Title Max of South Carolina Inc v. Crowley

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedApril 28, 2021
Docket4:20-cv-02938
StatusUnknown

This text of Title Max of South Carolina Inc v. Crowley (Title Max of South Carolina Inc v. Crowley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Title Max of South Carolina Inc v. Crowley, (D.S.C. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA FLORENCE DIVISION TITLEMAX OF SOUTH CAROLINA, ) Case No.: 4:20-cv-02938-JD-TER INC., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) VS. ) ORDER ) JESSICA RENEE CROWLEY, ) ) Defendant. ) oo)

This matter is before the Court on TitleMax of South Carolina, Inc.’s (“Plaintiff or “TitleMax”) Motion for Preliminary Injunction pursuant to Rule 65(a) Fed. R. Civ. P. TitleMax seeks an Order enjoining Jessica Renee Crowley (“Defendant”) “from: (1) further contact with Plaintiff's customers to encourage withdrawing, curtailing or cancelling their business with Plaintiff; (2) further use or disclosure of Plaintiff's Confidential Information and Trade Secrets; (3) making any disparaging or defamatory statements regarding Plaintiff; and (4) otherwise breaching or violating the Confidentiality Agreement or Covenants Agreement.” (DE 5-2, p.1.) Defendant, proceeding Pro Se, did not filed a response to the motion.' For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction 1s granted. BACKGROUND This matter arises out of, inter alia, a breach of contract dispute filed by TitleMax. (DE 1.) TitleMax is a South Carolina regulated lender that offers loans at retail locations throughout South Carolina. (DE 5-2, p. 1.) Defendant is a former employee hired as the Store Manager of its

! Because Defendant did not file a response to this motion, this Court will rely on Defendant’s answer to the complaint in addressing this motion.

Cheraw, South Carolina, location in 2016. (DE 5-2, p. 1.) TitleMax alleges that on March 24, 2020, while employed by the company Defendant called one of its customers and advised them “to stop making payments to Plaintiff pursuant to existing loan agreements because the agreements are illegal and unenforceable.” (DE 5-2, p. 3.) TitleMax further alleges “Defendant also encouraged the Cheraw Customer to file a lawsuit in North Carolina seeking a determination the

loan agreements – executed in South Carolina and containing a South Carolina choice-of-law provision – are governed by North Carolina law.” (DE 5-2, p. 3.) Moreover, TitleMax claims that Defendant “indicated [to the customer] she was in the process of contacting all Titlemax’s customers and intended to shut Titlemax down.” (DE 5-1, ¶ 16.) TitleMax contends one of its customers informed it that “Defendant’s efforts are not limited to her; rather, Defendant has contacted other customers to encourage additional breaches of loan agreements and the customers’ participation in litigation against Plaintiff in North Carolina.” (DE 5-2, p. 4.) Defendant denied these allegations in her Answer and contends she “has no desire or need to contact any Titlemax customers or try to shut Titlemax down.” (DE 9, ¶ 14.) The parties entered

two agreements regarding Defendant’s employment with TitleMax, a Confidentiality and Non- Solicitation Agreement (“Confidentiality Agreement”) and an Employment Covenants Agreement (“Covenants Agreement”). (DE 5-2, p. 1-2.) The Confidentiality Agreement gave Defendant access to current customers and customer lists and other confidential information. However, it prohibited Defendant’s use of such information outside the Plaintiff’s business or in any way detrimental to Plaintiff’s interests. (DE 5-2 p. 2.) This prohibition applied during the term of Defendant’s employment and any time thereafter. (DE 5-2, p. 2.) Furthermore, the Covenants Agreement limited Defendant’s ability to use TitleMax’s Confidential Information and Trade Secrets following her separation from employment. (DE 5-2, p. 2.) Additionally, it prohibited Defendant from “disparaging or defaming Plaintiff.” (DE 5-2, p. 2.) Lastly, the agreements provided equitable remedies clauses. “The Confidentiality Agreement provides that in the event of an actual or threatened breach of any term, covenant, or provision, Plaintiff shall be entitled to injunctive relief (temporary, preliminary and permanent)

against Defendant as a remedy at law would be inadequate and insufficient.” (DE 5-2, p. 2.) “Similarly, the Covenants Agreement provides that a breach or threatened breach by Defendant would cause irreparable harm and that monetary damages would be both inadequate and difficult to determine.” (DE 5-2, p. 2.) LEGAL STANDARD Under Rule 65(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., a court may issue a preliminary injunction. A

preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy . . . which is to be applied only in [the] limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). The primary purpose behind the issuance of a preliminary injunction is to “protect the status quo and to prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of a lawsuit ultimately to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful judgment on the merits.” In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2003). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish all four of the following elements: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

If a preliminary injunction motion is granted, the order granting it must “(A) state the reasons why it issued; (B) state its terms specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail-and not by referring to the complaint or any other document-the act or acts restrained or required.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d). DISCUSSION TitleMax’s request for injunctive relief relates only to the fourth and fifth causes of action asserted in the Complaint (i.e., Breach of Confidentiality Agreement and Breach of Covenants

Agreement). TitleMax is likely to succeed on the merits of these claims. Defendant does not dispute the existence or the validity of the agreements.2 (DE 9.) Rather, Defendant claims that “I have no recollection of said phone call that occurred on March 24, 2020, [and] I have never encouraged a customer to not make monthly payments on time, [and] I have no knowledge of telling any customer to sue Titlemax.” (DE 9 ¶ 3, 11, 13.) However, TitleMax has presented a Declaration of Christy Craft (“Craft”) District Director of Operations for TitleMax declaring and affirming inter alia Defendant’s alleged phone calls and conduct toward its customers. (DE 5-1, p. 1-3.) Given Defendant has failed to respond to TitleMax’s motion or offer any evidence to refute Craft’s Declaration, this Court finds that TitleMax is likely to succeed on the merits of its

breach of agreement causes of action. Furthermore, TitleMax is also likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. Generally, “irreparable injury is suffered when monetary damages are difficult to ascertain or are inadequate.” Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating Co., 22 F.3d 546, 551 (4th Cir. 1994) “However, when the failure to grant preliminary relief creates the possibility of permanent loss of customers to a competitor or the loss of goodwill, the irreparable injury prong is satisfied.” Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In re Microsoft Corporation Antitrust Litigation
333 F.3d 517 (Fourth Circuit, 2003)
Riedman Corporation v. Jarosh
349 S.E.2d 404 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1986)
International Controls Corp. v. Vesco
490 F.2d 1334 (Second Circuit, 1974)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Title Max of South Carolina Inc v. Crowley, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/title-max-of-south-carolina-inc-v-crowley-scd-2021.