Timber Products Co. v. United States

462 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 30 Ct. Int'l Trade 1632, 30 C.I.T. 1632, 28 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2568, 2006 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 165
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedNovember 8, 2006
DocketSlip Op. 06-162; Court 01-00216
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 462 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (Timber Products Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Timber Products Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 30 Ct. Int'l Trade 1632, 30 C.I.T. 1632, 28 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2568, 2006 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 165 (cit 2006).

Opinion

OPINION

POGUE, Judge.

This matter is before the court pursuant to remand from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) of Timber Prods. Co. v. United States, 28 CIT --, 341 F.Supp.2d 1241 (2004) 1 (“Timber I”). In Timber I, the court found, on cross-motions for summary judgment, that the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) correctly classified the Plaintiffs plywood entries under the residual subheading 4412.14.30 2 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) rather than the more specific provision 4412.13.40 3 advocated by Plaintiff, covering “plywood ... [w] ith at least one outer ply of ... Virola.’ ” The CAFC vacated and remanded Timber I, directing that this court determine whether or not Plaintiff could prove a commercial designation for ‘Virola,” as used in the plywood trade alone, that would apply to Plaintiffs entries at issue. Timber Prods. Co. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1198 (Fed.Cir. 2005) (“Timber II”).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff imported the subject entries of plywood from Brazil during 1996 and 1997. On its shipping and entry documents, Plaintiff identified the merchandise as “Su-mauma (C. Petanda) Plywood,” “Faveira (Parkia spp.) Plywood,” “Amesclao (T. Burseaefolia) Plywood,” “Brazilian White Virola Rotary Cut Plywood,” “White Virola Plywood,” “White Virola (Virola spp.) Plywood,” and “Edaiply Faveira (Parkia spp.).” Except for “Virola” the species identified are not listed separately as tropical woods in the HTSUS. 4 Therefore, Customs classified the entries under subheading 4212.14.30, HTSUS, as plywood with at least one outer face of non-coniferous wood. Plaintiff contends that Customs incorrectly classified these goods, because there is a commercial meaning of the term ‘Virola plywood” 5 that encompasses many *1345 different woods, including “Sumauma” “Faveira” and “Amesclao.”

Plaintiff admits that it cannot show that the entries at issue consisted of plywood with at least one outer ply of wood from a tree of the “Virola” genus 6 (including all the species thereof, ie. Virola spp. 7 ) but insists before this court that the term “Vi-rola” has a commercial designation, and that the entries at issue consisted of plywood with at least one outer ply of species that fit into the commercial designation for “Virola.” 8 In Timber I, the court found, primarily on the basis of statutory construction, that the Plaintiff did not prove the existence of any intent that the statute was meant to include a commercial designation of “Virola” that extended to species beyond the genus Virola. In this context, the court found that the Plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to support its “asserted commercial designation.” Timber I, 28 CIT at-, 341 F.Supp.2d at 1250-51.

The CAFC vacated the decision in Timber I, finding that the court “improperly required Timber [Plaintiff] to present evidence from outside the plywood trade,” Timber II, 417 F.3d at 1202-03, and stating that “[t]he relevant trade for analyzing whether a tariff term has an established commercial meaning is determined by the merchandise before the court in a particular case, not by all the merchandise to which the tariff term might apply.” Id. at 1202. The CAFC remanded the case to the court to “reconsider whether Timber proved a commercial meaning for Virola’ within the plywood trade alone.” Id. at 1203.

In giving full effect to the CAFC’s decision, the court recognizes that, by remanding the case and positing that this court must consider Plaintiffs proof of commercial designation within the plywood trade alone, the CAFC implicitly must have found that there was no Congressional intent evidenced in the statute that would trump any possible commercial designation. Cf. Witex, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 28 CIT-,-, 353 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1317 (2004) (“an established commercial meaning prevails over a common meaning unless contrary to Congressional intent.”)(citing Maddock v. Magone, 152 U.S. 368, 371, 14 S.Ct. 588, 38 L.Ed. 482 (1894)); Cadwalader v. Zeh, 151 U.S. 171, 176, 14 S.Ct. 288, 38 L.Ed. 115 (1894).

Specifically, the CAFC must have found that the structure of Chapter 44 of the tariff schedule did not indicate a desire on Congress’ part to have a uniform meaning for the term ‘Virola” that was preclusive of a commercial designation of the term *1346 “Virola” particular to the plywood trade. (“Virola” is mentioned several times throughout Chapter 44 of the HTSUS. 9 )

As both this court and the CAFC recognized, there is no definition of the term “Virola” provided in the HTSUS. Similarly, both this court and the CAFC found that the common meaning of the term “Virola” is “Virola spp.” 10 However, the CAFC found that though the term “Virola” is used in essentially the same manner throughout Chapter 44, such use was not sufficient evidence of statutory intent to preclude a contrary commercial designation in the plywood trade alone. Therefore, pursuant to the CAFC’s remand, this court held a trial to permit Plaintiff to produce evidence that demonstrates that a commercial designation exists for the term “Virola” in the plywood trade alone and that the entries at issue meet such definition.

FINDINGS OF FACT

(A) Uncontested Facts

The parties have agreed to the facts that follow.

1. This action contests the tariff classification by Customs of certain plywood imported from Brazil into the United States through the Customs Port of Philadelphia on or between July 6, 1996, and December 2,1997.

2. Timber Products Company (“Timber”) is the importer of record of the merchandise in the entries which are the subject of this action.

3. The entries at issue were liquidated, as entered, on or between December 27, 1996 and October 16,1998.

4. All liquidated duties, charges or ex-actions were timely paid and, with the exception of Protest No. 1001-97-100397 involving Entry No. 334-1009194-7, the *1347 parties agree that ail of the entries at issue were timely protested.

5.

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462 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 30 Ct. Int'l Trade 1632, 30 C.I.T. 1632, 28 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2568, 2006 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/timber-products-co-v-united-states-cit-2006.