Tilley v. Unopened Succession of Howard
This text of 976 So. 2d 851 (Tilley v. Unopened Succession of Howard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Margaret Howard TILLEY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
UNOPENED SUCCESSION OF Walter J. HOWARD, Defendants-Appellees.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
*852 Culpepper & Carroll by Bobby L. Culpepper, Jonesboro, for Appellants Margaret H. Tilley, et al.
Hal R. Henderson, Arcadia, Hargrove, Smelley, Strickland & Langley by Joseph L. Hargrove, Jr., Shreveport, for Appellees William Hamiter, Jr. John T. Hamiter.
Gary D. Nunn, for Appellees Unopened Succession of Walter J. Howard, et al.
Before STEWART, GASKINS and LOLLEY, JJ.
LOLLEY, J.
The plaintiffs in this case, Margaret Howard Tilley, Sandra Howard Morton, Jackie Gerardi, Harry C. Groves, Patricia Howard Hill and Hal and Vivian Henderson (hereinafter, plaintiffs or appellants), appeal a judgment by the Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Bienville, State of Louisiana, dismissing their claims against William Hamiter, Jr., John T. Hamiter, and the Unopened Succession of Walter J. Howard (hereinafter, the defendants or appellees).[1] For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
This matter is a suit for declaratory judgment filed by the plaintiffs to be declared the sole owners of all of the property described as the E/2 of SW/4, Section 17, Township 16 North, Range 4 West, Bienville Parish, Louisiana (the "property"). In their petition, the plaintiffs claim to be the sole owners of the property by virtue of ten and/or thirty years' acquisitive prescription. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that they are co-owners of a 1/4 interest in the property.
The parties in this litigation are all descendants of Henry and Sophronia Howard. Henry and Sophronia had two sons: Walter and Charlie. The present-day litigants stem from those two rootsthe plaintiffs from Charlie and the defendants from Walter. The property was originally owned by Henry and Sophronia. In 1902, Henry died. His widow then owned a 1/2 interest in the property, and the sons were co-owners of a 1/2 interest in the property. On November 17, 1908, Walter executed a deed (the "1908 deed") in which he sold to his brother, Charlie, all of the interest in the property that he owned at the time (i.e., a 1/4 interest). He also purported to sell to Charlie the interest in the property he would have upon his mother's death (i.e., the 1/4 interest he stood to inherit upon Sophronia's death). Specifically, the 1908 deed stated (verbatim):
The said Walter J. Howard, declares that he has this day and by these presents do grant, bargain sell, convey and deliver unto his brother, the said C.G. Howard, all his interest in and to the above described property, and all the interest he would have in case of his mothers death renouncing and relinquishing *853 all his rights, title and interest in and to said property, by reason of his heirship to said property. The said C.G. Howard accepting said sale of said interest without in any way disturbing the usufruct enjoyed by his mother.
Sophronia did not die until 1914, and there is no evidence in the record regarding her succession.
It is the 1/4 interest Walter stood to inherit from his mother that is now in dispute in this litigation. The plaintiffs, Charlie's heirs, argue that the 1908 deed placed Walter and his heirs (the defendants) on notice that Charlie's and/or his heirs' possession of the property was adverse and not co-owners. At the trial of the matter, the plaintiffs provided evidence of various acts of possession through the years in order to prove their ownership of the property through acquisitive prescription. The defendants maintain that the 1908 deed did not serve to place Walter on notice of Charlie's adverse possession, because it was an absolute nullity-Walter could not sell an interest in his mother's future succession. Further, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to prove overt acts of adverse possession for the requisite period of time. After hearing all the evidence, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate overt and unambiguous acts for a period of time sufficient to put the defendants on notice that they intended to possess the property for themselves. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claims and this appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
After a brief trial of the matter, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove they had possessed the property adversely for a thirty-year period; however, we believe that this determination was manifestly erroneous, because the record shows that starting in 1908 and up to at least 1970, Charlie and his heirs exercised overt, unambiguous and uninterrupted acts of possession on the property.
The general rule of acquisitive prescription is provided in La. C.C. art. 3486, which states, "Ownership and other real rights in immovables may be acquired by the prescription of thirty years without the need of just title or possession in good faith." The party alleging acquisitive prescription must establish that its possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public, and unequivocal. La. C.C. art. 3476. Possession is transferable by universal title or by particular title. La. C.C. art. 3441. Thus, there is no interruption of possession when a possessor dies. Finally, and of significance to the facts in this case, one who proves that he had possession at different times is presumed to have possessed during the intermediate period. La. C.C. art. 3443.[2]
However, as a general and well-established jurisprudential rule, an owner in indivision cannot acquire by prescription the rights of his co-owners in the property held in common. Possession by one co-owner is generally considered as being exercised on behalf of all co-owners. Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 50, 48 So.2d 369 (1949); Hill v. Dees, 188 La. 708, 178 *854 So. 250 (1937); Dew v. Hammett, 150 La. 1094, 91 So. 523 (1922); Simon v. Richard, 42 La. Ann. 842, 8 So. 629 (1890); Litton v. Litton, 36 La. Ann. 348 (1884); Liner v. Lewis, 34,746 (La.App. 2d Cir.06/22/01), 792 So.2d 822, writ denied, 2001-2547 (La.12/07/01), 803 So.2d 972; Headrick v. Lee, 471 So.2d 904 (La.App. 2d Cir.1985).
An exception to the general co-owner rule is allowed. Louisiana C.C. art. 3439 states, in pertinent part, that: "A co-owner, or his universal successor, commences to possess for himself when he demonstrates this intent by overt and unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice to his co-owner." See Franks Petroleum, Inc. v. Babineaux, 446 So.2d 862 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984); Givens v. Givens, 273 So.2d 863 (La.App. 2d Cir.1973), writ refused, 275 So.2d 868 (La.1973); Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal District v. Erwin Heirs, Inc., 1996-28, XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 3d Cir.05/08/96), 673 So.2d 1351. However, where a co-owner goes into and continues possession under a recorded instrument apparently conveying title, even though the purported conveyance may be invalid, the recorded instrument together with the acts of possession constitute notice to other co-owners. The possession is then regarded as hostile to the claims of the other co-owners, rebutting any presumption that possession is for the benefit of all co-owners. Succession of Seals, 243 La. 1056, 150 So.2d 13 (1963); Franks Petroleum, Inc., supra; Givens, supra.
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976 So. 2d 851, 2008 WL 442133, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tilley-v-unopened-succession-of-howard-lactapp-2008.