Tilley Properties, Inc. v. Bartow County

401 S.E.2d 527, 261 Ga. 153, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 130
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedMarch 15, 1991
DocketS90A1639
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 401 S.E.2d 527 (Tilley Properties, Inc. v. Bartow County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tilley Properties, Inc. v. Bartow County, 401 S.E.2d 527, 261 Ga. 153, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 130 (Ga. 1991).

Opinions

Smith, Presiding Justice.

Appellants, Tilley Properties, Inc. and Vulcan Materials Company, own over 700 acres of real property in Bartow County. In 1986, Bartow County enacted its first zoning ordinance, and the appellants’ property was zoned A-l, agricultural. Appellant Vulcan wants to mine the granite on the property, and in 1989 the appellants sought to have the property rezoned to M-l so that it could be mined. The application was denied. The appellants filed an action in the Bartow County Superior Court in which they sought, among other things, the rezoning of the property. Five months later, May 21, 1990, the complaint was amended and the appellants prayed for a writ of mandamus to compel the appellees to issue a certificate of zoning compliance.

At the June 5, 1990 hearing, the appellants argued that the zoning ordinance is null and void because it was not enacted in compliance with the Zoning Procedures Law (ZPL), OCGA § 36-66-1 et seq. The trial court disagreed, the petition for a writ of mandamus was denied, and the trial court upheld the Bartow County Zoning Ordinance. We reverse.

1. The appellants argue that the trial court erred in refusing to hold the ordinance invalid because Bartow County did not follow the mandatory language of the ZPL. Specifically, Bartow County did not conduct a public hearing for the purpose of adopting the policies and procedures to govern the calling and conducting of zoning hearings. OCGA § 36-66-5.1

[154]*154In McClure v. Davidson, 258 Ga. 706, 710 (373 SE2d 617) (1988), this Court examined the legislative intention in enacting the Zoning Procedures Law, (ZPL) OCGA § 36-66-1 et seq., and held that the procedures specified were mandatory and that non-compliance with the procedures would invalidate any zoning decisions after the effective date of the ZPL. The Bartow County ordinance was enacted after the effective date of the ZPL.

The ZPL establishes as state policy, “minimum procedures governing the exercise of [the zoning] power.” OCGA § 36-66-2 (a). All local governments are required to adopt policies and procedures to govern calling and conducting zoning hearings. OCGA § 36-66-5 (a). Printed copies of the policies and procedures must be available for distribution to the public. Id. “Prior” to the adoption of the policies and procedures, OCGA § 36-66-5 (c), a local government must publish within a newspaper of general circulation a notice of the public hearing, OCGA § 36-66-4, and a public hearing must be held on the proposed action. Id.

Bartow County did not comply with the mandatory language of the statute. There was no public notice in the newspaper, as required by OCGA § 36-66-5 (c), informing the public that there would be a hearing prior to adopting the policies and procedures, and there was no public hearing in which policies and procedures were adopted. The testimony at the trial court hearing establishes, beyond a doubt, that policies and procedures were not adopted at a public hearing for that purpose. OCGA § 36-66-5. 2 Additionally, there was no mention in the proposed ordinance about policies and procedures, “[a] fortiori, the General Assembly intended non-compliance with the procedures to invalidate any zoning decision after [January 1, 1986].” McClure at 710. The trial court erred in failing to hold that the County did not [155]*155comply with the statute and that the ordinance is void.

2. The trial court denied the appellants’ petition for a writ of mandamus on the ground that the ordinance was validly enacted. It also reasoned that if the ordinance was invalid there would be no clear legal right to a certificate.

According to the appellants’ amendment to their complaint, the Department of Natural Resources (Environmental Protection Division) forbids the operation of a rock quarry without a surface mining permit. However, a condition precedent to the issuance of the permit is a certificate of land use approval from the local governing authority. Without the certificate of land use approval, a surface mining permit cannot be issued, and without the surface mining permit, a quarry cannot be allowed. A “county has the duty and obligation to work with property owners to allow them the highest and best use of their property. . . .” DeKalb County v. Flynn, 243 Ga. 679, 680 (256 SE2d 362) (1979). Where, as in this case, the zoning ordinance is invalid, there is no valid restriction on the property, and the appellant has the right under the law to use the property as it so desires. Because there is no other specific legal remedy for the legal right, OCGA § 9-6-20, a writ of mandamus will lie to compel the officer to issue a certificate of land use to the appellant so that it might attempt to obtain a surface mining permit.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Hunt, J., who concurs in the judgment but dissents as to Division 2; Benham and Fletcher, JJ., who dissent.

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Tilley Properties, Inc. v. Bartow County
401 S.E.2d 527 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
401 S.E.2d 527, 261 Ga. 153, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 130, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tilley-properties-inc-v-bartow-county-ga-1991.