Thrower v. Brantley

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedJuly 28, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00129
StatusUnknown

This text of Thrower v. Brantley (Thrower v. Brantley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thrower v. Brantley, (S.D. Ga. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

AUGUSTA DIVISION

JOEL THROWER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV 125-129 ) EUGENE BRANTLEY; CAPTAIN ) DANIELS; CAPTAIN HARRELL; ) CAPTAIN DANKO; LIEUTENANT ) COWELL; LIEUTENANT JENKINS; ) SERGEANT SEYMORE; SERGEANT ) KUNTZ; CORPORAL GIST; CORPORAL ) ELLISON; CORPORAL FERN; DEPUTY ) DAGGETT; DEPUTY GAMBLE; ) DEPUTY REED; DEPUTY BUSBY; ) GILMORE; DEPUTY GRAHAM; DEPUTY ) PRESCOTT; DEPUTY HARRIS; DETRA ) WILLIS; and RHONDA ROSS, ) ) Defendants. )

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, detained at Charles B. Webster Detention Center in Augusta, Georgia, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, his complaint must be screened to protect potential defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 F. App’x 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Upon initial review of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court was unable to determine whether Plaintiff had any viable claims due to the scant facts provided in his complaint and Plaintiff’s failure to tie his allegations to specific Defendants. (Doc. no. 6.) The Court further explained that in § 1983 lawsuits supervisory officials are not subject to liability for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. (Id.) On

July 7, 2025, the Court entered an Order giving Plaintiff fourteen days to file an amended complaint to address the pleading deficiencies. (Id. at 5-7.) The Court cautioned Plaintiff that failing to timely submit an amended complaint would result in a presumption by the Court he desires to have this case voluntarily dismissed and would result in a recommendation for dismissal of this action, without prejudice. (Id. at 7.) The time to respond has passed, and Plaintiff has not submitted an amended complaint as required by the Court’s July 7th Order. A district court has authority to manage its docket to expeditiously resolve cases, and

this authority includes the power to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a court order. Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)); see also Eades v. Ala. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 298 F. App’x 862, 863 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“District courts possess the ability to dismiss a case . . . for want of prosecution based on two possible sources of authority: Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) or their inherent authority to manage their dockets.”).

Moreover, the Local Rules of the Southern District of Georgia dictate that an “assigned Judge may, after notice to counsel of record, sua sponte . . . dismiss any action for want of prosecution, with or without prejudice . . . [for] [w]illful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court; or [a]ny other failure to prosecute a civil action with reasonable promptness.” Loc. R. 41.1 (b) & (c). Finally, dismissal without prejudice is generally appropriate pursuant to Rule 41(b) where a plaintiff has failed to comply with a court order, “especially where the litigant has been forewarned.” Owens v. Pinellas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 331 F. App’x 654, 655 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989)). Here, Plaintiffs failure to file an amended complaint, or even to provide the Court with an explanation for his failure to amend his complaint, amounts not only to a failure to prosecute, but also an abandonment of his case. This is precisely the type of neglect contemplated by the Local Rules. The Court cautioned Plaintiff that a failure to respond would be an election to have his case voluntarily dismissed. Furthermore, because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court finds that the imposition of monetary sanctions is not a feasible sanction. In sum, the time to respond has passed, and Plaintiff has not submitted an amended complaint as required by the Court’s Order. Therefore, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS this case be DISMISSED without prejudice and that this civil action be CLOSED. SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 28th day of July, 2025, at Augusta, Georgia.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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Related

Jamil A. Al-Amin v. James E. Donald
165 F. App'x 733 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Eades v. Alabama Department of Human Resources
298 F. App'x 862 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
Kevin Owens v. Pinellas County Sheriff's Dept.
331 F. App'x 654 (Eleventh Circuit, 2009)
David Richard Moon v. Lanson Newsome, Warden
863 F.2d 835 (Eleventh Circuit, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
Thrower v. Brantley, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thrower-v-brantley-gasd-2025.