Tino R. Spears v. City of San Francisco, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 5, 2026
• Docket: 4:22-cv-04523
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TINO R. SPEARS, Case No. 4:22-cv-04523-KAW

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 9 v. PLEADINGS

10 CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 70 11 Defendants.

12 13 On December 10, 2025, Defendant City and County of San Francisco filed a motion for 14 judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the claims in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint 15 were barred by the statute of limitations. (Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 70.) 16 Upon review of the moving papers, the Court finds this matter suitable for resolution 17 without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and, for the reasons set forth below, 18 GRANTS Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismisses the case with 19 prejudice because any amendment would be futile. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 A. Relevant Factual Background 22 On January 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Government Claim with the San Francisco’s City 23 Attorney Office alleging misconduct on behalf of the San Francisco Police Department stemming 24 from an event that occurred in 2007. (Decl. of William M. Layne, “Layne Decl.,” Dkt. No. 70-1 ¶ 25 2, Ex. A.) On January 19, 2022, the City Attorney’s Office mailed correspondence to Plaintiff 26 informing him that his claim was insufficient because the document failed to state a specific date. 27 (Layne Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B.) Plaintiff did not respond to the letter, and the City denied Plaintiff’s 1 lawsuit. (See Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) 2 On March 8, 2023, the City was served with summons and Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint 3 alleging misconduct on behalf of San Francisco Police Department officers. (See Dkt. No. 18.) 4 The parties extensively met and conferred regarding perceived deficiencies in the amended 5 complaint, and Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on May 16, 2025. (See 6 Second Am. Compl., “SAC,” Dkt. No. 62.) Therein, Plaintiff alleges two claims: 1) Violation of 7 the Thirteenth Amendment, Slavery; and 2) Slavery, False Arrest, Unlawful Detention, and 8 Kidnapping. Plaintiff has maintained that the conduct leading to the allegations occurred in July 9 2007. (SAC at p. 31.) 10 B. Procedural Background 11 On December 10, 2025, Defendant City and County of San Francisco2 filed a motion for 12 judgment on the pleadings. (Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 70.) Plaintiff did not file an opposition, and, on 13 January 5, 2026, the Court issued an order to show cause to Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 73.) That same 14 day, Plaintiff filed a response indicating that his untimeliness was due to “severe mental health 15 issues.” (Dkt. No. 74 at 2.) Therein, Plaintiff asked for a 60-day extension of time. Id. Despite 16 Plaintiff’s assertion that this document was an opposition to the pending motion, it was not a 17 meaningful opposition, so the Court construed the filing as seeking an extension of time to file an 18 opposition to the pending motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. No. 75 at 1.) The Court 19 granted Plaintiff’s request for a 60-day extension and ordered that he file an opposition by no later 20 than February 23, 2026. Id. Plaintiff was advised that there would be no further extensions and 21 “that the failure to timely file an opposition by the February 23, 2026 deadline will result in the 22 motion for judgment on the pleadings being granted as unopposed and the case being dismissed 23 with prejudice for failure to prosecute.” Id. at 2. 24 On February 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed several documents. While erroneously docketed as a 25 letter, the Court construes Dkt. No. 78 as the opposition to the motion for judgment on the 26

27 1 The operative complaint does not provide paragraph numbering for all facts alleged, so all 1 pleadings. (Pl.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 78.) 3 Despite its prior admonition, the Court will accept 2 Plaintiff’s opposition filed one day late. On March 2, 2026, Defendant filed a reply. (Def.’s 3 Reply, Dkt. No. 82.) 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the 6 pleadings after the pleadings are closed but early enough not to delay trial. “Judgment on the 7 pleadings is properly granted when there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving 8 party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 9 2009). 10 “[T]he same standard of review applicable to a Rule 12(b) motion applies to its Rule 12(c) 11 analog,” because the motions are “functionally identical.” Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 12 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). A Rule 12(c) motion may thus be predicated on either (1) the 13 lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See 14 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). When considering a motion 15 to dismiss under Rule 12(c), the court “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true 16 and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 17 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). 18 In ruling on the motion, the court may consider exhibits attached to the pleadings, Durning 19 v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987), and facts which may be judicially 20 noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). When a court 21 grants a Rule 12(c) motion, leave to amend should be freely given if it is possible that further 22 factual allegations will cure any defect. See Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 23 2013). 24 25 3 The Court notes that Plaintiff is a pro se e-filer. The document filed as an opposition is a 26 handwritten letter explaining why the opposition (Dkt. No. 78) was filed one day late, rather than an opposition to the pending motion. (See Dkt. No. 76.) Moreover, while Dkt. No. 78 was 27 docketed as a motion to amend the complaint, it is an opposition to the pending motion and III. DISCUSSION 1 Defendant seeks to dismiss the second amended complaint on the grounds that both causes 2 of action are barred by the statute of limitations, and that, additionally, the first cause of action for 3 violation of the Thirteenth Amendment fails to state a claim. (Def.’s Mot. at 7-10.) Both claims 4 are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5 A. Section 1983 Claims 6 Defendant argues that both claims are time-barred. (Def.’s Mot. at 7.) To state a claim 7 under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the 8 Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the violation was committed by 9 a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Since both of 10 Plaintiff’s claims arise under the Constitution, they must be brought under Section 1983. 11 Since Section 1983 does not have its own statute of limitations, “the federal courts apply 12 the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law 13 regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent 14 with federal law.” Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014). 15 Here, the forum state is California, and “California’s statute of limitations for personal injury 16 claims is two years.” See id. 17 The operative complaint concerns an incident that occurred on July 4, 2007. (SAC at pp. 3, 18 10.) The case, however, was not filed until August 5, 2022, which is more than 15 years later. 19 In opposition, Plaintiff makes new allegations against third-party individuals during that 20 same time frame, so those allegations would be time-barred. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-2.) 21 Thus, the Section 1983 claims are barred by the statute of limitations absent allegations 22 that would provide a basis for tolling. 23 i. Equitable tolling 24 Defendant argues that equitable tolling does not apply to the 15-year delay and that 25 Plaintiff’s tolling allegations are conclusory and legally insufficient. (Def.’s Mot. at 8.) 26 Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s general allegations regarding memory loss and 27 mental health issues are insufficient to toll the statute of limitations, as tolling only applies for 1 legal incapacity at the time of accrual rather than at some point after. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. 2 Code § 352(a).) As a result, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to suggest 3 that he was legally incapacitated. (Def.’s Mot. at 8.) 4 In opposition, Plaintiff argus that he did not remember many of the details of these 5 incidents until November and December 2025 due to memory loss, but “[n]ow I remember almost 6 everything.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.) 7 In general, equitable tolling exists “to relieve hardships which, from time to time, arise 8 from a hard and fast adherence to more absolute legal rules, which, if strictly applied, threaten the 9 evils of archaic rigidity.” Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1052 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 10 omitted). It is only available in “extreme cases,” and “has been applied sparingly.” Scholar v. 11 Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 267 (9th Cir. 1992). The party invoking “equitable tolling bears the 12 burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 13 that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.” Wong, 732 F.3d at 1052 (internal 14 quotation omitted). The first element “requires the effort that a reasonable person might be 15 expected to deliver under his or her particular circumstances. Central to the analysis is whether 16 the plaintiff was without any fault in pursuing his claim.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). As to 17 the second element, the party “must show that extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his 18 untimeliness and . . . made it impossible to file the document on time.” Id. (internal quotation 19 omitted). Thus, equitable tolling is generally granted “when litigants are unable to file timely 20 documents as a result of external circumstances beyond their direct control.” Id. (internal 21 quotation omitted). 22 The Ninth Circuit has found that mental incompetence can toll a statute of limitations 23 when it “precludes a person from asserting his rights during the proper time period.” Brockamp v. 24 United States, 67 F.3d 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds by United States v. 25 Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1996); see also Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 465 n.9 (9th Cir. 26 2008) (citing Brockamp for the proposition that “equitable tolling may be appropriate . . . if a 27 medical condition prevented a plaintiff from filing suit”). To establish equitable tolling, the 1 his control by demonstrating the impairment was so severe that either (a) plaintiff was unable 2 rationally or factually to personally understand the need to timely file, or (b) plaintiff's mental 3 state rendered him unable personally to prepare a complaint and effectuate its filing.” Johnson v. 4 Lucent Techs. Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011).4 5 In determining whether mental impairment is an extraordinary circumstance, courts in this 6 circuit have found that “[t]he threshold for incapacitation . . . requires a showing that the plaintiff 7 ‘was completely psychiatrically disabled during the relevant limitation period.’” Lacayo, 2015 WL 8 993448, at *11 (quoting Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999)). For example, in 9 Stoll, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling because “[t]he 10 effects of the repeated sexual abuse, rape, and assault she experienced left her severely impaired 11 and unable to function in many respects,” observing that the plaintiff had repeatedly attempted 12 suicide, and was unable to read, open mail, function in society, and exercise an agency 13 relationship with her attorney. 165 F.3d at 1242. In Forbess v. Franke, the Ninth Circuit likewise 14 found that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling of his habeas petition where the plaintiff 15 suffered severe delusions that he was an undercover FBI agent working to apprehend his ex-wife, 16 and that the FBI had staged his conviction in an effort to lure his ex-wife out of hiding. 749 F.3d 17 837, 839-40. The plaintiff also believed that the FBI had asked him to stay in prison until his ex- 18 wife was arrested, at which time the FBI would secure his release, therefore making it unnecessary 19 to file a habeas petition. Id. at 839. The Ninth Circuit explained that “the peculiar nature of [the 20 plaintiff's] mental illness” made it so that it was not possible for the plaintiff to “rationally 21 understand the need to pursue federal post-conviction relief [because] if his reluctance to do so 22 was due to his delusional belief that the FBI wanted him to lay low as bait for the cartel, then 23 before the delusion lifted nothing anyone might have said to him about the need to timely file 24 would have altered his behavior.” Id. at 841. In other words, “[e]ven if [the plaintiff] had 25

26 4 Although stated in the disjunctive, in Forbess v. Franke, the Ninth Circuit stated that both prongs had to be met. 749 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2014) ("The impairment must have been (1) so severe 27 that the petitioner was unable personally to understand the need to timely file a habeas petition, 1 understood his legal rights completely, he would not have filed.” Id. 2 In contrast, courts have not applied equitable tolling based on mental disability even where 3 the plaintiff suffered significant mental health issues. In Orthel v. Yates, the Ninth Circuit 4 declined to apply equitable tolling where the plaintiff “grappled periodically with significant 5 mental issues during his incarceration,” but had also been occasionally found to be “fully alert and 6 oriented” with “fairly good insight and judgment regarding his illness,” was described as 7 “responsive, clear, coherent, and high functioning,” and had at times been able to “participate[] 8 productively in correspondence courses, college-level courses, and prison programming that 9 required substantial mental competence.” 795 F.3d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 2015). In Lacayo, the 10 district court likewise found that equitable tolling did not apply where the plaintiff had been 11 diagnosed with bipolar disorder, PTSD, and depression, but was still able to apply for state 12 disability benefits and file written requests for copies of her employment file. 2015 WL 993448, 13 at *12. Thus, the district court found that the plaintiff did not suffer “the type of utter 14 incompetence that gives rise to incapacitation-based tolling.” Id. Similarly, in Elshirbing v. 15 Hewlett Packard Co., the district court did not apply equitable tolling where the plaintiff asserted 16 that she had chronic fatigue syndrome and other work injuries with incapacitating side effects, and 17 that the defendants had suppressed and oppressed her motivation to an inferior intellectual status 18 which impacted her emotionally and psychologically. Case No. 00-cv-4104-MMC, 2001 WL 19 590034, at *4. The district court found that there no showing that these “asserted medical 20 problems significantly impaired her ability to function or to communicate,” or from obtaining the 21 information she needed. Id. at *5. 22 Here, Plaintiff fails to explain how his memory loss and mental health issues prevented 23 him from filing the instant lawsuit for 15 years. Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege that he had 24 no recollection of the July 4, 2007 incident itself during this time period. Rather, he claims that he 25 only now remembers more specific facts and who was involved. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-2.) This is 26 not the degree of complete psychiatric disability and utter incompetency required for equitable 27 tolling. 1 him from filing sooner, the statute of limitations presumably ran in 2009, so the pandemic 2 occurring 11 years later cannot toll an already-expired limitations period. (See SAC at p. 7.) 3 Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege equitable tolling for the intervening 15 years 4 between the incident and the filing of the initial complaint. 5 ii. Discovery Rule 6 While Plaintiff does not raise the discovery rule in opposition, the Court will address it, 7 because Plaintiff appears to invoke it in the second amended complaint. (See SAC at p. 7.) Under 8 state law, “[g]enerally speaking, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action is 9 complete with all of its elements.” Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 806, 27 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 110 P.3d 914 (2005) (cleaned up). The discovery rule is an exception to the 11 accrual rule and postpones “accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason 12 to discover, the cause of action.” Id. at 807. 13 In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff explains why he did not file the lawsuit sooner. 14 (SAC at p.7.) Plaintiff contends that he did not remember certain facts, and that medical 15 investigations, testing, “undiscovered injuries” and medical confirmation of worsening injuries 16 were the cause of the delay. Id. To the extent that he is attempting to invoke the discovery rule 17 and argue that his claims accrued later, the Court is not persuaded, because Plaintiff had “reason to 18 at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured them” at the time of the incident in 2007. 19 See Fox, 35 Cal. 4th at 807. Moreover, accrual occurs even if the plaintiff does not know a 20 defendant’s identity, because the identity is not an element of the cause of action, and presumably 21 the plaintiff will have an opportunity to discover the defendant’s identity during the course of 22 litigation. Id. (citing Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal. 4th 383, 399 (1999)). This is why we have 23 doe defendants. See ids. In sum, “[t]he discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or 24 should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action.” Fox, 35 Cal. 4th at 807 (emphasis added). 25 Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he was unaware of the 2007 incident giving rise to his claims, 26 so the discovery rule would not apply. 27 Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that he was pursuing his rights diligently B. Thirteenth Amendment Claim 1 Next, Defendant argues that the Thirteenth Amendment claim is independently unviable. 2 (Def.’s Mot. at 9.) The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. U.S. 3 Const. amend. XIII, § 1. To successfully state a claim, a plaintiff must allege that he was 4 compelled or otherwise “forced to work for the defendant by the use or threat of physical restraint 5 or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process.” United 6 States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). Generally, courts have limited the Amendment to 7 circumstances involving compelled labor. Id. 8 Here, Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts allege that, “[he] was arrested and enslaved,” and 9 “Treated like a slave. Unlawful detention by SFPD. White male SFPD officer (no records).” (SAC 10 at p. 4:18, 20.) Plaintiff’s allegations, if accepted as true, would amount to police misconduct, 11 which is addressable through the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff does not allege 12 conduct that would tend to show that he was enslaved. For example, Plaintiff does not describe the 13 work he was forced to do or how he was forced to do it. Instead, his conclusory allegations that he 14 was “enslaved” and “treated like a slave” better describe how he felt about the treatment, rather 15 than constituting a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 16 In opposition, Plaintiff provided more facts pertaining to his allegations. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 1- 17 2.) Therein, he alleged that he was drugged and kidnapped while doing confidential informant 18 (“CI”) work for the San Francisco Police Department. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-2.) He claims to have 19 been cuffed to a bench at the Tenderloin Police Station, where he was “sexually attacked.” Id. at 1. 20 In reply, Defendant argues that this claim is both time-barred and that the claim fails 21 because the Thirteenth Amendment only applies to compelled labor and involuntary servitude. 22 (Def.’s Reply at 4.) The Court agrees with both arguments. While the facts alleged in the 23 operative complaint and in Plaintiff’s later submissions are horrifying, he is attempting to frame a 24 police misconduct claim as a Thirteenth Amendment claim, which it is not. Moreover, as 25 discussed above, the claim is separately time-barred, because the statute of limitations for claims 26 brought under Section 1983 is two years. See discussion, supra, Part III.A. 27 Accordingly, the Court finds that the Thirteenth Amendment claim is barred by the ] applicable statute of limitations. Additionally, this claim is subject to dismissal for failure to state 2 || aclaim for enslavement. Thus, the motion must be granted as to this cause of action. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant City and County of San 5 || Francisco’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend because the case is 6 || barred by the statute of limitations rendering any amendment futile. 7 The Court will issue judgment separately in Defendant’s favor. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: June 5, 2026 10 DIS A. WESTMORE 1 United States Magistrate Judge a 12

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