Tilkin & Cagen, Inc. v. United Metal Receptacle Corp.

593 F. Supp. 2d 996, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105625, 2008 WL 5453760
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedDecember 30, 2008
Docket08 C 6095
StatusPublished

This text of 593 F. Supp. 2d 996 (Tilkin & Cagen, Inc. v. United Metal Receptacle Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tilkin & Cagen, Inc. v. United Metal Receptacle Corp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 996, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105625, 2008 WL 5453760 (N.D. Ill. 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MILTON I. SHADUR, Senior District Judge.

Sales representative Tilkin & Cagen, Inc. (“Tilkin”), terminated by United Metal Receptacle Corporation (“United”) after nearly 28 years of an informal relationship that Tilkin’s lawyer characterizes as “a handshake deal,” has sued both United and Rubbermaid Commercial Products, LLC (“Rubbermaid”), which purchased all of United’s assets for some $40.5 million during the same month as United’s notice of termination to Tilkin. Tilkin’s second lawsuit targeting both those defendants and Richard Weiss (“Weiss”) was filed in the Circuit Court of Lake County and then was promptly removed to this District Court. 1 Defendants have moved to dis *997 miss the multicount Complaint and, after the December 8, 2008 court session during which this Court orally indicated its threshold views on issues posed by TQkin’s claims, both sides have expanded on then-respective positions with further written submissions.

As always when a Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) motion is under consideration, this Court will credit the Complaint’s factual allegations. That does not of course extend to Tilkin’s characterization of the legal consequences of those alleged facts, to which this opinion turns its attention.

First off, before the issue of what Tilkin may be entitled to claim is addressed, it is useful to cabin the dispute by identifying what Tilkin may not pursue. That identification calls for a look at the situation visa-vis each of the three defendants. What cuts across the board, however, is Tilkin’s view that its invocation of the “procuring clause” doctrine assures it of compensation in perpetuity on the premise that once its efforts resulted in the placement of United’s products in a distributor’s catalog (now enlarged in Tilkin’s December 22 Supplemental Response to extend to distributors’ websites), the benefit from those efforts goes on forever.

Ironically the same Supplemental Response seeks to call to Tilkin’s aid the serendipitous decision of our Court of Appeals earlier this month in AA Sales & Assocs., Inc. v. Coni-Seal, Inc., 550 F.3d 605 (7th Cir.2008). AA Sales does shed light on another aspect of this case (dealt with later), but for the present it suffices to quote that opinion’s brief identification of a like claim made by the terminated sales representative there (id. at 612):

AA Sales points to no evidence that Coni-Seal agreed to continue post-termination commissions in perpetuity.

True enough, this case is at the pleading rather than the evidence stage — but nothing in Tilkin’s Complaint either states or creates a reasonable inference of such a perpetual entitlement. Greed is not an acceptable substitute for either evidence or the allegations in a complaint.

In that respect Supplemental Response 1-2 criticizes our Court of Appeals’ characterization of the procuring clause doctrine in Harold Wright Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 49 F.3d 308, 310 (7th Cir.1995) (and thus it presumably criticizes this Court’s reliance on that characterization);

The doctrine of procuring cause creates a default term, which is to say a term that a court plugs into a contract to fill a gap in a way the court thinks the parties would have done had they thought about it.

Although Tilkin seeks to denigrate Harold Wright by stating “this particular ‘default’ was apparently created in Harold Wright which cited to no prior authority in introducing this view,” its Supplemental Response fails to include among its references to AA Sales that case’s own identical description of the procuring cause doctrine as a “default rule” (550 F.3d at 610):

However, the procuring cause rule is merely a default rule and is inapplicable when a contract specifies other bases of fee recovery.

*998 It is worth observing that, although the following statement admittedly goes beyond the Complaint, page 2 of defendants’ recently filed Reply says this about the well-known Rubbermaid Company, a major player in its market (and United’s former market):

United and Rubbermaid products typically appeared in the same catalogs, and Tilkin’s efforts were directed to procuring space in the catalogs (typically a number of pages) in which United products would appear in competition with Rubbermaid products.
* :U *
However, after Tilkin was terminated, its previous efforts to get United products into catalogs were of no utility to Rubbermaid, which has its own sales force and, unlike United, has little difficulty acquiring catalog space when necessary.

That representation is hardly surprising, and if the facts bear out what Rubbermaid has said, that would further buttress what this Court had said about the Harold Wright statement during the December 8 status hearing that ended up calling for the parties’ most recent submissions (Tr. 16-17):

You provide me some authority, I’ll look at it. But you’ve got to do that, because otherwise you know the point that I made about our Seventh Circuit law that’s that Gadsby case and the Harold Wright case that it repeats, says essentially that it has to be a term that the court puts into a contract, because it’s not an express one certainly, to fill a gap that it would believe that the parties would have filled if they had thought about it. And unless you get me something that says, “Well, they should have known because here is the case law that said that,” I can tell you right now I am not prepared to find that the parties would have included such a provision if they had thought about it Your client might have wanted that, but as in all such relationships it takes two to tango, you know. And so unitary desire doesn’t do the job.

As for Weiss, identified in Complaint ¶ 5 as United’s “President, Chairman, CEO and Majority Shareholder,” Tilkin targets him in Count III (together with Rubbermaid) under the rubric “Tortious Interference with Economic Advantage.” That simply won’t do under principles established a quarter century ago in George A. Fuller Co. v. Chicago Coll. of Osteopathic Medicine, 719 F.2d 1326, 1333 (7th Cir.1983). Tilkin also adds Count V, labeled “Unjust Enrichment,” against Weiss alone. That heavy-handed effort to recharacterize United’s corporate sale of assets, even if followed by a distribution to Weiss in liquidation, won’t do either. In sum, no basis appears to exist for Weiss’ retention as a defendant.

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593 F. Supp. 2d 996, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105625, 2008 WL 5453760, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tilkin-cagen-inc-v-united-metal-receptacle-corp-ilnd-2008.