Tillman v. City of Saint Louis, Missouri

District Court, E.D. Missouri·Decided March 18, 2021·No. 4:21-cv-00299·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

ANTHONY TILLMAN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case No. 4:21cev299 RLW vs. ) ) CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2).! This case was filed on March 9, 2021. The Court held a telephonic hearing on March 17, 2021, on Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is fully briefed and ready for disposition. \

. Factual Allegations Plaintiff Anthony Tillman (“Tillman”) alleges has been denied the ability to shower since he has been detained at the City Justice Center (“CJC”), beginning October 5, 2020. (Memo at 1). Tillman alleges he detained in the second-floor infirmary, along with eight to ten other people and four people in isolation cells, ina COVID quarantine because no other areas of the jail have ramps or rails. (Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, 415; Tillman Declaration (“Tillman Dec.”), ECF No. 4,911). Tillman brings a one count Complaint under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12101, et seg. Tillman contends the shower facilities are “inaccessible to people with physical disabilities like Mr.

' Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2), but the Court addresses only the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. The Court orders Plaintiff to file his Motion for Preliminary Injunction as a separate document because it seeks distinct relief.

Tillman, and the Defendants have refused to make reasonable accommodations that would allow him to shower.” (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (“Memo”), ECF No. 2-1, at 1). Defendants named in this action are the City of St. Louis; Adrian Barnes, the Superintendent of CJC; and Dale Glass, the Commissioner of the St. Louis Division of Corrections.

Tillman has been a paraplegic since a 2017 shooting. (Memo at 2; Tillman Dec., □□□□ Previously, in February 2020, Tillman was incarcerated at the CJC. (Memo at 2). During that stay, Tillman fell while trying to take a shower “in an inaccessible bathroom after jail staff denied his request for assistance.” (Memo at 2). Specifically, Tillman states:

During this time, in March 2020, I was provided a shower that was not accessible for someone with my disability. The shower had a ramp but it only had one bar in the front of the shower and a fold-down seat that was not strong enough to hold me. To use the shower I had to roll my wheelchair to the shower, attempt to sit up from the wheelchair holding the one bar, maneuver with one hand on the bar and the other hand pushing down the fold-down seat, and effectively allow my body to fall down into the seat. Prison officials did not assign staff to help me shower. I eventually fell in the shower and cut myself on my left buttocks. (Tillman Dec., {{5,6).

Tillman suffered a laceration and then a blood infection. (Memo at 2, Tillman Dec, 6-7). Tillman “remains frightened that he may suffer another blood infection absent adequate hygiene protocols.” (Memo at 2, Tillman Dec., 29).

Upon his October 2020 arrival at the CJC, Tillman alleges he told a nurse he required “either (1) a shower equipped for individuals who use wheelchairs or, alternatively, (2) staff assistance in showering.” (Memo at 2, Tillman Dec., 917). Tillman alleges he never received a

shower or assistance with bathing, remained in his street clothes for 10 days after his initial request, and had his open wounds cleaned only one time per day (instead of twice). (Memo at 2, Tillman Dec., 4918, 19, 41). On October 15, 2020, prison officials provided Tillman with a wash basin and a rag, but Tillman could not access lower parts of his body due to his paraplegia. (Memo at 3, Tillman Dec., 4920-21).

Tillman alleges that, on various occasions, he complained verbally and in writing to medical and prison staff regarding his situation, but his complaints were either thwarted or ignored.

On March 8, 2021, correctional officer Price informed Tillman he would be moved to a “wheelchair accessible shower.” (Memo at 5, Tillman Dec., 940). The “wheelchair accessible shower” was the same shower where he fell in early 2020. (Memo at 5, Tillman Dec. $40). Tillman said he would not use this “inaccessible shower.” (Memo at 5, Tillman Dec., $40). Tillman claims he “repeatedly requested an accommodation that would allow him to use the shower,” but “[n]o reasonable accommodation was provided.” (Memo at 9). Tillman claims that Defendants’ failure to accommodate Tillman “has already led to severe medical complications” and without injunctive relief, those consequences will only worsen.” (Memo at 10).

Legal Standard

In deciding a motion for temporary restraining order, the district court balances four factors: (1) the likelihood of the movant's success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant in the absence of relief; (3) the balance between that harm and the harm that the relief would cause to the other litigants; and (4) the public interest. Jet Midwest Int'l Co., Ltd v. Jet Midwest Grp., LLC, 953 F.3d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 2020); Watkins Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003); Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir.1981).

Failure to show irreparable harm is an independently sufficient ground upon which to deny injunctive relief. Watkins Inc., 346 F.3d at 844 (citing Adam—Mellang v. Apartment Search, Inc., 96 F.3d 297, 299 (8th Cir. 1996); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 420 (8th Cir.1987). “The basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.” Bandag, Inc. v. Jack's Tire & Oil, Inc., 190 F.3d 924, 926 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959)).

Discussion

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits “Success on the merits has been referred to as the most important of the four [Dataphase] factors.” Roudachevski v. All-Am. Care Centers, Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2011). Therefore, the Court addresses this factor first. See id. “[A]n injunction cannot issue if there is no chance of success on the merits.” Mid-Am. Real Estate Co. v. Iowa Realty Co., 406 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 2005). “But, [Tillman] does not need to ‘prove a greater than fifty per cent likelihood that [he] will prevail on the merits.’” Jet Midwest Int'l Co., Ltd, 953 F.3d at 104445 (quoting Dataphase Sys., 640 F.2d at 113). Instead, Tillman “must simply or a ‘fair chance of prevailing.’” Jet Midwest Int'l Co., Ltd, 953 F.3d at 1044-45 (quoting Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v.

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