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 T.O., a minor through his No. 2:24-cv-1131 WBS AC 13 Guardian Ad Litem Hannah Morris, Individually and as Personal 14 Representative of the Estate of AMY WAYNE MORRIS, Deceased, and MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 15 S.O., a minor through his DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO Guardian Ad Litem Hannah Morris, DISMISS THIRD AMENDED 16 Individually and as Personal COMPLAINT AND TO STRIKE Representative of the Estate of 17 AMY WAYNE MORRIS, 18 Plaintiffs, 19 v. 20 COUNTY OF NEVADA, a Governmental Entity; WELLPATH, LLC, a 21 Delaware limited liability company; CALIFORNIA FORENSIC 22 MEDICAL GROUP, a Domestic Corporation; MICHAEL O’BRIEN, 23 individually; NATIVIDAD RICKS, RN; JENNIFER PIXLEY, RN, JOSEPH 24 BRITTON, MD, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and MATHEW J. 25 DUNDON TRUSTEE OF WELLPATH HOLDINGS, INC. LIQUIDATING 26 TRUST, 27 Defendants. 28 1 ----oo0oo---- 2 Plaintiffs T.O. and S.O. (“plaintiffs”) brought this 3 action against defendants California Forensic Medical Group, Inc. 4 (“CFMG”), Natividad Ricks, RN (“Nurse Ricks”), Jennifer Pixley, 5 RN (“Nurse Pixley”), and Joseph Britton, MD (“Dr. Britton”), 6 (collectively “Medical Defendants”); Wellpath, LLC (“Wellpath”); 7 Matthew J. Dundon, Trustee of Wellpath Holdings, Inc. Liquidating 8 Trust; the County of Nevada; Officer Michael O’Brien (“Officer 9 O’Brien”); and Does 1-10 seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 10 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments related to 11 and resulting from the injury and death of their mother, Amy 12 Wayne Morris (“Ms. Morris”). (Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Compl. 13 (“TAC”) (Docket No. 86) at 2—3.) Plaintiffs’ TAC asserts five 14 claims: (1) deliberate indiference; (2) state created danger; (3) 15 interference with familial relations; (4) failure to train, and 16 custom, practice, and policy; and (5) ratification. (Id. at 22— 17 37). 18 Medical Defendants and Wellpath now move to dismiss the 19 TAC (Docket Nos. 91, 92.); plaintiffs oppose the motions (Docket 20 Nos. 96, 97.). Also before the court is Medical Defendants’ and 21 Wellpath’s joint motion to strike plaintiffs’ opposition as 22 untimely, which plaintiffs also oppose. (Docket Nos. 98, 99.) 23 For the reasons that follow, Medical Defendants’ motion to 24 dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part, Wellpath’s 25 motion to dismiss will be granted, and the joint motion to strike 26 will be denied.1 27

28 1 Having previously summarized the factual and procedural 1 I. Standard of Review 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows the 3 court to dismiss a complaint that fails to state a claim upon 4 which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “A Rule 5 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro 6 v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In deciding such a 7 motion, all material allegations of the complaint are accepted as 8 true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. 9 Id. 10 Dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to allege 11 “sufficient facts . . . to support a cognizable legal theory,” 12 id., or to state “a claim to relief that is plausible on its 13 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 14 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 15 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 16 II. Medical Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 17 Medical Defendants move to dismiss with prejudice the 18 first, second, fourth, and fifth causes of action in the TAC. 19 (Docket No. 91 at 2.)2 20 A. Claim 1: Deliberate Indifference 21

22 background of this case in its September 2024 order, the court will not do so again here. (See Docket No. 33.) 23 2 The court notes that plaintiffs’ response in opposition 24 to Medical Defendants’ motion was not timely filed. Because the motion was filed on October 17, 2025 (see Docket No. 91), the 25 deadline for filing a response was October 31, 2025. See E.D. L.R. 230(c). Yet, plaintiffs waited to file until January 23, 26 2026. (See Docket No. 97.) In their untimely response, 27 plaintiffs decline to offer either an explanation of what caused them to file 84 days late or any reasons why the court should 28 excuse it. (See id.) 1 Plaintiffs allege that Nurse Ricks, Nurse Pixley, and 2 Dr. Britton are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth 3 Amendment because they acted with deliberate indifference to a 4 substantial risk of harm to Ms. Morris’s health and safety. 5 (Plaintiffs’ TAC (Docket No. 86) at ¶¶ 84—106.) 6 As a pre-trial detainee, the circumstances of Ms. 7 Morris’s confinement are addressed under the due process clause 8 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 9 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Castro v. County of Los 10 Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2016)). 11 “The touchstone of due process is protection of the 12 individual against arbitrary action of government,” Wolff v. 13 McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974), and “only the most egregious 14 official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the 15 constitutional sense,’” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (quoting Collins 16 v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)). Official 17 conduct rises to this level only if it “shocks the conscience.” 18 Id. “Where actual deliberation is practical, then an 19 [individual]’s ‘deliberate indifference’ may suffice to shock the 20 conscience.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 21 2010). 22 Section 1983 claims alleging violations of the right to 23 adequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment are 24 evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard. 25 Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1124-25. The objective deliberate 26 indifference standard requires allegations that (i) the defendant 27 intentionally facilitated the conditions of the plaintiff’s 28 1 confinement; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at 2 substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant 3 did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk; 4 and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the 5 plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 1125. 6 At issue here is the third prong, which is evaluated 7 based on “the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” 8 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (citation modified). Importantly “[t]he 9 mere lack of due care by a state official does not deprive an 10 individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth 11 Amendment,” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125, because “negligently 12 inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of 13 constitutional due process.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 14 389, 396 (2015); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 15 (1994) (holding that “deliberate indifference entails something 16 more than mere negligence”). Accordingly, “the plaintiffs must 17 [allege] more than negligence but less than subjective intent -- 18 something akin to reckless disregard.” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 19 (citations omitted). 20 Here, Medical Defendants argue that “despite later 21 alleging various ‘failures’ of the Medical Defendants in their 22 assessments and recommended plan of treatment for Ms. Morris,” 23 those allegations are directly contradicted by plaintiffs’ 24 allegations against Officer O’Brien, who they claim prevented 25 Medical Defendants from properly performing their duties. 26 (Docket No. 91 at 14.) As they correctly point out, plaintiffs 27 allege that Officer O’Brien’s obstructive conduct ‘prevented 28 1 medical staff from accurately and adequately assessing’ Ms. 2 Morris’[s] health.” (Plaintiffs’ TAC (Docket No. 86) at ¶ 5.) 3 Thus, Medical Defendants argue that plaintiffs have 4 failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim of 5 deliberate indifference because they “cannot . . . expect the 6 Court to find the Medical Defendants were deliberately 7 indifferent to medical needs they were prevented from knowing.” 8 (Docket No. 91 at 14.) But this argument is unavailing for at 9 least two reasons. 10 First, at the motion to dismiss stage, “[u]nder Federal 11 Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d), a plaintiff may plead inconsistent 12 facts to support two or more statements of a claim, even within 13 the same count.” Gross v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., N.Y., N.Y., No. 14 12-cv-2478 H JMA, 2013 WL 1628138, at *3 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 15 2013) (collecting cases); see also Oxnard Manor LP v. Hallmark 16 Specialty Ins. Co., No. 2:23-cv-01322-SPG-MAR, 2023 WL 8191128, 17 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2023) (“Federal Rule of Civil 18 Procedure 8(d) expressly permits the pleading of alternative, or 19 even inconsistent, claims.”); Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., 86 20 F.4th 961, 979 (2d Cir. 2023), rev'd and remanded on other 21 grounds, 604 U.S. 693 (2025) (“[A] plaintiff may plead two or 22 more statements of a claim, even within the same count, 23 regardless of consistency. . . . [I] a single count, a plaintiff 24 may plead multiple—sometimes contradictory—theories of 25 liability.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).). 26 Second, plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claim does 27 not rely solely upon facts inconsistent with their allegations as 28 1 to Officer O’Brien. Rather, the pleadings allege facts 2 independent from Officer O’Brien’s conduct that can support an 3 inference that Medical Defendants acted with deliberate 4 indifference. (See Plaintiffs’ TAC (Docket No. 86).) 5 Plaintiffs allege Nurse Ricks (1) knew about Ms. 6 Morris’s excessive daily consumption of alcohol over the 7 preceding year as well as how long it had been since Ms. Morris’s 8 last drink, (2) documented in Ms. Morris’s chart that she was in 9 “active withdrawal,” (3) observed Ms. Morris exhibiting symptoms 10 consistent with worsening withdrawal, and (4) recommended 11 administering medication used to taper patients off of 12 benzodiazepines. (Id. at ¶¶ 48, 63, 89—91.) They argue she 13 acted with deliberate indifference because, despite these facts, 14 she declined to conduct a more thorough intake evaluation, placed 15 Ms. Morris in general population rather than having her 16 transported to a hospital for further medical care, and 17 designated her to receive a minimal level of CIWA monitoring that 18 only required evaluation every eight hours. (Id. at ¶¶ 51, 53, 19 58, 94—95.) 20 Plaintiffs also allege that Nurse Pixley acted with 21 deliberate indifference because, while she had access to Ms. 22 Morris’s chart listing her as being in “active withdrawal” and 23 documented signs of potentially worsening withdrawal symptoms, 24 she withheld the timely administration of medication to Ms. 25 Morris despite her asking to be woken up to receive the 26 medication; failed to check Ms. Morris’s vitals when doing so 27 would have indicated a medical emergency; and failed to conduct a 28 1 CIWA evaluation documentation which was not completed until after 2 Ms. Morris had been discovered unresponsive. (Id. at ¶¶ 66—68, 3 73—74, 79, 96.) 4 Plaintiffs further allege that Dr. Britton acted with 5 deliberate indifference because he did not consult Nurse Ricks 6 about the recommended care plan, declined to conduct an 7 independent evaluation of Ms. Morris, and “fail[ed] to order an 8 appropriate housing assignment” or more “frequent CIWA 9 assessments.” (Id. at ¶¶ 61—62.) “[I]t appears that Dr. 10 [Britton]’s involvement in Ms. Morris’s care was limited to 11 rubberstamping the medications chosen by Nurse [Ricks] as part of 12 her initial assessment of Ms. Morris.” (Id. at ¶ 97.) 13 Taking all of plaintiffs’ allegations as true and 14 drawing every reasonable factual inference in plaintiffs’ favor, 15 the court finds that plaintiffs have plead facts sufficient to 16 allege objective deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Medical 17 Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 1 of the TAC as to Nurse 18 Ricks, Nurse Pixley, and Dr. Britton will be denied. 19 B. Claim 2: State-Created Danger 20 Plaintiffs allege that Nurse Ricks, Nurse Pixley, and 21 Dr. Britton are liable under the Fourteenth Amendment on a theory 22 of state-created danger. (Plaintiffs’ TAC (Docket No. 86) at ¶¶ 23 107—15.) 24 To allege state-created danger, plaintiffs must allege 25 three elements: (1) “a state actor’s affirmative actions created 26 or exposed him to ‘an actual, particularized danger [that he] 27 would not otherwise have faced,’” (2) “that the injury he 28 1 suffered was foreseeable,” and (3) “that the state actor was 2 deliberately indifferent to the known danger.” Sinclair v. City 3 of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674, 680 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Hernandez 4 v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2018)) 5 (citation modified). 6 Here, plaintiffs allege that Nurse Ricks, Nurse Pixley, 7 and Dr. Britton were deliberately indifferent to a foreseeable 8 and particularized danger to Ms. Morris that was created through 9 their affirmative acts by (1) “failing to provide [her] with her 10 medication for her withdrawals and seizures,” (2) “failing to 11 perform a proper medical screening,” (3) “failing to continuously 12 monitor” her, (4) “failing to take her vital signs . . . [and] 13 monitor her Oxygen saturation levels,” (5) “failing to administer 14 frequent CIWA assessments commensurate with her risk level of 15 developing delirium tremens and seizures,” and (6) “failing to 16 send her to the hospital where a higher level of care was 17 available[.]” (Plaintiffs’ TAC (Docket No. 86) at ¶ 113.) 18 Medical Defendants argue that the TAC fails to allege 19 facts sufficient to support a claim of state-created danger 20 because it “does not allege any affirmative actions”, yet 21 defendants concede that the TAC does allege affirmative acts with 22 respect to defendants’ “diagnosis, recommended CIWA monitoring 23 levels, and inmate housing location.” (See Docket No. 91 at 19— 24 21.) Plaintiffs also plead that Medical Defendants possessed 25 information that, when taken with the alleged failures to act, 26 support an inference that their inaction may have been 27 deliberate. (Plaintiffs’ TAC (Docket No. 86) at ¶ 112.) 28 1 Further, the TAC pleads facts sufficient to allege the 2 foreseeability element of plaintiffs’ state-created danger claim 3 by alleging facts about the evaluation, diagnosis, monitoring, 4 and treatment of Ms. Morris that, when taken together, can 5 support an inference of foreseeability with respect to at least 6 some dangers. (Id. at ¶¶ 112—14.) 7 Finally, because plaintiffs alleged facts sufficient to 8 support their claim of deliberate indifference under Claim 1, the 9 court finds they have likewise alleged facts sufficient to plead 10 the deliberate indifference element necessary for Claim 2 here. 11 (See id. at ¶¶ 112—15.) Thus, the court finds that plaintiffs 12 have plead facts sufficient to allege state-created danger 13 against Medical Defendants. 14 Accordingly, Medical Defendants’ motion to dismiss 15 Claim 2 of the TAC as to Nurse Ricks, Nurse Pixley, and Dr. 16 Britton will be denied. 17 C. Claims 4 and 5: Monell 18 Plaintiffs allege 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against CFMG 19 based on (1) failure-to-train, (2) custom, practice, and policy, 20 and (3) ratification theories under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 21 Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (Plaintiffs’ 22 TAC (Docket No. 86) at ¶¶ 125—57.) Medical Defendants argue that 23 these claims are time-barred under the applicable statute of 24 limitations. (Docket No. 91 at 11—12.) 25 Section 1983 contains no statute of limitations. See 26 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As such, “[a]ctions brought pursuant to 42 27 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the forum state’s statute of 28 1 limitations for personal injury actions.” Bird v. Dep’t of Hum. 2 Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Knox v. Davis, 3 260 F.3d 1009, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted)). In 4 California, the statute of limitations for a personal injury 5 action is two years. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 335.1. 6 While California law governs the length of the statute 7 of limitations, federal law controls when a civil rights claim 8 accrues. Knox, 260 F.3d at 1013; see also Morales v. City of Los 9 Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2000). “A limitations 10 period begins to run when the claim accrues.” Flynt v. Shimazu, 11 940 F.3d 457, 462 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Levald, Inc. v. City of 12 Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993)). The “discovery 13 rule” provides that “a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or 14 has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the 15 action.” Bird, 935 F.3d at 743 (citing Knox, 260 F.3d at 1013); 16 see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (“It is the 17 standard rule that accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a 18 complete and present cause of action[.]”). 19 Here, the parties do not dispute that the injuries 20 precipitating this action occurred on January 15—17, 2023. (See 21 Docket Nos. 86, 91, 97, 101.) While the record does not indicate 22 the precise day on which plaintiffs were notified about Ms. 23 Morris’s death, based on the representations of counsel during 24 oral arguments, the court assumes that plaintiffs learned of Ms. 25 Morris’s death on approximately January 17, 2023. Thus, the 26 injury underlying plaintiffs’ claims would have accrued on that 27 date. 28 1 It is also undisputed that (1) Wellpath advised 2 plaintiffs that CFMG was an interested party by naming it in its 3 Certificate of Interested Parties, filed on May 24, 2024, and (2) 4 plaintiffs declined to name CFMG as a defendant until filing the 5 TAC on September 19, 2025. (Docket Nos. 15, 86.) Medical 6 Defendants correctly observe that “[p]laintiffs allowed 976 days 7 – over two years and eight months – to elapse after Ms. Morris’s 8 death before finally naming CFMG[.]” (Docket No. 91 at 11.) 9 Given the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury 10 claims in California, then, Medical Defendants argue that “the 11 statute of limitations ran on January 17, 2025,” and that 12 plaintiffs’ claims against CFMG are now time barred as a result. 13 (Id.) 14 Plaintiffs argue in response that their claims against 15 CFMG are not time-barred because, under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(c), 16 the relation back doctrine applies. (Docket No. 97 at 7—10.) In 17 Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., the Supreme Court explained 18 that “Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) asks what the prospective defendant 19 knew or should have known during the Rule 4(m) period, not what 20 the plaintiff knew or should have known at the time of filing her 21 original complaint.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 22 U.S. 538, 548 (2010) (emphasis in original). Ordinarily, 23 “[i]nformation in the plaintiff’s possession is relevant only if 24 it bears on the defendant’s understanding of whether the 25 plaintiff made a mistake regarding the proper party’s identity.” 26 Id. 27 And in Kilkenny v. Arco Marine Inc., the Ninth Circuit 28 1 observed that “Rule 15(c) was intended to protect a plaintiff who 2 mistakenly names a party and then discovers, after the relevant 3 statute of limitations has run, the identity of the proper 4 party.” 800 F.2d 853, 857—58 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 5 U.S. 934 (1987). Crucially, “Rule 15(c) was never intended to 6 assist a plaintiff who ignores or fails to respond in a 7 reasonable fashion to notice of a potential party[.]” Id. The 8 presence of a mistake, however, is key. 9 Here, then, it is relevant that plaintiffs received 10 notice that CFMG was a potential party on May 24, 2024, because 11 that notice bears on CFMG’s understanding of whether plaintiffs 12 made a mistake in failing to name CFMG as a defendant. (See 13 Docket No. 15.) Plaintiffs received notice that CFMG was a 14 potential party approximately 16 months -- and multiple amended 15 complaints -- before adding CFMG as a defendant. (Compare Docket 16 No. 15, with Docket No. 86.) To the extent that plaintiffs are 17 correct that CFMG had “at least constructive notice,” CFMG had 18 reason to believe that plaintiffs were making a tactical decision 19 -- rather than a mistake -- in declining to name CFMG as a 20 defendant. See Kilkenny, 800 F.2d at 857–58 (“A plaintiff’s 21 failure to amend its complaint to add a defendant after being 22 notified of a mistake concerning the identity of a proper party 23 ... may cause the unnamed party to conclude that it was not named 24 because of strategic reasons rather than as a result of 25 plaintiff’s mistake.”); see also Krupski, 560 U.S. 538, 549 26 (2010) (“[M]aking a deliberate choice to sue one party instead of 27 another while fully understanding the factual and legal 28 1 differences between the two parties is the antithesis of making a 2 mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.”) 3 Where a party chooses not to name a defendant for 4 reasons other than mistake, the relation back doctrine under Rule 5 15(c) is unavailable. See Louisiana–Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, 6 Inc., 5 F.3d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the denial of a 7 Rule 15(c) motion where “[t]here was no mistake of identity, but 8 rather a conscious choice of whom to sue.”) 9 Thus, the court finds that plaintiffs’ claims against 10 CFMG are time-barred. Accordingly, the Medical Defendants’ 11 motion to dismiss Claims 4 and Claim 5 against CFMG will be 12 granted. 13 II. Wellpath’s Motion to Dismiss 14 Wellpath moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ TAC with 15 prejudice on the grounds that plaintiffs are enjoined from suit 16 against Wellpath pursuant to a 2025 order issued by the United 17 States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas. 18 (Docket No. 92 at 3.)3 19 Wellpath argues that its liabilities were discharged 20 under the terms of the “First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of 21 Reorganization of Wellpath Holdings, Inc. and Certain of Its 22 Debtor Affiliates” (the “Plan”), which became effective on May 9, 23 2025. (Id. at 3—4.) According to Wellpath, the bankruptcy 24

25 3 While the opposition to this motion was also filed delinquently late, see supra n. 2, the court briefly addresses 26 the merits because Wellpath’s motion hinges on the meaning and 27 effect of the bankruptcy court’s order and this court cannot merely accept that interpretation based solely on the absense of 28 opposition. 1 court’s Confirmation and Stay orders enjoin plaintiffs from 2 pursuing any claims against Wellpath. (Id. at 5.) 3 On November 11, 2024, Wellpath, LLC, and its affiliates 4 (“Debtors”) voluntarily filed petitions in the United States 5 Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas under chapter 6 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. (See Docket No. 45.) 7 Wellpath filed a “Notice of Discharge and Injunction” following 8 the bankruptcy court’s entry of its “Findings of Fact, 9 Conclusions of Law, and Order (I) Confirming the First Amended 10 Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Wellpath Holdings, 11 Inc. and Certain of Its Debtor Affiliates and (II) Approving the 12 Disclosure Statement on a Final Basis” (the “Confirmation Order”) 13 on May 1, 2025, and issuance of a “General Form of Order 14 Regarding Lift Stay Motions” (the “Stay Order”) on June 4, 2025.4 15 (See Docket No. 67.) In response, this court ordered plaintiffs 16 to file an amended complaint “join[ing] the Liquidating Trust of 17 Wellpath’s chapter 11 restructuring as a nominal defendant.” 18 (Docket No. 64 at 3.) 19 A bankruptcy court’s confirmation order effectuating a 20 Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization plan “‘discharges the debtor 21 from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation,’ 22 except as provided in the plan, the confirmation order, or the 23 code.” Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. 204, 214 24 (2024) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A)). Discharge of 25

26 4 Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F. 3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that courts “may take [judicial] notice of 27 proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to 28 matters at issue.” (citation omitted)). 1 liabilities “not only releases or ‘void[s] any past or future 2 judgments on the discharged debt; it also ‘operates as an 3 injunction ... prohibit[ing] creditors from attempting to collect 4 or recover the debt.’” Id. at 215 (citing Tennessee Student 5 Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004)). That said, 6 “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability 7 of any entity on, or the property of any other entity, for such a 8 debt.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(e). 9 Here, Article IX.A of the Plan discharged all “Claims, 10 Interests, and Causes of Action of any nature” that arose against 11 the Debtors prior to the Plan’s effective date. In re Wellpath 12 Holdings, Inc., No. 4:24-bk-90533 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 1, 2025) 13 (Docket No. 2596 at 128—29). And as explained further in the 14 Stay Order, while “[h]olders of personal injury tort and wrongful 15 death Claims against the Debtors are subject to the Trust 16 Distribution Procedures,” they “may also seek determinations of 17 the Debtors’ liability by the appropriate civil court pursuant to 18 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) with the Liquidating Trust as a nominal 19 party.” In re Wellpath Holdings, Inc., No. 4:24-bk-90533 (Docket 20 No. 2907 at 2). Inclusion of the Liquidating Trust as a nominal 21 party is permitted either to “recover against available third- 22 party insurance proceeds” or to “establish or liquidate the 23 amount of their claim for distribution under the Plan from the 24 Liquidating Trust.” Id. 25 Accordingly, and upon this court’s order to do so (see 26 Docket No. 64), plaintiffs added Wellpath Holdings, Inc. 27 Liquidating Trust as a nominal defendant, naming Matthew J. 28 1 Dundon, as Trustee of the Liquidating Trust, in their Second 2 Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (Plaintiffs’ SAC (Docket No. 68).). 3 Yet, the SAC did not remove Wellpath, LLC, as a defendant. (See 4 id.) Likewise, plaintiffs again included Wellpath, LLC, as a 5 defendant in the TAC. (See Plaintiffs’ TAC (Docket No. 86).) 6 In response to the motion, plaintiffs argue that 7 Wellpath remains a proper defendant because plaintiffs “have 8 filed their respective ‘OPT out forms’” in compliance with the 9 bankruptcy court’s Plan and Stay Orders. (Docket No. 96 at 2.) 10 Thus, plaintiffs conclude that they “are not ‘enjoined parties’ 11 and no dismissal is required[.]” (Id.) To support their 12 position, plaintiffs attached copies of the opt-out forms they 13 filed with the bankruptcy court. (Docket No. 96-1.) These opt- 14 out forms, however, clearly apply only to non-debtors. (Id. at 15 9, 29.) As Wellpath is a debtor rather than a non-debtor, then, 16 the opt-out forms do not apply to Wellpath and plaintiffs’ filing 17 of the forms does not circumvent the bankruptcy court’s 18 injunction. 19 Plaintiffs likewise mistakenly construe the ability, 20 under the Plan, of “holders of personal injury tort and wrongful 21 death claims” to “seek determinations of Debtor’s liability by 22 the appropriate civil” action to mean that debtors may be 23 properly named as parties. (See Docket No. 96 at 2—3.) 24 Plaintiffs claim the bankruptcy court’s “Order Denying the Heenan 25 Wilhite (#779594) Lift Stay Motion” (“Wilhite Order”), In re 26 Wellpath Holdings, Inc., No. 4:24-bk-90533 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 27 1, 2025) (Docket No. 2910), supports their view, but the court is 28 1 not persuaded. (See Docket No. 96 at 3.) The Wilhite Order is 2 clear that the injunction prohibiting action agianst Wellpath as 3 a debtor remains unchanged: “The Movant remains enjoined from 4 enforcing recovery from the Debtors, the Debtors’ estates, or the 5 Post-Restructuring Debtors with respect to any indemnification 6 obligations for such employees[.]”. In re Wellpath Holdings, 7 Inc., No. 4:24-bk-90533 (Docket No. 2910 at ¶ 5). 8 Under the terms of the Plan and the Stay Order, 9 however, it is clear that plaintiffs are enjoined from continuing 10 their action against Wellpath, LLC. As the bankruptcy court 11 explained in a separate order clarifying enforcement of the Plan 12 and its injunctive scope, “[t]he Plan does not permit any party 13 to proceed against the Post-Restructuring Debtors or any Debtor, 14 including but not limited to Wellpath LLC, in any capacity, 15 including as a nominal defendant.” In re Wellpath Holdco, LLC, 16 No. 4:24-bk-90566 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. January 26, 2026) (Docket No. 17 1279 at 2). Thus, Wellpath’s motion to dismiss the TAC will be 18 granted. 19 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Medical Defendants’ motion 20 to dismiss (Docket No. 91) be, and the same hereby is DENIED as 21 to Claims 1 and 2 of the Third Amended Complaint, and GRANTED as 22 to claims 4 and 5 as against defendant CFMG; 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Wellpath’s motion to dismiss 24 (Docket No. 92) plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint as against 25 that defendant be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 26 Accordingly, plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint is 27 hereby DISMISSED in its entirety as against defendants California 28 een nee on nnn nn ne en eo nnn EO EO EE Forensic Medical Group, Inc. and Wellpath, LLC.° IT IS SO ORDERED. | patea: March 20, 2026 bette 2d. □□ 4 WILIAMB □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Defendants’ joint motion to strike (Docket No. 98) 27 plaintiffs’ untimely responses in opposition (Docket Nos. 96, 97) is DENIED as MOOT. 28 19