Tile Shop Holdings, Inc. v. Allied World Nat'l Assur. Co.

981 F.3d 655
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedDecember 7, 2020
Docket19-2404
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 981 F.3d 655 (Tile Shop Holdings, Inc. v. Allied World Nat'l Assur. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tile Shop Holdings, Inc. v. Allied World Nat'l Assur. Co., 981 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 2020).

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 19-2404 ___________________________

Tile Shop Holdings, Inc.

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Allied World National Assurance Company

Defendant - Appellee ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Minnesota ____________

Submitted: June 17, 2020 Filed: December 7, 2020 ____________

Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________

STRAS, Circuit Judge.

After Tile Shop Holdings, Inc. settled multiple lawsuits with its shareholders, it sought indemnification under its directors-and-officers insurance policies. Its excess insurer, Allied World National Assurance Company, denied coverage. Tile Shop sued, but the district court1 granted Allied’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

I.

Founder Robert Rucker started Tile Shop in 1984. The company, which operates a chain of retail tile stores, was privately owned until 2012, when Rucker decided to take the company public. The reason for the move was the potential for “a national presence.”

As relevant here, the move created a new company, Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., which filed a series of documents with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including a registration statement in June 2012, several amendments in July, and a prospectus in early August. Those filings never mentioned certain related-party transactions. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a). Specifically, Tile Shop had obtained millions of dollars in supplies from Chinese export companies owned and operated in substantial part by Rucker’s brother-in-law. Id. (explaining that related-party transactions include dealings with an “immediate family member of a director or executive officer”).

About 15 months after Tile Shop went public, an investment-research firm reported that Tile Shop had failed to disclose the related-party transactions in its SEC filings. The report stated that Tile Shop “secretly control[led] its largest supplier” and had “use[d] this dubious entity to report fictitious margins.” In one explosive passage, the report made comparisons to the schemes run by “Bernie Madoff and Allen Stanford[],” and explained that “Tile Shop’s gross margins [we]re too good to be true.” Shareholders were advised to “sell . . . immediately.”

1 The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. -2- The report spelled trouble for the company. Tile Shop’s alleged misconduct led to two types of lawsuits. The first were shareholder class-action lawsuits under the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, et seq., 78a, et seq.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; Consolidated Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 4–5, Beaver Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., No. 0:14-cv- 00786-ADM-TNL (D. Minn. May 23, 2014), ECF No. 66. The second were derivative suits against the company’s officers and directors for breaches of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment. See Verified Consolidated Stockholder Derivative Compl. at ¶ 1, In re Tile Shop Holdings, Inc. Stockholder Derivative Litig., No. 10884-VCG (Del. Ch. July 31, 2015). Both sets of lawsuits eventually settled.

To recover some of what it had lost, Tile Shop sought benefits under its directors-and-officers policies. American International Group, Inc., more commonly known as AIG, was its primary insurer, but Tile Shop’s claims exceeded the policy limit of $10 million. So Tile Shop turned to Allied, its excess insurer, which denied coverage. The reason was a policy exclusion for wrongful prior acts.

Not satisfied with Allied’s reason for denying benefits, Tile Shop sought declaratory relief and damages in federal district court. The court, on a motion for summary judgment, reached the same conclusion that Allied had: the losses were nonrecoverable under a policy exclusion.

II.

Minnesota courts use a two-step burden-shifting framework when evaluating insurance-coverage questions. At the first step, Tile Shop must prove that the policy’s insuring clause covers its losses. See Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628, 636 (Minn. 2013). Only then, at the second step, does the burden shift to Allied to prove that an exclusion applies. See id. “At both of these steps, our review is de novo, and we must give the policy, including individual

-3- terms and exclusions, its plain and ordinary meaning.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Miller Architects & Builders, 949 F.3d 403, 405 (8th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted) (applying Minnesota law).

The second step is the focus here. Allied concedes that Tile Shop has shown that its losses are covered under the policy’s insuring clause. The disagreement is about whether they fall within an exclusion.

A.

Tile Shop’s excess policy contains what is called a “follow-form clause,” which subjects it to the terms and conditions of the primary policy. See Rausch v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 277 N.W.2d 645, 646 (Minn. 1979) (“A ‘follow[-]form endorsement’ is designed to ‘track’ or provide the same coverage as a separate underlying policy.”). The idea is to limit risk for the excess insurer by covering the same basic risks as the primary insurer, even if the excess policy contains some of its own unique terms and conditions. See 4 Jeffrey E. Thomas, New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition § 24.02, at 24-11 (2018) (explaining that follow-form clauses “contribute to uniform coverage and the spreading of risk among the insurers”).

Here, the spotlight is on the interaction between the follow-form clause and the primary policy’s prior-acts exclusion, which eliminates coverage for certain wrongful acts committed before the policy went into effect. The question is whether this exclusion has been made a part of the excess policy through its follow-form clause.

The follow-form clause in this case is fairly typical. See 4 Thomas, supra, § 24.02, at 24-10. “Except as [t]herein stated,” the excess policy “is subject to all terms, conditions, agreements and limitations of the Primary Policy.” The default, in other words, is that “all terms” and “limitations” in the primary policy, including any exclusions, are part of the excess policy, as if they had been copied and pasted -4- directly into the document. See id. (“A [follow-form clause] incorporates by reference the terms, conditions[,] and exclusions of the underlying policy.” (emphasis added)); cf. Halbach v. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Basic contract principles instruct that where a writing refers to another document, . . . the portion to which reference is made[] becomes constructively a part of the writing . . . .” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).

B.

The relevant exclusions here deal with “prior acts.” The first prior-acts exclusion explains that

the Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in connection with any Claim made against an Insured alleging any Wrongful Act occurring prior to August 20, 2012 or after the end of the Policy Period.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
981 F.3d 655, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tile-shop-holdings-inc-v-allied-world-natl-assur-co-ca8-2020.