Timothy Blon Hopkins v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 18, 2024
• Docket: 05-23-00970-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 18, 2024

In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00970-CR

TIMOTHY BLON HOPKINS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 86th Judicial District Court Kaufman County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 22-00533-86-F

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Reichek, Nowell, and Carlyle Opinion by Justice Reichek Following a jury trial, Timothy Blon Hopkins appeals his conviction for

sexual assault. In two issues, he challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to

prove lack of consent and contends the punishment charge failed to properly instruct

the jury on his eligibility for parole. We affirm the conviction.

Background

Appellant was charged with intentionally and knowingly causing the

penetration of the sexual organ of Diane (a pseudonym) with his sexual organ,

without Diane’s consent. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(1)(A). Sexual assault

is generally a second-degree felony, but is a first-degree felony if it involves certain prohibited sexual conduct, such as engaging in sexual intercourse with the actor’s

current or former stepchild. See id. §§ 22.011(f); 25.02(a)(2). Here, the indictment

alleged appellant intentionally and knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse with

Diane, a person he knew to be his stepchild.

Diane first met appellant when she was a young child. Her mother later

married him. At the time of the offense, Diane was age 17 and lived with her mother,

appellant, and three siblings. On the night of April 3, 2020, Diane was playing cards

and drinking alcohol with appellant and other family members. When it was time

for bed, Diane went to her bedroom. She was in bed with the light on when appellant

came in and shut the door behind him. Appellant told Diane she was beautiful. He

then started kissing her and got into her bed. Appellant took off Diane’s shirt and

kissed and grabbed her breasts. She was “telling him to stop,” but he did not stop.

He took off her underwear, licked her vagina, and penetrated her vagina with his

penis. After some time passed, appellant stopped because Diane was crying. He

told her he was sorry, that he did not know why he did it, and that it would not

happen again.

The jury found appellant guilty of sexual assault as charged in the indictment

and found he engaged in prohibited sexual conduct by intentionally and knowingly

engaging in sexual intercourse with a person he knew to be his stepchild. The range

of punishment was 5 to 99 years or life. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32(a). The

–2– jury assessed appellant’s punishment at confinement for 28 years. This appeal

followed. The State did not file a brief.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

We first address appellant’s second issue, in which he contends the evidence

is legally insufficient to support his conviction. He does not dispute that he had

sexual intercourse with his stepchild Diane. He argues the evidence is insufficient

to prove lack of consent because it does not show he used force, violence, or

coercion.

The penal code lists various circumstances in which a sexual assault is without

consent. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b). As is relevant to this case, a sexual

assault is without the consent of the other person if the actor compels the other person

to submit or participate by the use of physical force, violence, or coercion. Id. §

22.011(b)(1). The terms “force” and “violence” are synonymous when used in

relation to sexual assault. Wisdom v. State, 708 S.W.2d 840, 843 n.3 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1986). There is no requirement that a certain amount of force be used, only

that it be used. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(1); Carbajal v. State, 659

S.W.3d 164, 180 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. ref’d). Sexual assault is defined by

the actor’s compulsion, not by the victim’s resistance. Carbajal, 659 S.W.3d at 180.

In a case such as this involving a victim 17 years of age or younger, a sexual

assault conviction is supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07; see Carbajal, 659 S.W.3d at 180. Evidence

–3– is legally sufficient if any rational juror could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Delarosa v. State, 677 S.W.3d 668, 674 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2023).

Here, Diane’s testimony was that when appellant climbed into her bed, took

off her shirt, and touched her breasts, she told him to stop. He ignored her

protestation and continued to undress her and put his penis inside her. A rational

jury could have determined appellant compelled Diane to submit to sexual

intercourse through the use of physical force and violence.

Appellant compares his case to Jiminez v. State, 727 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. ref’d), in which the defendant was acquitted of sexual

assault. Jiminez is not binding on this Court and is factually and procedurally

distinguishable. The complainant in that case was a college student who fell asleep

in a building on campus after drinking alcohol. While in a state she described as

“three-fourths high and three-fourths asleep,” she became aware that someone was

in the room with her and had placed his hand on her vaginal area. Id. at 791. She

did not protest his actions, and when she realized he was a university police officer

armed with a gun, she pretended to be asleep or unconscious. Id. The defendant

inserted his finger into her vagina. Id. The complainant coughed loudly to make the

defendant think she was waking up, and he fled. Id. at 791–92. There was no

communication between the complainant and her attacker during the incident. Id. at

792.

–4– At the time, the sufficiency of the evidence was measured by the jury charge

actually given, not against a hypothetically correct jury charge as it is now. See

Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 239–40 (Tex. 1997). The Jiminez jury was

instructed that a sexual assault is without consent if the defendant compels the other

person to submit or participate by the use or the threat of physical force or violence.

Jiminez, 727 S.W.2d at 791. The charge did not instruct the jury that a sexual assault

is also without consent when the other person has not consented and the actor knows

she is unconscious or physically unable to resist or knows she is unaware the sexual

assault is occurring. Id. at 792; see TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(3) & (5).

Because the court of appeals concluded there was no evidence the defendant

intentionally or knowingly used or threatened to use force or violence—the only

theories of lack of consent in the charge, the court reversed the conviction. Jiminez,

727 S.W.2d at 792–93. In this case, there was communication between Diane and

appellant during the incident. She told him to stop his sexual actions, but he ignored

her and continued to force himself on her. The evidence is legally sufficient to

support appellant’s conviction for sexual assault. We overrule appellant’s second

issue.

Jury-Charge Error

In his first issue, appellant argues the jury charge on punishment contained an

erroneous instruction on the law of parole eligibility. He asserts the jury should have

been instructed as set out in § 4(a) of article 37.07 of the code of criminal procedure

–5– instead of as set out in § 4(b). Appellant did not object to the instruction and now

contends the error caused him egregious harm. We agree the instruction was

erroneous, but conclude appellant was not egregiously harmed.

The punishment charge included the instruction found in article 37.07, § 4(b),

which states in part:

Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the defendant will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served plus any good conduct time earned equals one-fourth of the sentence imposed or 15 years, whichever is less.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 4(b) (emphasis added). Because appellant

was found guilty of sexual assault, an offense listed in article 42A.054(a) of the code

of criminal procedure, the charge should have instead included the instruction found

in article 37.07, § 4(a):

Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the defendant will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served equals one-half of the sentence imposed or 30 years, whichever is less. If the defendant is sentenced to a term of less than four years, the defendant must serve at least two years before the defendant is eligible for parole.

Id. art. 37.07, § 4(a) (emphasis added); see id. art. 42A.054(a)(8). Thus, the jury was

erroneously instructed that appellant would not become eligible for parole until the

actual time served, plus good conduct time, equaled one-fourth of the sentence

imposed. It should have been instructed that appellant would not become eligible

for parole until the actual time served, without considering good conduct time,

–6– equaled one-half of the sentence imposed. See Igo v. State, 210 S.W.3d 645, 646

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

All alleged jury-charge error must be considered on appellate review

regardless of whether it was preserved in the trial court. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d

645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). If there was no objection to an erroneous charge,

we decide whether the appellant was egregiously harmed by the charge. Alcoser v.

State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). We assess harm in light of the

entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and

weight of the probative evidence, the argument of counsel, and any other relevant

information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Id. An erroneous jury

charge is egregiously harmful if it affects the very basis of the case, deprives the

accused of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory. Id. A finding of

egregious harm must be based on actual harm rather than theoretical harm. Id.

Egregious harm is a difficult standard to meet, and the analysis is a fact-specific one.

Id.

Other courts confronted with an identical error have determined it did not

cause egregious harm. See Igo, 210 S.W.3d at 647–48; Hogan v. State, 440 S.W.3d

211, 217–18 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d); Stewart v. State,

293 S.W.3d 853, 862 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. ref’d). After considering

and weighing the relevant factors in this case, we conclude the erroneous instruction

regarding the parole law did not cause egregious harm to appellant. Looking at the

–7– punishment charge as a whole, the jury was instructed that it was “not to consider

the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant.”

This curative language mitigates against a finding of egregious harm. Igo, 210

S.W.3d at 647. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume the jury followed the

charge and did not consider the manner in which parole might affect appellant’s

incarceration. See Crenshaw v. State, 378 S.W.3d 460, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

Next, we consider the state of the evidence. Under this factor, we determine

whether the evidence made it more or less likely that the charge error caused

appellant actual harm. Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d 834, 841 (Tex. Crim. App.

2015). Evidence showed appellant sexually assaulted Diane once before when she

was 13. Diane told her mom about it, but later recanted because appellant was the

breadwinner for their family. During the punishment phase, appellant stipulated he

had prior convictions for burglary of a habitation, robbery, and aggravated robbery.

The jury heard from the victim of the aggravated robbery, who testified about

appellant’s lack of remorse. We conclude the state of the evidence does not support

a determination of egregious harm.

Third, we consider whether any arguments made by the parties or the trial

judge exacerbated or ameliorated the charge error. Patterson v. State, No. 05-21-

01024-CR, 2024 WL 861388, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 29, 2024, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication). During closing arguments at

punishment, defense counsel asked the jury to sentence appellant on the low end of

–8– the punishment range. The prosecutor asked for life in prison. There was no mention

of parole. This factor weighs against finding egregious harm.

Last, we consider any other relevant information, such as whether the jury

sent requests for clarification during deliberations. Taylor v. State, No. 05-20-

00017-CR, 2022 WL 17335689, at *13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 20, 2022, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). During deliberations, the jury

asked the trial judge for “some direction on common or typical sentences for certain

categories of crimes.” It wanted “a frame of reference to make an appropriate

judgment.” Although appellant argues otherwise, this note does not indicate the jury

needed clarification about the parole law. Given the curative instruction, the strength

of the punishment evidence, and the lack of any jury argument about parole,

appellant has not shown egregious harm. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/Amanda L. Reichek// 230970f.u05 AMANDA L. REICHEK Do Not Publish. JUSTICE TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

–9– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

TIMOTHY BLON HOPKINS, On Appeal from the 86th Judicial Appellant District Court, Kaufman County, Texas No. 05-23-00970-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 22-00533-86- F. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Opinion delivered by Justice Reichek. Justices Nowell and Carlyle participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 18th day of November, 2024.

–10–