American Sulphite Pulp Co. v. Howland Falls Pulp Co.

70 F. 986, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 3250
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maine
DecidedNovember 9, 1895
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 70 F. 986 (American Sulphite Pulp Co. v. Howland Falls Pulp Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
American Sulphite Pulp Co. v. Howland Falls Pulp Co., 70 F. 986, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 3250 (circtdme 1895).

Opinion

PUTHAM, Circuit Judge.

This case involves a controversy over a patent issued to George F. Russell, growing out of an application filed April 10, 1890, and culminating in a reissue dated November 15, 1892. The patent relates to improvements in the construction of digesters in which wood pulp is manufactured by the sulphite process, and the claims are as follows:

“1. The improved pulp digester herein described, having an outer shell, A, and a continuous lining or coat, B, of cement, as described, applied to the interior of the said shell, for the purpose set forth.
“2. The improved pulp digester herein described, having an outer shell. A, a continuous lining or coat, B, of cement, substantially as described, applied to the interior of the said shell, and an interior lining of tiles, O, all substantially as set forth.”

The second claim need receive' no attention. It is distinguished from the first only by the addition of an interior lining of tiles. The specification states that the purpose of this lining is to prevent the wearing away of the cement by the friction of the mass of puip. There is no invention in this, and the whole substance of the patent is in the first claim. This consists- of only two elements, the shell and the continuous lining -or coat of cement. Its language is so unequivocal that its construction needs no aid from secondary rules, and is not enlarged nor limited by the redundant, and, in some particulars, somewhat obscure, language of the specification, whether of the original patent or of the reissue, except in one particular.

In The Telephone Cases, 126 U. S. 1, 2, 8 Sup. Ct. 778, the court found that Bell discovered that human speech could be reproduced and understood over a telephone by gradually changing the intensity of a continuous electric current, that he had devised a way by which these changes of intensity could be made and speech actually transmitted, and that thus he put the art in condition for practical use.. Consequently, the court held that the use of a continuous electric current was his art. Thus, the court made his patent practically as broad as the art, notwithstanding he had not discovered every way in which the art could be made useful. In the case at bar, the corresponding art would include every form of continuous, homogeneous, acid-resisting lining which can be applied in a plastic form; and the substantial difference is that, in the Telephone Gases, the idea of [989]*989making use of a continuous electric current for transmitting human speech" was new, while the idea of a continuous, homogeneous, acid-resisting lining was a common one in the practical arts, but no method had been devised of constructing any form of it suitable for pulp digesters. Consequently, whatever invention was made in this field was limited to specific methods of working out the common idea, and of applying it usefully. To admit more than this in behalf of the patentee in this case would necessarily admit that he was entitled to cover the whole art, which is plainly impossible.1 in harmony with this, the claim was limited to a coat or lining of cement. But this word has the ordinary, commercial meaning of hydraulic cement, and also a larger, and, perhaps, more accepted, sense. It cannot, in this patent, be given the latter, without substantially giving the patentee the whole art, and much moré than he can claim to have actually invented or discovered. Therefore, we are compelled to limit the word which he has himself chosen to its ordinary, commercial sense. An examination of the file wrapper leads to the same results, but we need not enlarge on this. The word “cement” having various significations, its precise definition for this purpose must thus he determined. With that exception, we need only say that we are not to construe what does not need to he construed, and that the simple phraseology of this claim can neither he added to, nor taken from, by what appears in the specification, by what occurred in connection with the reissue, or by any alleged implied disclaimer arising in relation thereto. We know of no mystery relating to ascertaining the legal meaning of claims in patents, and we apply to this case the fundamental rules by which is read every instrument whose language is clear in itself.

The second element in the first claim is the “continuous lining or coat of cement, as described, applied to the interior” of the shell. If the words, “as described,” had followed the word “applied,” there would have been some basis for argument in favor of a narrow and merely verbal construction, which might have limited the claim to cement applied in the precise manner pointed out in the specification. But, as they stand, the words, “as described,” can have no effect to restrict the claim in that manner, and it covers every kind of continuous lining or coat of cement, limiting the word “cement” asalreadystated. It thus includes a lining made up mainly of cement blocks, as practiced by the defendant. If the patented, Russell, was entitled to his patent at all, the defendant’s method of obtaining a continuous lining of cement is plainly within its scope; and it differs so unsubstantially from the method described in the patent that it has the appearance of a mere evasion, easily devised when sought for, and plainly within tiie rules touching equivalents.

Does the patent represent a patentable invention? In answering this question, we for the present assume that the work of the pat-entee, Russell, whatever it was, was original in the sense of the patent [990]*990law. It is very evident that tbe art to which the patent relates had been for a long time urgent for a practical lining for the iron or steel shells of digesters, which would be reasonably economical, and that the urgency had been so great as to have become a fundamental necessity. For several years no one had been able to respond; so that, under the circumstances, whoever should solve the whole problem, or should make advances of practical use in that direction, whether by adoption from other arts, or otherwise, would have been entitled to be held an inventor, both by the common judgment and by the courts. Mitscherlich accomplished this in part; but he always had a lead lining in direct juxtaposition with the shell, and his interior' material was not continuous. The Russell device displaced the lead, and furnished a continuous and homogeneous lining. That the use of cement as a continuous lining, and the consequent dispensing with lead linings, involved a true and valuable discovery, either by the patentee in this suit, or by Wenzel, who will be referred to more particularly hereafter, or by each of them independently of the other, is shown by indubitable earmarks appearing through the record, at various points. The French patent of Pierredon, so much relied on by defendant, shows this in the fact that Pierredon carefully pointed his joints with lead, so as to prevent the possibility of the exposure of even a'thread of the cement to the acid contents of the digestér. The reception in Europe of the Wenzel digesters answers this question; and even as late as July 30, 1889, which was a few months after the time when the patentee in this case claims to have completed his invention, Springer, an admitted expert regarding the use of this class of digesters, and who had been investigating the subject-matter abroad, doubted, in his letter of that date, the practicability of using cement, “as we .understand the word,” to put it as he does.

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Bluebook (online)
70 F. 986, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 3250, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-sulphite-pulp-co-v-howland-falls-pulp-co-circtdme-1895.