Thurston v. Chester

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedJuly 13, 2010
Docket10-3053
StatusUnpublished

This text of Thurston v. Chester (Thurston v. Chester) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thurston v. Chester, (10th Cir. 2010).

Opinion

FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit

July 13, 2010 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT

ANDRE LAMONT THURSTON,

Petitioner - Appellant, No. 10-3053 v. (D. Kansas) CLAUDE CHESTER, Warden, USP- (D.C. No. 5:09-CV-03028-RDR) Leavenworth,

Respondent - Appellee.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

Andre Lamont Thurston, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the

dismissal by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas of his

application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He also appeals the denial of his

motion for reconsideration. He claims that he will suffer the effects of not

participating in the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Program (IFRP) because the Bureau has improperly interpreted the regulations

governing the IFRP. The district court rejected his claim and he appeals. We

affirm.

On July 1, 1996, Mr. Thurston was sentenced to 360 months’

imprisonment, five years’ supervised release, a $50 criminal assessment, $3,000

restitution, and a $17,100 fine for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

cocaine base (crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He has paid the assessment

and restitution in full, but has a balance of over $14,000 due on his fine.

The purpose of the IFRP is to “encourage[] each sentenced inmate to meet

his or her legitimate financial obligations.” 28 C.F.R. § 545.10. Under the

program, prison staff assist an inmate in developing a financial plan to meet those

obligations, and monitor the inmate’s progress under the plan. See id. § 545.11.

An inmate is responsible for maintaining progress in fulfilling the financial

obligations of the plan. See id. § 545.11(b). “Payments may be made from

institution resources or non-institution (community) resources.” 1 Id.

1 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b) reads in its entirety:

(b) Payment. The inmate is responsible for making satisfactory progress in meeting his/her financial responsibility plan and for providing documentation of these payments to unit staff. Payments may be made from institution resources or non-institution (community) resources. In developing an inmate’s financial plan, the unit team shall first subtract from the trust fund account the inmate’s minimum payment schedule for UNICOR or non–UNICOR work assignments, set forth in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this section. (continued...)

-2- Mr. Thurston arrived at the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth,

Kansas, on June 4, 2008. He began with $171.74 in his inmate trust account. On

June 12, 2008, he signed a contract to participate in the IFRP; his plan called for

quarterly payments of $25 to be withdrawn from his account beginning in

September 2008. He had no institution work assignment, and by the time he was

to make his first payment, he had depleted his account balance to $.79. He did

not make his first payment and was placed on refusal status on October 1, 2008.

He filed this suit on January 29, 2009.

The penalties for not participating in the IFRP include (1) notification to

the Parole Commission of the refusal to participate, (2) ineligibility for furlough,

(3) ineligibility for performance, bonus, or vacation pay, (4) ineligibility for work

1 (...continued) The unit team shall then exclude from its assessment $75.00 a month deposited into the inmate’s trust fund account. This $75.00 is excluded to allow the inmate the opportunity to better maintain telephone communication under the Inmate Telephone System (ITS).

(1) Ordinarily, the minimum payment for non-UNICOR and UNICOR grade 5 inmates will be $25.00 per quarter. This minimum payment may exceed $25.00, taking into consideration the inmate’s specific obligations, institution resources, and community resources.

(2) Inmates assigned grades 1 through 4 in UNICOR ordinarily will be expected to allot not less than 50% of their monthly pay to the payment process. Any allotment which is less than the 50% minimum must be approved by the Unit Manager. Allotments may also exceed the 50% minimum after considering the individual’s specific obligations and resources.

-3- detail outside the facility in which he is incarcerated, (5) ineligibility for

UNICOR (which is a federal work program designed to “employ and provide job

skills training” to federal inmates, UNICOR, FPI General Overview FAQs,

http://www.unicor.gov/about/faqs/faqsgeneral.cfm), (6) more stringent monthly

commissary spending limits, (7) quartering in the lowest housing status, (8)

ineligibility for community-based programs, (9) ineligibility for a release gratuity,

and (10) ineligibility for an incentive for participation in a residential drug-

treatment program. See 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d). We question whether the

implementation of these penalties would change the conditions of Mr. Thurston’s

incarceration enough to form the basis for a cognizable habeas claim. See Glaus

v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 387–88 (7th Cir. 2005). But because that issue is not

jurisdictional, we shall address the merits of Mr. Thurston’s contentions.

Mr. Thurston claimed in his § 2241 application (1) that the Bureau of

Prisons misinterpreted IFRP regulations and (2) that his sentencing court

improperly delegated the setting of his IFRP payment obligations. The Bureau’s

alleged misinterpretation of the regulations is the only issue he raises on appeal.

Mr. Thurston reads 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b) to say that when he is

“unassigned to any job and has no institutional income,” Aplt. Br. at 4, the

Bureau may not require him to satisfy his obligations under an IFRP payment plan

to which he agreed, and may not subject him to sanctions for failing to make

timely payments. He asserts that § 545.11(b) allows payments to be withheld

-4- from his account only if he has a work assignment as described in § 545.11(b)(1)

or (2). He further argues that requiring him to continue to make IFRP payments

would necessarily require him to do so with funds sent to him by his family,

contrary to the intent of the regulations.

Mr. Thurston’s view of the regulations is incorrect.

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Related

Pierson v. Morris
282 F. App'x 347 (Fifth Circuit, 2008)
Glaus v. Anderson
408 F.3d 382 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)

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