Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co.

129 F. 378, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4751
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts·Decided April 27, 1904·No. No. 1,237·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

HALE, District Judge.

This suit is brought for infringement of claim 18 of letters patent No. 394,039, dated December 4, 1888, to Charles J. Van Depoele. The claim alleged to have been infringed is as follows: “A turn-buckle, the body portion of which is composed of insulating material, substantially as described.” The defenses are that there is no invention, and that there has been no infringement. The claim covers an insulated turn-buckle, such as is alleged to be used on an electric railway under the suspended conductor system. The purpose of the device is to unite in a single structure means for tightening the span wire and means for furnishing insulation between the trolléy wire and the ground. It is well known that the grounded rails on an electric road usually form the return circuit of an overhead trolley railway. Necessarily the trolley wire must be carefully insulated from the ground, or from any structure electrically connected with the ground. It is alleged that the practice is to insulate the trolley wire itself from the span wire, and then to place an insulating turn-bucklé in the span wire also, so that, if any accident should destroy the insulation at the first point, there would still remain effective insulation between the electric current and the ground. Previous to this device it is alleged that a metallic turn-buckle had always been used, with separate insulating devices wherever such insulation was required. The problem in the mind of the inventor was to unite the two functions of tightening the span wire and at the same time affording an electrical barrier to prevent the passage of the electric current.

The defendants urge the defense of invalidity.- They insist that turn-buckles were old, and insulating material was old, and that it was not invention to put them together. It does not appear that these two elements have ever been put together until this union was effected by Van Depoele. The devices referred to in the prior art are ordinary metallic turn-buckles and swivels. Some of the swivels to which reference is made contain insulating material, and are al[379]*379leged to have been used for purposes of insulation as well as for the usual purposes of swivels. Where swivels are so constructed, they require only the addition of a screw to malee them insulating turnbuckles. The Clark patent, No. 227,095, comes the nearest to presenting a case of anticipation, but this patent, in any event, requires the function of tightening to be added to the swivel in order to make it a reference for an insulating turn-buckle. It is claimed, too, that the Clark patent does not even present an insulated swivel, and that provision is made for preventing the insulation, instead of effecting it. We think, however, the discussion on these lines is immaterial. The whole question of invalidity is presented clearly and distinctly by the learned counsel for the defendants in his claim that the turn-buckle of the patent in suit presents merely a union of two well-known devices, namely, the old metallic turn-buckle and insulating material, which also was old. It is urged with great force that the mere uniting of two instruments is not invention. The well-known theory of the patent law is cited as contained in the Supreme Court decision that it is not invention to substitute rubber for part of the lead in lead pencils, so tha,t the lead pencil will form a combined pencil and eraser. Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U. S. 347, 23 L. Ed. 719. See, also, Rubber Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498, 22 L. Ed. 410. The Supreme Court has announced the doctrine with great clearness that the combination of old devices into a new article without producing any new mode of operation is not invention. Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U. S. 310, 26 L. Ed. 749; Floresheim v. Schilling, 137 U. S. 64, 11 Sup. Ct. 20, 34 L. Ed. 574. These cases present the uniting of two functions without adding any new utility. On this subject the well-known doorknob case is perhaps the leading one, and demands careful consideration. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248, 13 L. Ed. 683. The patent in that case was for a clay or porcelain doorknob. The court said: '

“But in tlie case before us tbe knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use; and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement. Now, it may very well be that by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well-known mode an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic of wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob. But this, of itself, can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine made in whole or in part of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one; or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent. The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes Intended, but nothing more.”

But on careful examination of the device claimed in the patent in suit, and of all that class of authorities to which we have called attention, we are satisfied that the insulated turn-buckle does not come [380]*380within the reasoning of these cases. In the lead pencil case no new utility was presented by the patent. The device still remained a lead pencil at one end and an eraser at the other end. The combination of the old devices did not produce any new and single mode of operation. The two old functions were left of erasing at one end and of writing at the other. So, also, in the doorknob case, the patent did not produce any new mode of operation. It did not unite any two functions. The doorknob was still a doorknob, and only a doorknob. It presented a plain, simple substitution of materials and an improvement of a commercial product by such substitution. But, while the commercial product was improved, it was not made functionally different. The courts have, however, distinctly held that where to a prior structure a part is added which gives a new utility, there is invention. In the Faber Case, which we have cited, Mr. Justice Hunt clearly draws the distinction between a case where no new utility is found and a case in which a new combination does result in„a new utility. He says, in speaking of the result in the matter of the rubber-ended lead pencil:

“A pencil is laid down and a rubber is taken up, one to write, the other to erase. A pencil is turned over to erase with, or an eraser is turned over to write with. The principle is the same in both cases.”

He further, in his opinion, shows other instances of the same character. He says:

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Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 129 F. 378, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4751 (circtdma 1904).

129 F. 378 (Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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