Rushing v. Smedley

142 So. 330
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 11, 1932
DocketNo. 4142.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 142 So. 330 (Rushing v. Smedley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rushing v. Smedley, 142 So. 330 (La. Ct. App. 1932).

Opinion

STEPHENS, J.

This is a petitory action in which the plaintiff seeks to be recognized as the true and lawful owner of the following described land situated in Bossier parish, La., to wit: “Beginning at the southeast corner of Section 12, Township 18 north, Range 12 west, and running 790 feet west; thence north 120 feet to Shreveport and Minden road; thence east along said road to the intersection of Min-den, Haughton and Shreveport roads; thence along said Haughton road to a point where said road crosses the east line of Section 12, Township 18, north, Range 12, west; thence along said section line a distance of 32 feet to the point of beginning, all of said described lands' being in Section 12, Township 18 north, Range 12 west.”

The plaintiff alleges a record title to' the described land by mesne conveyances from the United States government; and avers that the defendants are in the actual, physical possession of the property, without any title whatsoever; and that they have refused to deliver possession thereof without good or legal cause for such refusal.

The defendants answered, admitting that they are in possession of the land claimed by the plaintiff, but denying that said land is in section 12 as alleged; but averring that it is in section 13. Further answering, the defendants aver that they are the lawful owners of, and in possession of, the E. ½ of the N. E. ¾ of section 13, township 18 north, range 12 west, Bossier parish, La., which includes the property claimed by- the plaintiff, which is a six-acre strip of said land lying south of the Shreveport-Minden-Haughton road; that said described land was purchased by HectQr and Mariah Moory, father and mother, respectively, of the defendants, from one B. R. Springfield in the year 1889; and that they inherited said land from their'father and mother, both now deceased, whose successions they have accepted; that the said land extends to and adjoins the Shreveport-Minden-Haughton road on the south side thereof, but does not extend into section 12, as alléged by the plaintiff. The defendants further aver in the alternative that, if the land in dispute be found by the court to lie in section 12, they, and their father and mother, before them, have been in the actual, physical, notorious, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession of the said strip of land in dispute, in good faith, and as owners for more than forty years; and for more than thirty years the northern boundary of their property, which includes the six acres in dispute, has been and is now marked by a fence along said public road, which said fence and road has been tacitly recognized by the plaintiff’s authors in title as the northern boundary thereof; and that, if the plaintiff or his authors in title ever had any right1 or title to the strip of land in dispute, the same is now prescribed and lost to him by the prescription of thirty years, which said prescription they specially plead.'

The defendants further aver in their an-' swer that on or about November 1, 1925, the plaintiff herein unlawfully took possession of the land in dispute, and claimed to be the owner thereof against their protests; that they instituted a possessory action against the plaintiff, in which judgment, was rendered, recognizing them as the rightful possessors of said land, and reserving to them the right-, to sue for rent and damages caused by plaintiff’s disturbance of their possession.

They -pray that the demands of plaintiff be rejected, and in the alternative that theplea of prescription of thirty years be sustained and for damages in the sum.of $700. • -

It is apparent that, if the land'in-dispute lies in section 12, the plaintiff should recover upon the record title, but, if it does not, the plaintiff’s demand should be rejected.

In order to determine the controversy' by fixing the boundary between secti&'s Í2 'arid 13, three surveys were made; one by Mr. Neatherly, appointed by the court for that purpose; another -by Mr. Hardeman; and ⅜ third by Mr. Dutton.

The trial court overruled the plea of prescription of thirty years, and adopted the section line as established by the survey of Mr. Neatherly, which had the effect of dividing the land in dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants; and all parties appealed.

The line as fixed by Mr. Hardeman locates all of the property in disputé in section 12; while the survey of Mr. Dutton placed it all in section 13. If the Hardeman line be adopted, the plaintiff is entitled to recover; if the Dutton line be held correct, the plaintiff’s demand must be rejected; and, if the Neatherly line be adopted, the property must be divided almost in half, as was ordered by the district judge.

Each, of the surveyors gave equally plausible reasons in support of the correctness of their findings, and the findings of each vary so completely we must confess that we are at a loss to determine from the evidence adduced where the section line should be established.

Fortunately, however, we find it unnecessary to settle that confusing question in order to decide this controversy, as we are of the opinion that the record clearly discloses that the title to the property in dispute is in the defendants by virtue of prescriptive possession of thirty years.

In 1889, and for a number of years prior thereto, the property north of the land in dispute and north of the public road was *332 ■owned by John J. Edwards, Sr., the author in title of plaintiff. The property south of the public road and adjoining the Edwards place was owned by Hector Moory, an old negro; the land in dispute being included within the Moory fence, running along the south side of the road.

The actual possession as owners of the land in dispute by the defendants through their father and mother began in 1SS9. Their actual possession as owners has since been continuous, uninterrupted, undisturbed (w-ith the exception hereinafter referred to), public, and ’unequivocal to the date of the filing of this shit.

. Ás áílegéd' in the defendants’ answer, the plaintiff disturbed the defendants’ possession in 1925, but they were quieted therein by a final judgment of court in a possessory action in 1926.

With these facts before us, which are unquestionably established by the reeord, we have only to examine the evidence' supporting the attempt of the plaintiff to show that certain of the defendants paid rent on the land in dispute to the plaintiff’s author in title, thereby acknowledging ownership in another and interrupting their possession as owner.

The only witness introduced by the plaintiff in this connection was Mr. Frank Edwards, whose evidence is to some extent contradictory and very unsatisfactory. We quote from his testimony as follows:

“Q. Old Hector Moory never paid any rent? A. Who?
“Q. Hector Moory? A. He was dead at the time when we found out this line run there.
“Q. If you hadn’t‘found out the line run there how was he paying rent all this time? A. The line was run, then is when we collected rent.
“Q. They have not paid rent for the last forty or fifty years? A. Tes, sir, inside of forty, I told you about fifteen years ago.
“Q. Fifteen years they have been paying' rent? A. Tes, sir.
“Q.

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Bluebook (online)
142 So. 330, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rushing-v-smedley-lactapp-1932.