Tinsley v. United States

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: April 22, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2988
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _________________________________________ ) TREVAR D. TINSLEY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 24-cv-02988 (APM) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________________________ )

ORDER

Before the court is Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 8 [hereinafter

Def.’s Mot.]. The motion is denied.

Plaintiff Trevar D. Tinsley is a former member of the United States Army. Compl.,

ECF No. 1, ¶ 3. He brings a collateral attack—not a request for direct review—of his court-martial

conviction. Id. at 1. 1 The court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider his challenges.

The D.C. Circuit has read Schlesigner v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), as holding that “federal

courts have jurisdiction to review the validity of court-martial proceedings brought by non-

custodial plaintiffs who cannot bring habeas suits.” Sanford v. United States, 586 F.3d 28, 32

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). It also has held that 28 USC § 1331 provides federal

courts with subject matter jurisdiction to hear such actions. See U.S. ex rel. New v. Rumsfeld, 448

F.3d 403, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Sanford and New thus make clear that a federal court’s jurisdiction

to collaterally review a service member’s conviction is not limited, as Defendant argues, to “the

1 Contrary to what Defendant says, Plaintiff is not seeking a direct review of his conviction. See Def.’s Mem. in Support of Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 8-1, at 5. His complaint plainly states he is seeking “collateral review of an unconstitutional conviction by a general court-martial.” Compl. at 1. framework of some other suit” in which the plaintiff “seeks a remedy—such as release or an award

of back pay—that may be granted after declining to give res judicata effect to the court-martial

judgment.” See Def.’s Mem. in Support of Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 8-1, at 6–7. Those authorities

also dispose of Defendant’s contentions that sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims and that

Plaintiff lacks a cause of action. See id. at 9–10.

The parties shall meet and confer and, by April 29, 2025, propose a schedule for further

proceedings in this matter, including a schedule for summary judgment. The parties’ summary

judgment papers shall address the merits of Plaintiff’s claims under the standard of review for non-

custodial collateral attacks on court-martial proceedings set forth in Sanford, 586 F.3d at 32

(“[T]here are two steps in applying the ‘full and fair consideration’ standard: (1) a review of the

military court’s thoroughness in examining the relevant claims, at least where thoroughness is

contested; and (2) a close look at the merits of the claim, albeit with some degree of deference and

certainly more than under [a] de novo standard.”); see also Henry v. Kendall, No. 21-cv-865

(CKK), 2022 WL 3081408, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2022). This instruction is not meant to foreclose

Defendant from arguing that a more deferential standard should apply. See Sanford, 586 F. 3d. at

31–33 (discussing the Supreme Court’s approaches to collateral review of custodial versus non-

custodial collateral attacks of court-martial proceedings).

Dated: April 22, 2025 Amit P. Mehta United States District Court Judge