Tichich v. City of Bloomington

835 F.3d 856, 2016 WL 4547350
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 1, 2016
DocketNo. 14-3151, No. 14-3188, No. 14-3225, No. 14-3288, No. 14-3750, No. 15-1288, No. 15-1846, No. 14-2964, No. 14-3404, No. 14-3448, No. 14-3673, No. 15-1805, No. 14-3651
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 835 F.3d 856 (Tichich v. City of Bloomington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tichich v. City of Bloomington, 835 F.3d 856, 2016 WL 4547350 (8th Cir. 2016).

Opinion

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

The Minnesota Department of Public Safety (DPS) maintains a database of driver’s license data (DPS database). It is the alleged misuse of that database information which is the subject of these appeals.

A number of Minnesota driver’s license holders (plaintiffs) brought suit against numerous cities, counties, and other government entities (local entities); numerous unknown law enforcement or other government personnel, and supervisors, officers, deputies, staff, investigators, employees or agents of local entities or other government entities in Minnesota (collec[866]*866tively, Law Enforcement Does); current and former DPS Commissioners Ramona Dohman and Michael Campion (collectively, Commissioners); and various unknown officers, supervisors, staff, employees, independent contractors, and agents of DPS (collectively, DPS Does). The complaints allege that the above-described entities and individuals (defendants) violated the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA or Act), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725, by accessing or disclosing personal information from the DPS database without a permissible purpose. The district courts dismissed the actions for failure to state a claim. We affirm in part, reverse in part,' and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

Our opinion in McDonough v. Anoka County, 799 F.3d 931, 937-38 (8th Cir. 2015) (McDonough), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2388, 195 L.Ed.2d 763 (2016), discussed the history, purpose, and applicability of the DPPA, and so we do not repeat that discussion here.

The present appeals raise issues similar to those presented in McDonough and are governed by our holdings in that case, one of which is that the four-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) begins to run when a DPPA violation occurs. McDonough, 799 F.3d at 943. We also held that each defendant’s alleged conduct must be assessed independently to insure that.plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient facts regarding that defendant’s impermissible purpose to state a facially plausible claim to relief against it. Id. at 946. We discussed the suspicious access and timing patterns that would nudge some of the claims “ ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’ ” Id. at 947 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

We assessed each defendant’s alleged conduct independently to ensure that the facts pleaded regarding that defendant’s impermissible purpose were sufficient to state a plausible claim against that defendant. Id. at 946.

We held that allegations were not to be assessed in isolation, that the complaint should be read as a whole, and that time-barred claims could be considered in assessing the plausibility of timely filed claims. Id. at 946. We said that in the absence of allegations of concerted activity, “something more is needed to nudge the allegations across the line of plausibility and tie the conduct of specific Defendants to a more general inference of impermissible purpose.” Id. at 947. We noted that generalized allegations merely consistent with the liability of any particular defendant are insufficient to cross the line of plausibility in the absence of allegations of concerted activity. Id.

We analyzed the allegations for any evidence of a degree of local fame or of a relationship between the plaintiff and particular officers or agents of the local entities and whether the alleged access occurred in such a way as to correspond with a significant event that could explain the interest in the plaintiffs personal information. We also looked for any suspicious access and timing patterns, such as accesses on the same day or within a short time span through multiple unrelated agencies. Id. We viewed a pattern of late-night accesses as possibly resulting from less supervision during those hours' and out of boredom, curiosity, or romantic interest.

We held that the plaintiffs’ allegations of high volumes and suspicious timing of accesses, coupled with the legislative auditor’s report, which found that at least half of Minnesota’s law enforcement officers were misusing personal information in the database, sufficiently rebutted the pre[867]*867sumption of regularity usually accorded to public officers. Id. at 948.

We concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaints that merited consideration fell within one of the following categories:

1) accesses on the same day as or within a few hours of accesses by other, unrelated entities during the limitations period; 2) multiple late-night accesses during the limitations period; or 3) a history of frequent suspicious accesses fitting the above criteria, even if prior to the limitations period, coupled with accesses within the limitations period.

Id. at 950.

We recognized the concern that the district courts had voiced about the lack of a coherent and workable way to distinguish between those' claims that could be fairly said to satisfy the standard of plausibility and those that do not, and we acknowledged that making that determination might well be an arduous, time-consuming process. Id. at 948. Likewise, we acknowledge here that while the “something more” required in the absence of allegations of concerted activity may be viewed as an imprecise measure of line-drawing, it serves to distinguish intuitively from factually plausible claims.

We affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the Commissioners and DPS Does, id. at 957, and we enter a similar ruling with respect to those defendants in these cases.

Before turning to the individual complaints in this group of cases, we reject the requests that we expand our holding in McDonough to say that all timely pled accesses should be read as stating a plausible DPPA claim, that time-barred accesses should be addressed separately from timely raised claims, and that a showing of plausibility against a few entities should be extended to all of the entities. Such extension of McDonough’s reach would in effect result in the imposition of collective rather than the individual liability contemplated by McDonough, something we decline to do.

We clarify McDonough by holding that sequential accesses occurring within a several-minute time span should be considered as one obtainment rather than several. While these close-in-time accesses fall within the technical meaning of “obtainment” as explained in McDonough, 799 F.3d at 944, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we will view them as constituting one continuous gaining or acquiring of the same information by the same user at the same time, rather than as separate time-punctuated accesses.

Finally, we express our appreciation for the parties’ post-McDonough supplemental briefs, which have been of assistance in our review of these cases.

We turn, then, to the individual eases before us.

II.

1. Sarah Kristine Tichich’s Complaint

Tichich competed in many beauty pageants and was named Mrs. Minnesota United States in 2007. She competed in the Mrs.

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Bluebook (online)
835 F.3d 856, 2016 WL 4547350, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tichich-v-city-of-bloomington-ca8-2016.