Tittle v. Alabama Power Co.

570 So. 2d 601, 1990 Ala. LEXIS 687, 1990 WL 155119
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedSeptember 7, 1990
Docket88-1654
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 570 So. 2d 601 (Tittle v. Alabama Power Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tittle v. Alabama Power Co., 570 So. 2d 601, 1990 Ala. LEXIS 687, 1990 WL 155119 (Ala. 1990).

Opinion

This is a premises owner liability case in which a summary judgment was entered in favor of the defendant, Alabama Power Company.1 *Page 603

Alabama Power contracted with Combustion Engineering, Inc., and other contractors in the spring of 1985 for maintenance work at Alabama Power's Gorgas steam plant during a scheduled maintenance outage. Tittle, an ironworker, was hired by Combustion Engineering to work on that job. While working at the plant Tittle allegedly slipped on insulation dust that was on the plant floor and fell, injuring his neck and back. He later filed an action against Alabama Power and the insulation contractor.2 Tittle alleged that Alabama Power exercised the right to control the employees of Combustion Engineering on the job site and therefore had a duty to ensure that he had a safe workplace. He alleged that Alabama Power breached its duty by allowing the insulation dust to remain on the floor and thereby proximately caused his fall.

Alabama Power filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that it was merely the premises owner and therefore was under no duty to provide Tittle with a safe workplace. Alabama Power contended that the contract between it and Combustion Engineering made the latter responsible for the safety of its own employees, and Alabama Power denied that it retained or exercised any right of control over the manner in which Combustion Engineering's employees performed their work. The trial court granted Alabama Power's motion, and Tittle appeals. He argues that he presented evidence showing that Alabama Power exercised control over the manner in which Combustion Engineering's employees worked, thereby incurring the responsibility for providing him with a safe workplace.

The general rule regarding the duty owed by premises owners to independent contractors and their employees is settled:

"[A] premises owner owes no duty of care to employees of an independent contractor with respect to working conditions arising during the progress of the work on the contract. 'The general rule does not apply, however, if the premises owner retains or reserves the right to control the manner in which the independent contractor performs its work.' Thompson v. City of Bayou La Batre, 399 So.2d [292] at 294 [(Ala. 1981)]; Hughes v. Hughes, 367 So.2d [1384] at 1386 [(Ala. 1979)]. 'When the right of control is reserved, the relationship changes from one of premises owner and independent contractor to that of master and servant.' 399 So.2d at 294.

"A master-servant relationship is not created, however, when the owner merely retains the right to supervise or inspect work of an independent contractor as it progresses for the purpose of determining whether it is completed according to plans and specifications, and retains the right to stop work that is not properly done. Pate v. United States Steel Corp., 393 So.2d [992] at 995 [(Ala. 1981)]."

Weeks v. Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc., 419 So.2d 1381,1383 (Ala. 1982) (emphasis in original).

In this case the contract between Alabama Power and Combustion Engineering unambiguously assigned the duty of supervising Combustion Engineering's employees to that company. However, this Court's inquiry does not end after examining the contract between the parties; their conduct must also be considered. Alabama Power had a number of "area coordinators" present on the job site to see that the contractors were performing their work in compliance with the specifications in the contracts. Those coordinators were supervised by Steve Ferguson, the assistant maintenance superintendent in charge of the outage at the Gorgas plant. This Court, recognizing that ensuring such compliance is a legitimate concern for the premises owner, has held that this type of supervision does not create a master and servant relationship. Weeks, supra; Pate v.United States Steel Corp., 393 So.2d 992, 995 (Ala. 1981). However, the scope of supervision that can be exercised is limited *Page 604 to protecting the owner's interest in seeing that the results contemplated by the contract are achieved. Id.

If the premises owner exercises control over the means and manner in which the work is performed, the owner-independent contractor relationship is converted to that of master and servant, because an independent contractor relationship exists only if the person doing the work and said to be the independent contractor is subject to the will of his employer, i.e., the person for whom he has contracted to do the work, only as to the result, but not as to the manner of achieving that result. Sawyer v. Chevron USA, Inc., 421 So.2d 1263 (Ala. 1982); 41 Am.Jur.2d Independent Contractor § 8, at 751-52 (1968).

Tittle's motion in opposition to Alabama Power's motion for summary judgment was supported by affidavits by Tittle and Thurman Nichols, his foreman. In those affidavits both men stated that Alabama Power employees gave instructions to Combustion Engineering employees regarding how to perform their work. Alabama Power filed a motion to strike those affidavits, arguing that they contradicted earlier deposition testimony by Tittle and Nichols and for that reason could not be used to create a question of fact to defeat its motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that motion moot on the same day it entered summary judgment for Alabama Power. Tittle argues that the affidavits, together with other evidence, provided a proper basis for denying summary judgment.

This Court has held that when a party to an action has given clear answers to unambiguous questions that negate the existence of any genuine issue of fact, that party cannot later create an issue of fact by submitting an affidavit that directly contradicts, without explanation, that earlier testimony. That rule is based on the concern that such an affidavit might be a sham. Robinson v. Hank Roberts, Inc.,514 So.2d 958, 961 (Ala. 1987); Lady Corinne Trawlers v. ZurichIns. Co., 507 So.2d 915, 917-18 (Ala. 1987); See also Van T.Junkins Associates, Inc. v. U.S. Industries, Inc.,736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir. 1984).

Nichols was not a party to this action, and to date this Court has applied the rule stated in Robinson and Lady CorinneTrawlers only to parties, recognizing the motivation they might have to fabricate a sham affidavit. There is no reason to assume that disinterested third parties possess the same motive, and thus, the logic that supports the application of the rule to parties is not present. Even assuming that the rule could be applied to affidavits of non-parties in some instances, it is not applicable here, because Nichols's affidavit did not contradict clear answers to unambiguous questions in his deposition.

Alabama Power cites the following two questions and answers from Nichols's deposition:

"Q. At any time were you given any directions directly by an Alabama Power Company employee?

"A. No.

"Q.

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Bluebook (online)
570 So. 2d 601, 1990 Ala. LEXIS 687, 1990 WL 155119, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tittle-v-alabama-power-co-ala-1990.