Tim Caesar Blanks v. Sgt. Capel, Ofc. Jasmine Brewington, Ofc. J. Rickers, and Lt. Angela Sessoms

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA TIM CAESAR BLANKS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 1:24CV588 ) SGT. CAPEL, OFC. JASMINE ) BREWINGTON, OFC. J. RICKERS, ) and LT. ANGELA SESSOMS, ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Tim Caesar Blanks alleges that, while to use hers, and failing to stop Caple he was an inmate at Scotland from doing so; and Sessoms showed Correctional Institution (“SCI”) in deliberate indifference to Blanks’s February 2024, Sergeant Caple,1 on serious medical needs when she Officer J. Ricker’s2 order, pepper instructed officers to leave him in his sprayed him while he was handcuffed cell after the incident for ten minutes. inside a locked cell and Lieutenant Sessoms instructed officers to leave This matter is before the Court on the Blanks in the cell for ten minutes after parties’ cross-motions for summary the incident. And, according to judgment. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Blanks, none of this would have Docket Entry 60; Def. Caple Mot. for happened had Officer Brewington not Summ. J., Docket Entry 61; Sessoms, reported his earlier agitated behavior. Brewington, and Ricker’s Mot. for He now brings this Section 1983 Summ. J., Docket Entry 64. action alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. Although Blanks characterizes his motion as one for summary judgment, Specifically, Blanks alleges that Caple in fact, he argues against granting used excessive force when she summary judgment due to the deployed the pepper spray; Ricker existence of genuine material used excessive force by threatening to disputes. On the other hand, the use her pepper spray, ordering Caple defendants argue that the undisputed 1 Capel’s name is spelled Caple. 2 Defendant Rickers’s name is spelled Ricker. evidence shows they are not liable for Brewington to call for assistance. violating Blanks’s constitutional Brewington Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10; Dismissal rights and that they are each entitled Ltr. at 5, Docket Entry 62-4. Ricker to qualified immunity. and Caple responded to the unit. Brewington Decl. ¶ 12. Ricker placed For the reasons set forth below, the Blanks in handcuffs through the Court should grant the defendants’ wicket door of his cell before she and summary judgment on the official Caple escorted him to a holding cell in capacity claims against them. The the Red Unit. Ricker Decl. ¶ 6. Court should deny Blanks’s motion Brewington did not follow Caple, and Caple’s motion. The Court should Ricker, or Blanks to the Red Unit, nor grant summary judgment for did she see Blanks for the remainder Brewington and Sessoms and grant in of her shift. Brewington Decl. ¶ 13. part and deny in part summary judgment for Ricker. The Court On the way to the Red Unit, Ricker should grant qualified immunity for tried to calm Blanks by reminding Brewington and Sessoms and deny him that he had never caused her any qualified immunity for Caple and problems previously and just needed Ricker. to cool off. Ricker Decl. ¶ 7. I. FACTS Upon arrival at the Red Unit, Ricker placed Blanks, still handcuffed, in a The undisputed facts show that locked holding cell. Id. ¶ 8; Dismissal Blanks was an inmate housed in the Ltr. at 5. Blanks was yelling. mental health block/Blue Unit at SCI Dismissal Ltr. at 5. At 10:05 p.m., on February 6, 2024. See Def. Ricker’s Caple took out her pepper spray Resps. to Pl.’s First Set of Reqs. for canister and administered a burst of Admis., Docket Entry 62-7. That pepper spray through the holding cell night, correction officer III door. Ricker Decl. ¶ 10; Incident R. at Brewington was overseeing the unit. 2, Docket Entry 67-10. Ricker, a correctional officer I, and Caple, a correctional sergeant III, Lieutenant Sessoms, a correctional were also on duty elsewhere at SCI lieutenant III at SCI supervising the that night. See Sgt. Brewington Decl. Gray Unit that night, responded to a ¶¶ 4, 6 (Nov. 7, 2025), Docket Entry call that a use of force incident had 65-1; Officer Ricker Decl. ¶ 4 (Nov. 6, occurred in the Red Unit. Lt. Sessoms 2025), Docket Entry 65-2; Charlene Decl. ¶¶ 3-7 (Nov. 5, 2026), Docket Nicole Caple Decl. ¶ 2 (Nov. 6, 2025), Entry 65-3. Docket Entry 62-5. Ricker remained in the corridor At approximately 10:00 p.m., Blanks watching Blanks while Caple went to was agitated because Brewington the sergeant’s office on the unit. would not release him from his cell to Incident R. at 2. Caple told Sessoms assist with janitorial work, prompting she had used OC pepper spray on Blanks. Sessoms Decl. ¶ 7. One statement detailing what direct minute later, Caple returned to the order was given twice and cell, followed by Sessoms who kept a refused to provide a detailed visual on Blanks. Incident R. at 2. statement. Upper management Sessoms did not authorize any use of has been notified. force against Blanks that day and did not know or have reason to know that Incident R. at 4. Caple would administer pepper spray However, M. Parsons, the Facility on Blanks. Sessoms Decl. ¶ 13. Approver of the Incident Report, At 10:09 p.m., correctional sergeant reviewed the report and concluded III Jarred Gholston, correctional that “staff followed all policies and sergeant III David Graham, and procedures we have in place for this correctional sergeant III Lenwood type of incident. Only the amount of Graham escorted Blanks from the cell force was used to get the situation to the showers for decontamination. under control.” Id. at 5. Witness Statements at 2, 9, 10, Docket The North Carolina Department of Entry 67-6. They gave him a fresh set Adult Correction terminated Caple’s of clothes and took him out of the Red employment, effective July 4, 2024. Unit at 10:25 p.m. Id. at 2, 9, 10; Dismissal Ltr. Her dismissal was Incident R. at 3. related to two use-of-force incidents, At 10:51 p.m., correctional sergeant one on November 5, 2023 and the III Antonio Tolbert and correctional February 6, 2024 incident involving officer III T. Nguyen escorted Blanks Blanks “while he was restrained in from his cell to the medical exam handcuffs in a locked holding cell.” room for assessment and back to his See id. (detailing witness statements holding cell three minutes later. Id. at made as a part of the investigation 3; Witness Statements at 4, 12. into the February 6 incident). As required, Sessoms investigated the The dismissal letter explained that use of force incident, obtained witness she “administered a burst of pepper statements, and prepared an incident spray at the offender when he was report. Sessoms Decl. ¶ 9. She restrained in a holding cell, and he did concluded that not otherwise pose a threat to himself or others. Force is not allowed to be [a]ll policies and procedures used against a properly restrained were not followed for this type offender and the use of pepper spray of incident due to Sergeant on Blanks was not reasonably Caple not providing a reason necessary to carry out a proper for administering OC Pepper Spray, not providing the direct order that was given. Sergeant Caple was asked to provide a correctional objective.” Id. at 8.3 cleared Blanks); Ricker Decl. (describing Blanks’s erratic and The dismissal letter also reported aggressive behavior and threatening other correctional officers who statements to Ricker and Caple once witnessed the February 6 incident and in the Red Unit holding cell); Incident stated that they would not have R. (noting Blanks’s refusal to obey sprayed Blanks because he was in Ricker’s orders); Def. Caple’s Resps. handcuffs in a locked cell and not to Pl.’s Interrogs., Docket Entry 67-18 posing a threat to himself or staff. See (responding that Blanks refused generally id. at 4-6. orders and verbally threatened staff). But the parties dispute Blanks’s II. STANDARD OF REVIEW conduct that led Brewington to call for assistance that night, his refusal to A court “shall grant summary obey orders once inside the cell in the judgment if the movant shows that Red Unit, the extent of his injuries, there is no genuine dispute as to any and Sessoms’ directions upon material fact and the movant is learning of the incident. See entitled to judgment as a matter of generally Brewington’s Decl. law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine (describing Blanks’s kicking, yelling, dispute of material fact exists “if the and threat to her precipitating her call evidence is such that a reasonable jury for assistance); Pl.’s [Verified] Br. in could return a verdict for the Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. nonmoving party.” Anderson v. (“Verified Br. in Supp.”), Docket Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 Entry 70 (claiming Blanks did not (1986). In analyzing a summary pose a threat to staff, himself, judgment motion, courts property, or other inmates at the time “must construe all facts and Caple administered pepper spray; reasonable inferences in the light describing treatment for injuries he most favorable to the nonmoving sustained, nightmares, and party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59 aggravation of PTSD; and claiming F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023). The that Sessoms instructed Ricker to moving party bears the burden of leave him in the cell for ten minutes); establishing the absence of a genuine Dismissal Letter (stating that Blanks dispute of material fact by did not pose a threat to himself or “identifying those portions of ‘the others); Def. Ricker’s Resps. to Pl.’s pleadings, depositions, answers to First Set of Reqs. for Admis. (denying interrogatories, and admissions on that Blanks was not acting violently or file, together with the affidavits, if any’ disruptively when Caple used force which it believes demonstrates the against him and stating that “medical” absence of a genuine issue of material

3 “Not every violation of prison policy is a violation of the constitution.” King v. Riley, 76 F.4th 259, 267 (4th Cir. 2023). fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 personal knowledge”). Cf. Jones v. U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule Harrell, No. 7:21-cv-541, 2025 WL 56). 2712429, at *2 n.3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 2025) (not permitting pro se plaintiff “An affidavit or declaration used to to rely on his brief to oppose summary support [summary judgment] must judgment because it was not verified); be made on personal knowledge, set McAllister v. Johnson, No. 1:10-CV- out facts that would be admissible in 13, 2023 WL 8604205, at *1 evidence, and show that the affiant or (M.D.N.C. Apr. 4, 2023) (“To the declarant is competent to testify on extent his brief contains factual the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. assertions, those assertions are not 56(c)(4); see also Evans v. Techs. verified and have no evidentiary Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, value.”). 962 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. “‘When faced with cross-motions for 1991)). summary judgment, the court must review each motion separately on its A party generally cannot rely on own merits to determine whether statements in a brief to support a either of the parties deserves motion for summary judgment, judgment as a matter of law.’” TC because they are not evidence. City of Heartland LLC v. Schiffman, No. Greensboro v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of 1:23-CV-665, 2026 WL 1785093, at *1 Elections, No. 15-CV-559, 2017 WL (M.D.N.C. June 22, 2026) (quoting 11488724, at *1 n.4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 2017) (collecting cases); see also Hill 523 (4th Cir. 2003)), appeal v. Carvana, LLC, No. 22-CV-37, 2022 docketed, No. 26-1912 (4th Cir. July WL 1625020, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 23, 16, 2026). “‘When considering each 2022). individual motion, the court must take care to resolve all factual disputes However, persuasive authority and any competing, rational supports consideration of a pro se inferences in the light most favorable party’s verified submissions to the to the party opposing that motion.’” court, including briefs, at the Id. (quoting Rossignol, 316 F.3d at summary judgment stage. See, e.g., 523). Jones v. Perry, No. 9:21CV1822, 2022 WL 16952240, at *5 n.4 (D.S.C. Oct. III. GOVERNING LAW 27, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL 16951990 (Nov. 15, 2022) (stating Title 42, United States Code, Section that “a pro se litigant’s . . . verified 1983 “is a federal statutory remedy submission must be considered as an available to those deprived of rights affidavit and may, standing alone, secured to them by the Constitution defeat a motion for summary and, in a more sharply limited way, judgment when the allegations the statutory laws of the United contained therein are based on States” by persons acting under color of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l “The more demanding . . . subjective Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. component . . . asks a single question: 2009). A plaintiff bringing suit whether the officers acted with a pursuant to § 1983 must show that a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’” person acting under color of state law Dean, 984 F.3d at 302 (quoting violated a Constitutional or other Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, federal legal right. West v. Atkins, 487 761 (4th Cir. 1996)), that is, U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “wantonness in the infliction of pain,” id. “In contrast to the objective A. Excessive Force component, this is a demanding standard.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112-13. Here, as against Caple, Rickers, and The plaintiff must establish that the Brewington, the constitutional right officer applied force “maliciously and at issue is the right to be free from an sadistically for the very purpose of officer’s use of excessive force, derived causing harm” rather than “in a good- from the Eighth Amendment. Whitley faith effort to maintain or restore v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986); discipline.” Dean, 984 F.3d at 302. see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. For example, an officer acts in good 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (“The Eighth faith when confronting “immediate Amendment . . . serves as the primary risks to physical safety” and source of substantive protection to “compelling compliance with prison convicted prisoners in cases . . . where rules and procedures” to “preserve the deliberate use of force [by prison internal order.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at officials] is challenged as excessive 113 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 and unjustified.”). U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d 963, 970 (4th Cir. 1984) A claim for the use of excessive force (“rejecting rule that use of mace “involves both an objective and a against recalcitrant inmate may be subjective component.” Dean v. justified only by threat to physical Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 302 (4th Cir. safety”)). 2021).

“The objective component measures The United States Supreme Court the nature of the force employed, recognized long ago that “corrections asking whether that force ‘was officials must make their decisions ‘in sufficiently serious to establish a haste, under pressure, and frequently cause of action.’” Id. (quoting Brooks without the luxury of a second v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112 (4th Cir. chance.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 2019)). “This is not a high bar; de (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). minimis or trivial force is not enough, They “must balance the need ‘to but anything more will suffice.” Id. maintain or restore discipline’ (citing Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112). through force against the risk of injury to inmates.” Id. Accordingly, “‘[p]rison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference Williams, 77 F.3d at 763 and stating in the adoption and execution of that the phrase “or other chemical policies and practices that in their agents” “plainly reaches the use of judgment are needed to preserve pepper spray”) (emphasis in original). internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.’” Id. “[T]he extent of injury suffered by an (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22). inmate is one factor that may suggest See also N.C. Dep’t of Adult ‘whether the use of force could Correction, Use of Force Policy (Aug. plausibly have been thought 30, 2018) (authorizing the use of necessary’ in a particular situation.” pepper spray as a “first level of Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 response” “[t]o control or deter (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at violent, threatening or aggressive 7). However, “[a]n inmate who is acting offenders . . .”), Docket Entry gratuitously beaten by guards does 65-5. not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because But an officer crosses the line and acts he has the good fortune to escape maliciously and sadistically, for without serious injury.” Id. at 38. example, “when [she] inflict[s] pain . . . to punish an inmate for To determine the nature of the force, intransigence or to retaliate for courts assess “[1] the need for insubordination,” Brooks, 924 F.3d application of force, [2] the at 113-14, n.4 (citing cases finding a relationship between that need and reasonable jury could infer the officer the amount of force used, [3] the used excessive force in response to the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the inmate’s use of profanity and threats responsible officials,’ and [4] ‘any of violence and other similar efforts made to temper the severity of statements directed at officers), or “to a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503 punish or retaliate against an inmate U.S. at 7 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at for his prior conduct,” Dean, 984 F.3d 321). at 302, and possibly when the officer “If a reasonable jury could find, based “use[s] force on an inmate who is on the inferences drawn under the restrained and compliant and posing Whitley factors or other evidence, no physical threat,” id. (noting this that correctional officers used force conduct “raises the specter of such an maliciously to punish or retaliate impermissible motive”). “[I]t is a against an inmate, then summary violation of the Eighth Amendment judgment [in favor of the officers] is for prison officials to use mace, tear not appropriate.” Dean, 984 F.3d at gas or other chemical agents in 303-02. quantities greater than necessary or for the sole purpose of infliction of pain.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 240 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting B. Deliberate Indifference of Prison officials may act with Serious Medical Needs deliberate indifference by “intentionally denying or delaying Here, as against Sessoms, the access to medical care . . . .” Estelle, constitutional right at issue once 429 U.S. at 105. But “[m]ere delay is again derives from the Eighth not enough.” Moskos v. Hardee, 24 Amendment, but it involves alleged F.4th 289, 298 (4th Cir. 2022). “A deliberate indifference to Blanks’s commonplace medical delay such as serious medical needs. that experienced in everyday life will only rarely suffice to constitute an “Claims that prison officials failed to Eighth Amendment violation, absent provide adequate medical care to an unusual circumstances where the inmate, like excessive force claims, delay itself places the prisoner at sound in the Eighth Amendment.” ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ such Iko, 535 F.3d at 241. A plaintiff must as where the prisoner’s condition show that the officer “acted with deteriorates markedly or the ailment ‘deliberate indifference’ (subjective) is of an urgent nature.” Id. to the inmate’s ‘serious medical needs’ (objective).” Id. (quoting Estelle v. IV. DISCUSSION Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A. The Court should grant A serious medical need is “‘one that summary judgment to the has been diagnosed by a physician as defendants in their official mandating treatment or one that is so capacity on the basis of obvious that even a lay person would sovereign immunity. easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quoting At the time of the incident, each of the Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, defendants was an employee of the 846 (7th Cir. 1999)). North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections (“the Department”). See An officer acts with deliberate Caple Decl. ¶ 2; Ricker’s Resps. to Pl.’s indifference when she has “actual Interrogs. ¶ 2 (responding to question knowledge of the risk of harm to the about “DPS” employment), Docket inmate” and also “‘recognize[s] that Entry 67-17; Brewington’s Resps. to [her] actions were insufficient’ to Pl.’s 1st Set of Interrogs. ¶ 2 (same), mitigate the risk of harm to the Docket Entry 67-15; Sessoms’s Resps. inmate arising from his medical to Pl.’s Interrogs. ¶ 2 (same), Docket needs.” Id. (quoting Parrish ex rel. Entry 67-20. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in The Department “is a North Carolina original). agency.” Biggs v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 953 F..3d 236, 241 (4th Cir. 2020); see also Dade v. FNU Carlineo, No. 1:22-cv-00125-MR, Congress has not abrogated a state’s 2023 WL 2386777, at *2 n.3 immunity from suits arising under (W.D.N.C. Mar. 6, 2023) (“The § 1983. Biggs, 953 F.3d at 241. And NCDPS is now known as the North “North Carolina has not consented to Carolina Department of Adult being sued under § 1983 and therefore Corrections (NCDAC).”). has not waived sovereign immunity in that context.” Singh v. Univ. of N.C. at “[A] suit against a state official in his Chapel Hill, 659 F. Supp. 3d 659, 669 or her official capacity is not a suit (M.D.N.C. 2023). Therefore, Blanks against the official but rather is a suit cannot seek damages against the against the official’s office,” and, thus, defendants in their official capacities. “is no different from a suit against the And Blanks only requests money State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of damages against the defendants. See State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Compl. § VI. For these reasons, the Cf. id. at 71 n.10 (recognizing, though, Court should grant summary that “‘official-capacity actions for judgment for the defendants on the prospective relief are not treated as official capacity claims. actions against the State’”) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, B. The Court should deny Blanks’s 167 n.14 (1985)). motion for summary judgment.

Generally, the Eleventh Amendment As the moving party seeking summary bars actions against a state unless the judgment, Blanks bears the initial state consents or Congress properly burden of demonstrating the absence abrogates immunity. Va. Office for of a genuine issue of material fact. See Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. Celotex, 477 at 325. But he has, by his 247, 254 (2011). Cf. Alden v. Maine, own admission, failed to do so. 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999) (“We have sometimes referred to the States’ In his verified brief in support of his immunity from suit as ‘Eleventh motion, Blanks describes the Amendment immunity[,] . . . [a] defendants’ responses to convenient shorthand but something interrogatories and requests for of a misnomer, for the sovereign admissions as “squarely immunity of the States neither derives contradictory” to his declaration and from, nor is limited by, the terms of affirmatively states that “[t]here is the Eleventh Amendment. . . . [T]he clearly a genuine issue of fact” and States’ immunity from suit is a this “factual dispute is also material.” fundamental aspect of the sovereignty See Verified Br. in Supp. at 5-6. which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and Indeed, the evidence does not permit which they retain today . . . .”). the Court to determine as a matter of law that any of the defendants has violated Blanks’s constitutional rights. Therefore, Court should deny “permitted to take measures, Blanks’s motion. including the use of appropriate force, intended to secure his cooperation.” C. The Court should deny Id. at 118. summary judgment to Caple in her individual capacity. Caple further contends that the photographs of Blanks taken shortly Caple does “not contest that the use of after the incident, as well as his pepper spray was non-trivial,” Def. medical assessments, “blatantly Caple Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. contradict[]” Blanks’s alleged injuries for Summ. J. (“Caple’s Mem. in from the pepper spray. Id. at 18-19 Supp.”), Docket Entry 62 at 15, and, (citing Ex. 2). instead, argues that Blanks has not put forth evidence that she used force There is evidence to support Caple’s maliciously and sadistically. position that the force was not malicious and sadistic, that is, it was To meet her burden as the moving “needed to preserve internal order party, Caple points out that multiple and discipline,” see Hudson, 503 U.S. witnesses observed that Blanks had at 6: Blanks himself admitted that he been “kicking his cell door, was openly was agitated and yelling for hostile to staff, [and] was Brewington to open his cell door when communicating threats to staff.” Id. at she would not let him out of his cell in 16 (citing Ex. 1, Offender Disciplinary the Blue Unit to help her clean. See, Infraction; Ex. 2, Incident R.). And e.g., Dismissal Letter at 5 (Blanks’s once in the holding cell in the Red witness statement). And, according to Unit, he refused orders. Id. at 16-17 Ricker, once in the Red Unit holding (citing Ex. 2; Ex. 4, Dismissal Letter; cell, Blanks refused to follow her Ex. 5, Caple Decl.). In response to his orders to turn around to allow her to refusal, she administered “a single remove his handcuffs and told her, short blast of OC peppery spray.” Id. “Fuck you, I’m not giving you shit.” at 17-18 (citing Ex. 2; Ex. 4). See, e.g., Ricker Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Dismissal Letter at 4. Thus, Caple argues that her tempered

use of force was necessary because Likewise, there is evidence that the Blanks “was not docile and was extent of injury Blanks suffered refusing multiple lawful orders,” a suggests Caple plausibly thought the situation in which “corrections force exerted was necessary, see officers could reasonably perceive a Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. Ricker danger . . . .” Id. at 22-23. The law reported as part of the incident recognizes that “inmates cannot be investigation that, in response to permitted to decide which orders they Blanks’s refusal, Caple administered will obey, and when they will obey one burst of pepper spray through the them.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 117. When wicket door at waist level. See, e.g., an inmate resists, the officer is Dismissal Letter at 5. Blanks even although Blanks was angry and states that it is undisputed that Caple yelling, he was secure and did not sprayed him at waist level. Pl.’s pose a threat to anyone. See, e.g., Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 6, Dismissal Letter at 5. Gholston, who Docket Entry 71. The color was standing fifteen feet away from photographs of Blanks taken shortly the holding cell at the time of the after the incident show discoloration incident, reported that Blanks was of the back of Blanks’ shirt and his mad but did not kick the holding cell arms which were in handcuffs behind door and was not a security risk at the his back. Incident R. at 15-18. time of the incident. Id. Similarly, Gholston and David Graham reported David Graham, who was standing six that the spray hit Blanks in the back, feet away from the cell at the time of which Blanks also acknowledged. See, the incident, reported that Blanks e.g., Dismissal Letter at 5. “did not kick the cell,” was in handcuffs in a locked cell, and “was The nurse who completed the medical not posing a threat to himself or staff.” assessment saw no injuries. See, e.g., Id. id. at 6. Blanks also admitted during the incident investigation that he As for where Blanks was hit with the suffered no injuries as a result of the spray, as part of the Unit Response incident. See, e.g., id. at 5. investigation, Caple said she sprayed Blanks in “his facial area.” Grievance However, despite her argument Resp. at 1, Docket Entry 67-5. In his otherwise, other evidence suggests verified brief, Blanks claims that he there are genuine issues of material was “summarily maced starting below fact regarding the “malicious and his waist to his back and upper body,” sadistic” component. For example, despite “offer[ing] no resistance” to after the incident, according to officers immediately preceding the Correctional Captain Revels, Caple deployment of pepper spray. Blanks’s initially told her that she did not know Verified Br. in Supp. at 2. why she sprayed Blanks. See Dismissal Letter at 4. Revels reported On February 6, during a clinic that Caple then told her that she encounter after the incident, Blanks sprayed Blanks because he refused to reported that his hands burned a little “give the handcuffs back.” Id. bit and he had pain in his right hand. Lenwood Graham reported that Caple See Med. Recs. at 21, Docket Entry 68. also told him that she sprayed Blanks Blanks contends he told the nurse that “because he would not give [her] the “his body felt like it was fire,” he handcuffs.” Id. at 5. “couldn’t move, see,” and he “had trouble breathing.” Verified Br. in Furthermore, Ricker reported as part Opp’n at ¶ 22, Docket Entry 72. of the incident investigation that she did not use her pepper spray because, On February 9, Blanks wrote his therapist at SCI and explained that Cason had become “belligerent and Caple deployed the pepper spray argumentative” when an officer told “start[ing] at my male body parts and him he was not on the recreation list worked her way up to my eyes and and had to return to his cell. Id. Once head,” although he closed his eyes at in his cell, he refused to allow the the time. Med. Recs. at 13. The next officers to remove his handcuffs. Id. day, he submitted a request to see his This is where the similarities end. therapist, noting that his PTSD “kicked in” during the incident and he Three officers arrived at Cason’s cell “suffered a panic attack” and could to assist in removing his handcuffs. not breathe. Id. at 14. During a Id. They attached an extension tether February 28 mental health to the handcuffs and pulled Cason appointment, Blanks reported having towards the door which he initially about three flashbacks and prevented from closing. Id. After the nightmares about the incident. Id. at door closed, officers removed the 9. handcuffs from Cason. Id. Once his hands were free, Cason reached out of In March, Blanks twice requested a the slot in his cell door and grabbed medical appointment because he was the officer’s duty belt and refused to having “problems out of left ear, due let go of the officer. Id. Another to where I got sprayed by Officer SGT officer then administered the burst of Caple Scotland CI never had problems pepper spray through the cell door. Id. with my left ear until that incident happened” and “problems out of left Unsurprisingly, the court found that ear where O/C pepper spray got down the evidence “did not support an inside it.” Id. at 7, 11. He reported the inference that the defendants acted same during his associated clinical maliciously and sadistically with the encounter. See Med. Recs. at 23, intent to cause harm to Cason.” Id. at Docket Entry 62-6. *7. For obvious reasons, the facts of Cason differ from the facts here, most Caple contends that Cason v. notably Cason’s grabbing the officer’s Lodgson, No. ELH-11-3089, 2012 WL duty belt and refusing to let the officer 3144633 (D. Md. July 27, 2012), go. No such evidence has been where the Court granted summary proffered here. judgment in favor of the pepper spraying officer, is “[a] factually After a thorough review of the similar” case. Caple’s Mem. in Supp. evidence, Blanks’s story is not at 21-22. Cason was an inmate in a “blatantly contradicted by the Maryland prison when an officer record.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 230 (“When administered one burst of pepper opposing parties tell two different spray through the slot in his cell door. stories, one of which is blatantly 2012 WL 3144633, at *2. contradicted by the record, so that no reasonably jury could believe it, a irresponsibly, and the need to shield court should not adopt that version of officials who perform their duties the facts for purposes of ruling on a responsibly from ‘harassment, motion for summary judgment.”). distraction, and liability.’” Byers v. Painter, 173 F.4th 155, 160 (4th Cir. There is evidence from which a 2026) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, reasonable jury could find that Caple 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). did not deploy the pepper spray to restore order or the like but, instead, Qualified immunity shields did so in response to intransigence or government officials from civil in retaliation for Blanks’s earlier liability unless a plaintiff shows both behavior towards Brewington, use of (1) that the official violated a vulgarity, and insolence. There is also constitutional right and (2) that the evidence from which a reasonable right was clearly established at the jury could find that Blanks did not time of the violation. Pearson, 55 U.S. pose a threat to the corrections at 232. officers or himself, and, thus, there was no need for this use of force. “In resolving whether to award There is also evidence from which a qualified immunity at summary reasonable jury could determine that judgment, courts are to engage in a Blanks suffered injuries from the ‘two-pronged inquiry.’” Nazario v. pepper spray. Gutierrez, 103 F.4th 213, 230 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572 In sum, construing the facts and U.S. 650, 655 (2014)). First, the court inferences therefrom in Blanks’s determines whether “in a light most favor, a reasonable jury could return a favorable to the injured party – ‘the verdict in his favor on his § 1983 claim officer’s conduct violated a against Caple. Genuine disputes of constitutional right.’” Id. (quoting material fact exist regarding Caple’s Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 state of mind when she administered (2001)). Next, the court asks the pepper spray that preclude “whether the right at issue in the first summary judgment. prong was ‘clearly established at the time’ of the contested action.” Id. The Court should deny Caple’s motion (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 227). for summary judgment. “Accordingly, a court may award qualified immunity to an official if D. The Court should deny Caple either (1) there is no violation of a qualified immunity. constitutional right, or (2) the constitutional right was not clearly “The doctrine of qualified immunity established.” Id. (citing Pearson, 555 ‘balances two important interests,’ U.S. at 227). namely, the need to hold accountable public officials who exercise power The court is required to define the right of an inmate particularly one constitutional right at a “‘high level of who is restrained in handcuffs in a particularity’” because “[t]he way in locked cell to be free from the use of which an alleged right is described excessive force. See id. (explaining matters.” Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100 that “the clearly established right F.4th 498, 505 (4th Cir. 2024) must be viewed with reference to the (quoting Ewards v. City of particular facts of the case”). Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1999)). “Although a case directly Where, as here, genuine disputes of on point is not required, existing material fact “preclude summary precedent ‘must have placed the judgment on [the plaintiff’s] claim of statutory or constitutional question [the use of excessive force], [t]hese beyond debate.’” Id. at 505-06 disputes necessarily also preclude (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. summary judgment on the first step of 100, 104 (2018)). the qualified immunity inquiry.” Bolick v. Anderson, 169 F.4th 528, In the context of a violation of the 540 (4th Cir. 2026); see also Eighth Amendment, the Fourth Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, Circuit Court of Appeals requires less 359-360 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations specificity in defining the right than in omitted) (“If a plaintiff has alleged a cases involving the Fourth clearly established right, summary Amendment, but “the unlawfulness judgment on qualified immunity must still be ‘apparent’ based on pre- grounds is improper as long as there existing law.” See King v. Riley, 76 F. remains any material factual dispute 4th 259, 266 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing regarding the actual conduct.”); Pfaller v. Amonette, 55 F. 4th 436, Vathekan v. Prince George’s Cnty., 453 (4th Cir. 2022) and quoting Hope 154 F.3d 173, 179 (4th Cir. 1998) v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). (“When resolution of a case depends “In the end, the key inquiry is whether on determining what actually ‘the law provided “fair warning” that happened, ‘the issue is inappropriate [the officer’s] conduct was for resolution by summary unconstitutional.’” Atkinson, 100 judgment.’” (quoting Rainey v. F.4th at 506. (quoting Booker v. S.C. Conerly, 973 F.2d 321, 324 (4th Cir. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 538 (4th 1992))). Cir. 2017) (alteration in Booker)). To answer that question, courts look to As previously discussed, there exist precedent of the United States genuine disputes of material facts Supreme Court and, in this district, regarding whether Caple violated the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Blanks’s Eighth Amendment right Id. when she administered pepper spray. Therefore, the Court “proceed[s] to In relation to Caple’s conduct, the the second step: whether the right was constitutional right at issue is the clearly established.” Bolick, 169 F.4th CV-166-M, 2025 WL 77897, at *9 at 540. (E.D.N.C. Jan. 10, 2025) (quoting Martin v. Short, No. 23-1588, 2024 At the time of the incident, “it was WL 3200715, at *4 (4th Cir. June 27, clearly established that a corrections 2024)). officer’s use of force in bad faith – not to preserve order or induce Further, though not dispositive, the compliance, but to punish through the NCDAC Policies and Procedures ‘wanton infliction of pain’ – violates clearly state that “[a]n officer is an inmate’s Eight Amendment right.” prohibited from using force solely as a Brooks, 924 F.3d at 119. “That result of verbal provocation. An principle applies with particular officer shall not use force against an clarity to cases . . . where the victim is offender . . . who is effectively restrained, compliant, and incapable restrained.” Use of Force Policy, of resisting or protecting himself, and Docket Entry 65-5 at 3. otherwise presents no physical threat in any way.” Thompson v. Commonw. Because genuine disputes of material of Va., 878 F.3d 89, 105 (4th Cir. facts exist about Caple’s use of force 2017). and the right of an inmate handcuffed inside a locked cell to be free from the More than three decades ago, the use of excessive force was clearly Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals established at the time of the incident, recognized “‘that it is a violation of the summary judgment on Caple’s Eighth Amendment for prison defense of qualified immunity is not officials to use mace, tear gas or other appropriate. The Court should not chemical agents in quantities greater grant it at this stage. than necessary or for the sole purpose

of infliction of pain.” Iko, 535 F.3d at E. The Court should grant in part 240 (emphasis in original) (quoting and deny in part Ricker’s Williams, 77 F.3d at 763 and stating motion for summary judgment. that the phrase “or other chemical

agents” “plainly reaches the use of Next, Blanks asserts that Ricker pepper spray”). threatened to spray him by pulling out

her pepper spray and then ordering A “‘reasonable officer would have Caple to deploy her own spray. See understood that’” “(without warning) Compl. § IV.D.; Verified Br. in Supp. pepper spray[ing] a prisoner who was at 15. fully restrained inside of a locked cell

because that prisoner was kicking the As to the first allegation, Ricker door seeking the help of an officer” herself reported that she “pulled [her] “‘was unlawful, whether by then- spray but then saw 3 sergeants existing precedent or by the otherwise standing behind [her].” Witness obvious illegality of that outrageous Statements at 6. See also Caple Resps. conduct.’” Ransom v. Page, No. 7:23- to Admis. ¶ 11 (stating the same). But “In a § 1983 suit . . . the term appellate courts have agreed that ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer.” threats alone cannot provide a basis Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 for a § 1983 suit. See Henslee v. Lewis, (2009). A supervisor can only be 153 F. App’x 178, 180 (4th Cir. 2005) liable under § 1983 for “their personal (unpublished) (“Mere threats or wrongdoing or supervisory actions verbal abuse by prison officials, that violated constitutional norms.” without more, do not state a Timpson v. Anderson Cnty. cognizable claim under § 1983.”) Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., 31 (citing Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir. 2022) 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979)); Fischl v. (emphasis added). The supervisor’s Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. “‘indifference or tacit authorization’” 1997) (“[M]ere allegations of verbal of “a constitutional violation abuse, threats or defamations by a committed by a subordinate state or correctional officer to a prisoner are local government official” must be “‘a not cognizable in a Section 1983 causative factor’ in enabling the action . . . .”); King v. Olmsted County, violation.” Bolick, 169 F.4th at 541 117 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, (“[A] threat constitutes an actionable 798-99 (4th Cir. 1994)). To determine constitutional violation only when the if a supervisor is liable, courts “must threat is so brutal or wantonly cruel as consider whether the supervisor’s to shock the conscience . . . or if the own ‘deliberate indifference threat exerts coercive pressure on the permitted the constitutional abuses to plaintiff and the plaintiff suffers the continue unchecked.’” Id. (quoting deprivation of a constitutional Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 right.”); Robertson v. City of Plano, (4th Cir. 1984)). 70 F.3d 21, 24 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[M]ere threatening language or gestures of a A plaintiff must show custodial office[r] do not, even if true, amount to constitutional violations.”) (1) that the supervisor had (citation omitted). actual or constructive knowledge that [her] This case is lacking the “something subordinate was engaged in more.” Ricker’s threat to pepper conduct that posed a spray Blanks was just that: she pervasive and unreasonable stopped short of carrying out that risk of constitutional [or threat. other legal] injury to citizens like the plaintiff; As for Ricker’s order for Caple to deploy her pepper spray, the (2) that the supervisor’s undisputed facts foreclose the claim, response to that knowledge which sounds in supervisory liability. was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 203 the alleged offensive (4th Cir. 2002)). practices; and An officer can be liable under this (3) that there was an affirmative theory when she “(1) knows that a causal link between the fellow officer is violating an supervisor’s inaction and individual’s constitutional rights; (2) the particular constitutional has a reasonable opportunity to [or other legal] injury prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not suffered by the plaintiff. to act.” Randall, 302 F.3d at 204. “The ‘bystanding officer must know of Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. [her] fellow officer’s misconduct . . . . If the bystander lacks such This claim of supervisor liability knowledge, [she] cannot be a against Ricker fails from the start. participant in the unlawful acts, and The undisputed evidence shows that the imposition of personal liability is Ricker was not Caple’s supervisor. impermissible.’” Johnson, 105 F.4th Caple was also a higher rank than at 124 (quoting Randall, 302 F.3d at Ricker and Ricker’s superior. See 204 n.24). Ricker Decl. ¶ 13; Ricker’s Resps. to Despite Ricker’s argument otherwise, Pl.’s Interrogs. ¶¶ 12, 20. Blanks there are genuine disputes of material presents no evidence otherwise. facts about her knowledge of a

constitutional violation, opportunity In addition to sounding in supervisory to stop Caple, and choice not to act. liability, this claim could be one based For example, Ricker reported that she on the theory of bystander liability would not have administered pepper against Ricker. See Verified Br. in spray under these circumstances Opp’n at 2 (stating “[t]he officers who because Blanks “was secured at the were present failed to protect Plaintiff time, and even though he was angry Blanks from certain doom”); id. at 16 and yelling, he did not pose a threat to (“Ricker . . . stood there and watched anyone,” Dismissal Letter at 4, Caple [administer] pepper to Plaintiff implying she knew doing so would be Blanks.”); see generally also Tim excessive force. On the other hand, as Caesar Blanks’ Decl. in Opp’n, Docket described above, there are genuine Entry 73 (stating the same). disputes of material fact about

whether Caple violated Blanks’s Such a claim is “premised on an constitutional rights as a threshold officer’s ‘affirmative duty to intervene matter. In addition, as part of the to protect the constitutional rights of incident investigation, Ricker stated citizens from infringement by other that she told Caple, Gholston, and law enforcement officers.’” Johnson v. Graham, “I’m not sure if I can spray Robinette, 105 F.4th 90, 123-24 (4th him but you’re three sergeants, you Cir. 2024) (quoting Randall v. Prince decide,” id. at 4-5, implying Ricker did not know if the administration of Brewington, and Ricker’s Mot. for pepper spray would be excessive Summ. J. at 11, Docket Entry 65. But under those circumstances. the cases she cites for support, Hamilton v. Roederer Corr. Complex, Similarly, there is evidence from No. 3:20-CV-P160-DJH, 2020 WL which a jury could find that Ricker did 4587524 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 10, 2020) not have a reasonable opportunity to and Jennings v. Mitchell, 93 F. App’x stop Caple. Ricker averred that 723 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished), “Caple took out her pepper spray are distinguishable. The Hamilton canister and administered a burst of court dismissed the complaint on 28 pepper spray” “[w]ithout warning.” U.S.C. § 1915A review because the Ricker Decl. ¶ 10. Further, she stated plaintiff alleged no injury, and the that “[a]t no time before or during the Jennings court affirmed summary use of force incident did [she] know or judgment for the correction officer even suspect that Sergeant Caple because the undisputed evidence would use pepper spray against” showed lawful use of pepper spray Blanks, the “incident happened and no respiratory distress. Here, quickly and surprised [her]” such that genuine issues of material fact remain she “did not have time to react before regarding Caple’s actions’ legality. Sergeant Caple had already finished Accordingly, the Court should grant in administering pepper spray.” Id. ¶ 14. part Ricker’s motion for summary Gholston similarly described Caple’s judgment as to the § 1983 claims administration of the pepper spray as based on threats and supervisory “immediate[].” Dismissal Letter at 5. liability and deny in part Ricker’s Under these circumstances, Ricker motion for summary judgment as to would not have had a reasonable the § 1983 claim of bystander liability. opportunity to stop Caple or make the

choice not to act. On the other hand, F. The Court should deny Ricker her telling Caple, Graham, and qualified immunity. Gholston to decide what to do implies

she had time to stop the The constitutional right of an inmate administration of pepper spray and in handcuffs inside a locked cell to be chose not to do so. free from excessive force was clearly

established on February 6, 2024, as Considering all inferences in Blanks’s previously explained. The material favor, a reasonable jury could find disputes surrounding Caple’s Ricker liable for bystander liability. conduct, as well as Ricker’s, foreclose

the award of qualified immunity to Ricker disputes liability, albeit for Ricker at this stage. See Bolick, 169 general use of excessive force, because F.4th at 541. there is evidence that Blanks did not

suffer injuries from the pepper spray. The Court should deny Ricker See Mem. in Supp. of Sessoms, qualified immunity. the witness statements from the G. The Court should grant incident, including Blanks’s Brewington’s motion for statement, place Brewington there. summary judgment. See, e.g. Dismissal Letter at 4-6. The summary of the video footage of the Blanks’s primary claim against incident does not mention Brewington is that she instigated the Brewington at all. See, e.g., id. at 6. excessive force by reporting his disruptive behavior. Compl. § IV.D. Although Blanks did not place (“Brewington started the whole Brewington at the incident when he situation by saying I made threats and gave his witness statement, he does was kicking door, she lied”); Verified state in his verified brief in opposition Br. in Supp. at 15 (“Brewington gave to the defendants’ motions that false information, that the Plaintiff Brewington “stood there” when was kicking his assigned cell door, Ricker and then Caple pulled out their shouting threats, which started the pepper spray. See Verified Br. in whole incident.”).4 Opp’n at 16. But the record evidence blatantly contradicts this statement In § 1983 suits, liability will only lie such that no reasonable jury would where the official charged acted believe Brewington was present for personally in the deprivation of the the use of force incident; therefore, plaintiff’s rights. Wilcox v. Brown, the Court will “not adopt that version 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) of the facts for purposes of ruling on (emphasis added) (quotations [the] motion for summary judgment.” omitted). See Iko, 535 F.3d at 230.

To meet her burden as the moving Because it is undisputed that party, Brewington avers: she told Brewington did not act personally in Blanks he would not be released from the alleged deprivation of Blanks’s his cell to help her clean the unit; she rights, the Court should grant told him to stop kicking his cell door; Brewington summary judgment. and she called for assistance. Brewington Decl. ¶¶ 6-12. That was H. The Court should grant the extent of her interaction with Brewington qualified Blanks on February 6. After Caple and immunity. Ricker removed him from the holding cell on her unit, she did not see Blanks Because the undisputed evidence again that shift. Id. ¶ 13. Therefore, shows that Brewington did not violate she was not present during the Blanks’s rights, she is entitled to incident. Id. Furthermore, none of qualified immunity. See Bolick, 169

4 Likely out of an abundance of caution, supervisory liability. The Court does not Brewington argues that she cannot be read Blanks’ complaint to allege such liable under the theories of bystander or theories against Brewington. F.4th at 540 (“Answering either Sessoms did not remember Ricker question [of the two-step qualified asking her what to do with Blanks or immunity inquiry] in the negative what she told Ricker in response. See warrants granting qualified Sessoms’s Resps. to Pl.’s Interrogs. immunity.”). ¶ 24. “After reviewing his control actions and the incident report, I I. The Court should grant probably told her to place him in the Sessoms’ motion for summary holding cell.” Id. She did “not judgment. remember saying to leave [Blanks] inside the holding cell for any period Finally, Blanks alleges that Sessoms of time.” Id. ¶ 23. Sessoms also did violated his constitutional rights by not remember “the scene after SGT. telling officers to leave him in the David D. Graham stat[ed], ‘I’ve had holding cell for ten minutes after enough of this crap!,’ before freeing Caple deployed her pepper spray. Plaintiff Blanks from the locked Verified Br. at 2, 15. Essentially, holding cell . . . .” Id. ¶ 25. Blanks claims she was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical Policy required the officers to give needs.5 Blanks “an immediate opportunity to flush his or her eyes with water once More specifically, Blanks contends control has been restored.” See that “when Ricker asked Sessoms, NCDAC Use of Force Policy at 5. And what do you want us to do with him? Gholston, David Graham, and Sessoms replied, ‘leave him in there Lenwood Graham escorted Blanks to for 10 minutes!’” Id. at 2. “[T]hats the showers to be decontaminated when SGT David D Graham finally minutes after Caple sprayed him. spoke up and said, ‘Alright, I’ve had Statements of Witnesses at 2, 9, 10. enough of this crap!’ SGT David Graham made his way through to Afterwards, at approximately 10:50 unlock the holding cell and begged p.m., Toni Nguyen and Antonio Plaintiff Blanks to take a cold Tolbert took Blanks from his cell in shower.” Id. According to the the Blue Unit for a medical undisputed summary of the video assessment. Id. at 4, 11, 23. Blanks footage of the incident, David Graham complained of his “hands burning a removed Blanks from the cell little bit” and his eyes burning. Med. approximately four minutes after Recs. at 21-22, Docket Entry 68. The Sessoms arrived in the holding cell nurse assessed him, reported “no area. See Dismissal Letter at 6. visible sign of OC spray” on his face and “no skin swelling, redness, or blistering anywhere” on his body, and

5 Likely out of an abundance of caution, or supervisory liability. The Court does Sessoms argues that she cannot be liable not read Blanks’ complaint to allege under the theories of bystander liability either of these theories against Sessoms. saw no other injuries. Dismissal of law on the inmate’s deliberate Letter at 6. Officers also “kept a indifference to serious medical needs visual” on Blanks for one hour. E.g., claim: Statements of Witnesses at 4. Moskos experienced the usual Days following the incident, Blanks transitory effects of pepper wrote to his therapist requesting a spray for a period of, at most, mental health visit and explaining 90 to 120 minutes. He did not that as a result of the incident, his testify to a serious medical PTSD “kicked in,” he “suffered a panic reaction or to any pain beyond attack,” “couldn’t breathe,” and was the normal discomfort of “having flash backs.” Med. Recs. at 14. pepper spray: even by his own In addition, he sought medical account, he simply expressed treatment to address “problems with that his eyes were burning, not [his] left ear” that developed after that he was experiencing more “that incident happened.” Id. at 7, 11. serious medical issues. In circumstances such as these, The undisputed evidence shows that, involving a short delay in no matter what Sessoms said to do decontamination, without any with Blanks after Caple sprayed him, aggravating factors such as a David Graham removed him from the serious medical reaction, courts cell approximately three minutes after have consistently found that Sessoms was seen outside of the cell the objective prong is not and approximately five minutes after satisfied. Caple sprayed him. David Graham and other officers then escorted Id. at 298. Blanks to the showers to decontaminate. Approximately forty- Here, as in Moskos, there is no five minutes after Caple sprayed him, evidence that any delay in officers took Blanks for a medical decontamination or medical assessment. This delay, without treatment stemming from Sessoms’ more, is not enough to show a orders “put him at a ‘substantial risk’ constitutional violation. See Moskos, of ‘serious harm,’” as is required for a 24 F.4th at 298. deliberate indifference claim. Id. The mental health harm Blanks reported In Moskos, the inmate claimed that arose from the incident itself, not any prison officials were deliberately delay in treatment for the pepper indifferent to his serious medical spray. needs “because they delayed decontaminating him after he was Accordingly, the Court should grant sprayed with pepper spray.” Id. at Sessoms summary judgment on the 297. As the Moskos court recognized deliberate indifference claim. when it affirmed judgment as a matter J. The Court should — grant Sessoms’ Motion for Summary Sessoms qualified immunity. Judgment as follows: Because the undisputed evidence i. GRANT IN PART as to shows that Sessoms did not violate the official capacity claim Blanks’s rights, she is entitled to and the portions of the qualified immunity. See Bolick, 169 §1983 claim based on F.4th at 540 (“Answering either threats and supervisory question [of the two-step qualified liability against Jessica immunity inquiry] in the negative Ricker, and DENY IN warrants granting qualified PART the remainder of immunity.”). her motion, ii. GRANT Jasmine V. CONCLUSION Brewington’s motion, and IT IS HEREY ORDERED that the iiii GRANT Angela Sessoms’ Clerk redact Tim Caesar Blanks’s date motion. of birth from pages 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 21, and 22 of Docket Entry 68 and refile those pages as publicly available; SALMLL J fy na Gibso#) McFadden IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that United States Magistrate Judge the Clerk seal Docket Entry 62-6, redact Tim Caesar Blanks’s date of July 24, 2026 birth from page 23 of Docket Entry 62-6, and refile that page as publicly available; IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court: 1. DENY Tim Caesar _Blanks’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 2. GRANT IN PART Charlene Nicole Caple’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the official capacity claim against her, and DENY IN PART the remainder of her motion, 3. GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Jessica’ Ricker’s, Jasmine Brewington’s, and Angela 22