Thompson v. Wallace Commercial Landscape

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: August 15, 2024
• Docket: 3:23-cv-01530
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MCKENZIE THOMPSON, Case No.: 23-cv-01530-AJB-DDL Plaintiff, 12 ORDER: v. 13 WALLACE COMMERCIAL (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 14 LANDSCAPE; and DOES 1 through 25, MOTION FOR SUMMARY 15 inclusive, JUDGMENT; and Defendant. 16 (2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 17 MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

18 (Doc. Nos. 14 & 15) 19 20 Before the Court is Defendant Wallace Commercial Landscape’s motions for 21 summary judgment, (Doc. No. 14), and Rule 11 sanctions, (Doc. No. 15). The motions 22 have been fully briefed, (Doc. Nos. 19, 20, 22, 23), and the matter is suitable for 23 determination on the papers and without oral argument, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 24 7.1.d.1. Accordingly, the Court hereby VACATES the hearing currently set for August 29, 25 2024, at 2:00 p.m. For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion 26 for summary judgment and DENIES Defendant’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions. 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff began working for Wallace Commercial Landscape as a civilian 3 groundskeeper on Camp Pendleton in December 2021. (Deposition of McKenzie 4 Thompson (“Thompson Depo.”), Doc. No. 19-1, at 7, 9.)1 Defendant is a landscape 5 contractor that was charged with servicing DeLuz Housing on Camp Pendleton’s Military 6 Base. (Id. at 8, 28–29.) Due to medical and personal issues, Plaintiff had a total of three 7 different employment stints with Defendant, from December 2021 through late January 8 2022; May 2022 through September 2022; and late November 2022 through March 2023. 9 (Id. at 11, 18–19.) Throughout her employment, Plaintiff was primarily supervised by 10 Kristina Butcher. (Id. at 22.) When Butcher was absent, Plaintiff was supervised by 11 Clarence Farnham. (Id. at 33–34.) Plaintiff’s job duties generally did not require her to 12 work off-base, and there were only four or five instances during Plaintiff’s employment in 13 which she left the base for a brief period of time. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 6; Thompson Depo. at 14 24–26.) 15 Beginning in January 2023, Farnham made inappropriate sexual-based comments 16 and unwelcome advances toward Plaintiff. (Thompson Depo. at 30.) For example, Farnham 17 frequently made inappropriate comments such as “women getting wet for him,” “getting 18 women off,” and “women love vibrators.” (Id. at 31–32, 34; Doc. No. 14-1 at 7.) These 19 remarks were made in front of Butcher and other team members during lunch breaks or 20 while commuting together. (Thompson Depo. at 35.) 21 On one occasion, while purchasing work supplies off-base at Lowe’s Home 22 Improvement with Farnham and Butcher, Farnham made inappropriate comments about 23 Plaintiff’s physical appearance, remarking that she has a “nice ass.” (Id. at 32, 36.) 24 Moreover, Farnham invited Plaintiff to his house on multiple occasions, always extending 25 these invitations when they were alone together at work. (Id. at 31, 33–34.) 26

27 1 Citations to the record refer to the CM/ECF system page number at the top of each page rather than the 28 1 On February 10, 2023, Farnham, Butcher, and Plaintiff planned to surf together at 2 Cardiff by the Sea in Encinitas after work. (Id. at 38–39.) Farnham offered to drive Plaintiff 3 to save on gas. (Id. at 47–48.) Although Butcher had agreed to join them, she ultimately 4 did not show up at the beach, leaving Plaintiff and Farnham alone. (Id. at 38–39.) 5 While in the car on the drive to the beach, Farnham made numerous inappropriate 6 sexual remarks to Plaintiff and suggested that they change clothes together, and referred to 7 his penis as “his Johnson.” (Id. at 39.) Farnham continued to make inappropriate remarks 8 throughout their time together. (Id.) Once back in the car after surfing, Farnham grabbed 9 and squeezed Plaintiff’s right breast and placed his hand on her inner thigh. (Id. at 40, 78– 10 79.) Plaintiff firmly told Farnham “No,” but despite the refusal, he persisted and confessed 11 his attraction to her. (Id. at 40.) 12 During this car ride home from the beach, Plaintiff text messaged Butcher that 13 Farnham had “made a move” on her and made her feel uncomfortable. (Id. at 59; Doc. No. 14 19-1 at 87.) The next morning, Plaintiff met with Butcher and reported Farnham’s groping 15 in detail. (Thompson Depo. at 60.) When asked if Plaintiff felt comfortable with the 16 prospect of continuing to work with Farnham, Plaintiff responded “I honestly don’t know.” 17 (Id.) 18 A couple of days later, on February 13, 2023, Plaintiff informed Butcher that she 19 was still “struggling” with Farnham’s groping, and that she “wasn’t really too comfortable” 20 working with him. (Doc. No. 19 at 11.) The same day, Plaintiff also told her boyfriend 21 about the groping incident, who became upset and messaged Farnham’s wife about 22 Farnham’s infidelity. (Thompson Depo. at 54–55.) Farnham’s wife thereafter appeared at 23 Defendant’s worksite to confront her husband about the assault allegation. (Id. at 37–38.) 24 Approximately one day later, Plaintiff overheard a conversation between Butcher and 25 Farnham regarding the Encinitas incident, in which she heard Butcher say to Farnham, “it’s 26 not like you really did anything,” or words to that effect. (Declaration of McKenzie 27 Thompson (“Thompson Decl.”), Doc. No. 19-2, ¶ 24.) 28 /// 1 On or around February 22, 2023, Defendant’s owner, Ms. Wallace, came to the 2 Camp Pendleton worksite. Wallace pulled Plaintiff aside and notified her that Butcher had 3 reported the Encinitas incident. (Thompson Depo. at 63.) When Wallace asked if Plaintiff 4 was okay, she responded, “Not really,” and when asked if she was okay working with 5 Farnham, she responded, “I don’t know.” (Id. at 64.) Wallace then told Plaintiff that “some 6 things were just meant to be a secret.” (Id. at 63.) No investigation or corrective action took 7 place. 8 On March 16, 2023, Butcher was absent from the worksite, and Farnham was left in 9 charge of the team. (Id. at 51.) After a verbal altercation with Farnham, in which he stated 10 Plaintiff “was basically begging for and asking for it,” Plaintiff grew upset and text 11 messaged Butcher that she was “heading to the sheriffs [sic] office to start a report and an 12 investigation to press charges.” (Id. at 71–72; Doc. No. 19-1 at 88.) Butcher responded, 13 “Alright give my info for an additional witness.” (Doc. No. 19-1 at 88.) Plaintiff 14 immediately went to report Farnham’s February 10th Encinitas sexual assault to the San 15 Diego County Sheriff’s Department North Coastal Station. (Doc. No. 19-1 at 90.) 16 Later that day, within a few hours of Plaintiff informing Butcher that she was filing 17 a police report, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment by text message. (Doc. No. 18 19-1 at 88.) Indeed, Butcher text messaged Plaintiff, stating “We are going to go ahead and 19 release you from your position. I will need your keys back so if you could bring them 20 tomorrow morning. We will pay you until the end of next Friday.” (Id.) Plaintiff responded 21 by asking, “Why am I being released[?]” but Butcher merely responded, “I need you to 22 return your keys please.” (Id.) 23 Plaintiff filed the Complaint on July 6, 2023, in the Superior Court of California, 24 County of San Diego, as Case No. 37-2023-00028451-CU-OE-CTL. (See Doc. No. 1-2.) 25 On August 18, 2023, Defendant removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 26 §§ 1331 and 1441(a). (Id.) Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses her second (gender 27 discrimination), fourth (negligent supervision), sixth (wrongful termination), and seventh 28 (intentional infliction of emotional distress) claims, but asserts the motion for summary 1 judgment should be denied as to her remaining claims. (Doc. No. 19 at 7.) Plaintiff’s 2 remaining claims are brought under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act 3 (“FEHA”), California Government Code § 12940, et seq., for (1) sexual harassment, 4 (2) failure to prevent sexual harassment and/or discrimination, and (3) retaliation. (Id.) 5 II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 6 A. Request for Judicial Notice 7 Defendant requests judicial notice in support of its motion for summary judgment. 8 The Court may take judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute that 9 is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or 10 (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 11 reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 12 In support of its motion, Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of 13 (1) California Legislature, Stats, 1939, ch. 710, § 1, ceding exclusive jurisdiction of the 14 land which became Camp Pendleton; and (2) Letters of acceptance, dated January 12 and 15 September 8, 1943, and February 18, 1944, from Acting Secretary of the Navy to the 16 Governor of the State of California, in which the federal government accepted jurisdiction 17 of the land which became Camp Pendleton. (Doc. No. 14-8 at 2.) Plaintiff does not oppose 18 judicial notice of these documents. (See generally Doc. No. 19.) The Court finds these 19 exhibits are matters of public record to which there are no reasonable disputes. See Lee v. 20 City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001). As such, the Court GRANTS 21 Defendant’s request for judicial notice. 22 B. Legal Standard 23 A court may grant summary judgment when it is demonstrated there exists no 24 genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 25 as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 26 157 (1970). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing a 27 court of the basis for its motion and of identifying the portions of the declarations, 28 pleadings, and discovery that demonstrate an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. 1 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is “material” if it might 2 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 3 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” as to a material fact if there is 4 sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See 5 Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). 6 Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant 7 must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the 8 movant. See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Where 9 the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant may 10 prevail by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s 11 claim or by merely pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential 12 element of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 13 210 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000). If a moving party fails to carry its burden of 14 production, then “the nonmoving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the 15 nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Id. If the moving 16 party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that 17 a genuine dispute as to any material fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 18 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party cannot “rest upon the 19 mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading but must instead produce 20 evidence that sets forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See 21 Estate of Tucker ex rel. Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 22 2008) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). 23 The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences 24 that may be drawn from the facts placed before a court must be drawn in favor of the 25 opposing party. See Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003). 26 However, “[b]ald assertions that genuine issues of material fact exist are insufficient.” See 27 Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Day v. Sears 28 Holdings Corp., 930 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“Conclusory, speculative 1 testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and 2 defeat summary judgment.”). Further, a motion for summary judgment may not be defeated 3 by evidence that is “merely colorable, or is not significantly probative . . . .” See Anderson, 4 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations omitted); see also Hardage v. CBS Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 5 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). If the nonmoving party fails to produce evidence 6 sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact, the moving party is entitled to 7 summary judgment. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at 1103. 8 C. Discussion 9 Defendant moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims, asserting each 10 are barred under the federal enclave doctrine. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 5.) 11 1. Federal Enclave Doctrine 12 Defendant first contends Camp Pendleton is a federal enclave which came into being 13 in or around 1942, and that Plaintiff’s claims are thus barred by the federal enclave 14 doctrine. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 12.) Defendant further asserts Plaintiff’s pertinent allegations 15 are solely based on conduct occurring at the workplace, and thus took place on a federal 16 enclave. (Id. at 13.) Defendant also argues that to the extent Plaintiff’s allegations extend 17 beyond the workplace, they are immaterial as Defendant has no liability for Plaintiff’s 18 interactions with Farnham away from the workplace outside of work hours. (Id.) Plaintiff 19 concedes Camp Pendleton is a federal enclave and that she generally worked on a federal 20 enclave, but asserts the pertinent allegations arise from sexual harassment of Plaintiff away 21 from Camp Pendleton. (Doc. No. 19 at 15–16.) 22 Federal courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the 23 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, including claims pursuant to the federal 24 enclave doctrine. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The federal enclave doctrine draws its authority from 25 Article I, section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution: 26 Congress shall have power * * * To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases 27 whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by 28 Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat 1 of Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the 2 Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, 3 and other needful Buildings. 4 U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 17. Unless repudiated by Congress, the laws applicable to a federal 5 enclave include (i) federal law and (ii) state laws that were in effect at the time of cession 6 and are not inconsistent with federal law. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 7 587 U.S. 601, 610–11 (2019) (citing James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakul, 309 U.S. 94, 100 8 (1940)); see Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 547 (1885). Given the 9 federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction over federal enclaves, preexisting state law 10 consistent with federal law continues in force as surrogate federal law, unless altered by 11 Congress. Korndobler v. DNC Parks & Resorts at Sequoia, No. 1:15-cv-00459 LJO SKO, 12 2015 WL 3797625, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2015). 13 Pursuant to the federal enclave doctrine, “the activities of federal installations are 14 shielded by the Supremacy Clause from direct state regulation unless Congress provides 15 ‘clear and unambiguous’ authorization for such regulation.” Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. 16 Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 180, (1988). This shield extends to “a federally owned facility 17 performing a federal function . . . even though the federal function is carried out by a private 18 contractor, unless Congress clearly authorizes such regulation.” Id. at 181. 19 Plaintiff’s remaining first, third, and fifth claims, for sexual harassment, failure to 20 prevent sexual harassment and/or discrimination, and retaliation, are based on the FEHA. 21 (See Doc. No. 1-2.) “The predecessor statutes of FEHA were contained in the Fair 22 Employment Practices Act, which was not enacted until 1959.” Taylor v. Lockheed Martin 23 Corp., 78 Cal. App. 4th 472, 483 (2000) (citing former Cal. Labor Code, § 1410 et seq., 24 added by Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 121, § 1, pp. 1999–2005). Plaintiff does not argue that these 25 claims come within a reservation of jurisdiction by California or that FEHA was adopted 26 by Congress. 27 Defendant further asserts that other than the Encinitas incident, Plaintiff’s 28 allegations are solely based on conduct occurring at the workplace. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 13.) 1 Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s reaction when Plaintiff reported the Encinitas incident— 2 first to Burnham, and then to police—occurred away from Camp Pendleton, and thus the 3 federal enclave doctrine does not apply. (Doc. No. 19 at 16.) 4 a. Sexual Harassment 5 Plaintiff’s first claim alleges sexual harassment under the FEHA. FEHA prohibits 6 sexual harassment in the workplace. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1). “[U]nder the 7 FEHA, an employer is strictly liable for all acts of sexual harassment by a supervisor.” 8 State Dept. of Health Servs. v. Superior Ct., 31 Cal. 4th 1026, 1042 (2003). “A workplace 9 may give rise to liability [under FEHA] when it is permeated with discriminatory sex-based 10 intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 11 conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” 12 Alexander v. Cmty. Hosp. of Long Beach, 46 Cal. App. 5th 238, 262 (2020) (quoting Lyle 13 v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 38 Cal. 4th 264, 278–79 (2006)) (cleaned up). 14 As to the Encinitas beach incident, Defendant asserts it has no liability for Plaintiff 15 and Farnham’s interactions away from the workplace outside of work hours. (Doc. No. 14- 16 1 at 13.) The Court agrees. See State Dept. of Health Servs. v. Superior Ct., 31 Cal. 4th 17 1026, 1041 n.3 (2003) (“The employer is not strictly liable for a supervisor’s acts of 18 harassment resulting from a completely private relationship unconnected with the 19 employment and not occurring at the workplace or during normal working hours.”); Atalla 20 v. Rite Aid Corp. 89 Cal. App. 5th 294, 309, 311 (2023) (“The underlying goal of FEHA 21 in this context is to provide effective measures to prevent workplace harassment.”). 22 Defendant next argues the federal enclave doctrine applies here because a claim of 23 sexual harassment under the FEHA is inextricably tied to the workplace. (Doc. No. 22 at 24 6.) Defendant additionally argues that where the majority of pertinent claims forming a 25 cause of action take place on a federal enclave, the federal enclave doctrine applies. (Id. 26 (citing Jimenez v. Haxton Masonry, Inc., No. 18-cv-07109-SVK, 2020 WL 3035795, at 27 *5–6 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2020), and Jamil v. Workforce Res., LLC, No.: 18-CV-27-JLS 28 (NLS), 2018 WL 2298119, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 21, 2018)).) In Jimenez, the court found 1 the plaintiff’s claims stemmed from work conducted on various federal enclaves. The 2 plaintiff argued that the hours spent traveling to and from federal enclave job sites 3 precluded the application of the federal enclave doctrine, but the court found this 4 unpersuasive. 2020 WL 3035795, at *5. 5 Similarly, in Jamil, the plaintiffs sought recovery for travel time to and from the 6 military base and other off-the-clock work. 2018 WL 2298119, at *1. The defendants 7 removed the case to federal court on the basis of the federal enclave doctrine, and the 8 plaintiffs filed a motion to remand arguing that the entirety of the wage and hour violations 9 happened outside of the federal enclaves. Id. at *1, *3–4. The court held that “[a]lthough 10 some events took place on Camp Pendleton and others took place at Defendants’ office, it 11 is clear that the majority of the pertinent events took place on a federal enclave. The 12 allegations stem from Plaintiffs’ employment and work performed at Camp Pendleton. 13 This is sufficient for federal jurisdiction.” Id. at *4. 14 The Court also finds Albers v. Yarbrough World Solutions, No. 5:19-cv-05896-EJD, 15 2020 WL 2218964 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2020), instructive. In Albers, the plaintiff filed suit 16 against his employer for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 17 Act and California wage and hour laws. Albers, 2020 WL 2218964, at *1. Plaintiff alleged 18 the federal enclave doctrine was irrelevant to his complaint because many of the alleged 19 tortious acts occurred outside of federal enclaves. Id. at *7. The court initially found that 20 “any claims stemming from projects on federal lands are barred.” Id. The court further 21 held, however, that his remaining claims were unrelated to Plaintiff’s services at the federal 22 enclave. Id. at *8. The court stated, “Plaintiff had to enter this [illegal] agreement [in 23 violation of the California Business and Professions Code] regardless of where he 24 performed construction services—the agreement applied to all contracted services (private, 25 state, or federal). Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to show that the agreement applied 26 equally to his non-federal projects.” 27 The Court finds the majority of the claims forming Plaintiff’s sexual harassment 28 claim take place on a federal enclave, and thus this claim is barred by the federal enclave 1 doctrine. Plaintiff concedes that “Farnham’s sexual harassment could be initially traced to 2 sexually harassing comments Farnham made on Base, and on work-related trips . . . .” 3 (Doc. No. 19 at 20.) Indeed, Plaintiff states Farnham began making inappropriate 4 comments to her in January 2023, and that “most of these comments were made on Base[.]” 5 (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff further asserts that Farnham’s off-site, after hours sexual harassment 6 affected her at work. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff only alleges one work-related trip to 7 purchase work supplies off-base at Lowe’s Home Improvement, during which Farnham 8 made inappropriate comments about Plaintiff’s physical appearance. (Id. at 9–10.) 9 Plaintiff’s single alleged work-related trip was related to her employment at Camp 10 Pendleton and, as such, the Court finds “the majority of the pertinent events took place on 11 a federal enclave.” 12 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to 13 Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim. 14 b. Retaliation and Failure to Prevent 15 Harassment/Discrimination 16 Plaintiff asserts her claim for failure to prevent harassment overlaps with her 17 harassment claim, which she asserts is not barred by the federal enclave doctrine because 18 the Encinitas incident did not occur on a federal enclave. (Doc. No. 19 at 17.) In reply, 19 Defendant asserts this cause of action is concerned with preventing workplace 20 discrimination and harassment, and because the majority of pertinent events took place on 21 a federal enclave, the federal enclave doctrine applies. (Doc. No. 22 at 8.) 22 Plaintiff similarly asserts that because she was terminated for events arising from 23 locations away from Camp Pendleton (the February 2023 Encinitas incident and the March 24 2023 police station report), the federal enclave doctrine does not bar her fifth claim for 25 FEHA retaliation. (Doc. No. 19 at 22.) Plaintiff specifically asserts she “predominantly 26 worked on a federal enclave (Camp Pendleton), but her FEHA retaliation claim arises from 27 sexual harassment that occurred off a federal enclave, and her resulting police report also 28 occurred off a federal enclave.” (Id.) Defendant replies that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim 1 arises out of her work on Camp Pendleton, and thus is barred by the federal enclave 2 doctrine. (Doc. No. 22 at 5.) 3 In determining whether a particular tort claim “arose on” a federal enclave, courts 4 consider whether the “tort claims arose from actions and injuries that occurred on federal 5 enclaves.” Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 32 F.4th 733, 750 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. 6 denied sub nom. Chevron Corp. v. San Mateo Cnty., Cal., 143 S. Ct. 1797 (2023). If the 7 claim is “too attenuated and remote” from the federal enclave, then the federal enclave 8 does not bar state law claims. Id. at 750–51. 9 The Court finds that because Plaintiff was employed exclusively at Camp Pendleton, 10 her employment claims arose within a federal enclave, regardless of where the actions 11 underlying the decisions concerning her employment or termination occurred. See Haining 12 v. Boeing Co., No. 2:12–cv–10704–ODW (MRWx), 2013 WL 4874975, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. 13 Sept. 11, 2013) (finding federal enclave doctrine barred state-law employment claims 14 despite the plaintiff’s assertion that certain employment decisions and communications 15 occurred outside the enclave). Plaintiff fails to cite any case, and the Court finds none, for 16 the proposition that a plaintiff’s employment claims arise where the underlying events 17 affecting the employment decision takes place. While not directly on point, several cases 18 have emphasized that a court looks to “the plaintiff’s place of employment as the 19 significant factor in determining where the plaintiff’s employment claims arose under the 20 federal enclave doctrine.” Lockhart v. MVM, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 1452, 1459–60 (2009). 21 In Haining, the plaintiff argued his state law employment claims arose from Boeing 22 employees’ conduct and actions occurring outside the federal enclave, asserting: 23 (a) his complaints were communicated to Boeing Human Resources and Equal Employment Opportunity representatives located outside the enclave; 24 (b) these Boeing representatives confirmed Haining’s complaints and 25 conducted their investigation outside the enclave; (c) Boeing’s representatives also confirmed Haining’s requests for accommodations for Parkinson’s 26 disease while outside the enclave; and (d) Boeing’s representatives denied 27 Haining’s requested accommodations based on decisions made outside the enclave. 28 1 Haining, at *2. The court found this argument unavailing, noting that “[t]he enclave’s law 2 governs the employment claims of an employee of a federal contractor operating on a 3 federal enclave.” Id. at *3 (citing Taylor v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 78 Cal. App. 4th 472, 4 481 (2000) (“As the employee of a contractor operating on the enclave, Taylor’s claims are 5 governed by the enclave’s law.”)). 6 Similarly, in Lockhart, the court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims under 7 the federal enclave doctrine despite the plaintiff’s argument that (1) the termination was 8 decided and implemented at MVM’s headquarters in Virgina, which was not on a federal 9 enclave, and (2) she was informed of her termination at home, also not on a federal enclave. 10 Lockhart, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 1458–59. The court found that despite this evidence, 11 “appellant was the employee of a federal contractor operating on a federal enclave. Thus, 12 her employment claims are governed by the enclave’s law.” Id. at 1459; see Abikar v. 13 Bristol Bay Native Corp., 300 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1102 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (finding the 14 plaintiff’s argument that the federal enclave doctrine did not apply because the defendant 15 made their decisions regarding the plaintiffs’ employment from outside the federal enclave 16 “plainly meritless”). 17 Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff’s retaliation and failure to prevent harassment claims 18 are barred by the federal enclave doctrine, and GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary 19 judgment as to these claims. 20 III. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 21 Next, Defendant seeks sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel under Federal Rule 22 of Civil Procedure 11 “due to the significant amount of time Plaintiff has been on both 23 actual and constructive notice that her claims have no legal basis.” (Doc. No. 15-1 at 9.) 24 Defendant argues Plaintiff knew at the onset of filing her Complaint that all material 25 allegations occurred on a federal enclave, and that Defendant attempted to meet and confer 26 on this issue, but Plaintiff did not meaningfully engage in the process nor agreed to dismiss 27 her claims. (Id. at 10.) Defendant requests the Court to enter an order (1) granting 28 Defendant’s motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 in its entirety; (2) awarding monetary 1 sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel, Gruenberg Law, in the amount of $44,784.40, 2 and (3) dismissing all of Plaintiff’s causes of action with prejudice, and dismissing this 3 action. (Id. at 3.) 4 A. Legal Standard 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides in pertinent part, that when a party 6 presents a signed paper to a court, that party is certifying that to the best of their 7 “knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 8 circumstances . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 9 existing law or by nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing 10 law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). Sanctions under Rule 11(c) are 11 warranted only when there has been a violation of Rule 11(b), i.e., when a party files a 12 lawsuit or motion that is frivolous, legally unreasonable, without factual foundation, or is 13 otherwise brought for an improper purpose. Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1388 (9th 14 Cir. 1994) (citing Conn v. Borjorquez, 967 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1992); Operating 15 Engrs. Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988)). A filing is “frivolous” when 16 it is “both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.” Townsend v. 17 Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990). A filing is made for an 18 improper purpose if it was intended “to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly 19 increase the cost of litigation[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). Either improper purpose or 20 frivolousness is sufficient to sustain an award of sanctions under Rule 11(c). Townsend, 21 929 F.2d at 1362. 22 A finding of subjective bad faith is not required under Rule 11. See Smith v. Ricks, 23 31 F.3d 1478, 1488 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Counsel can no longer avoid the sting of Rule 11 24 sanctions by operating under the guise of a pure heart and empty head.”). If the court 25 determines a Rule 11 violation occurred, “the court may impose an appropriate sanction on 26 any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.” 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). 28 /// 1 B. Safe Harbor Notice 2 Where such sanctions are sought by motion, Rule 11 contains a “safe harbor” 3 provision stating that a motion for sanctions may not be filed until 21 days after it is served. 4 See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11(c)(1)(A). This “safe harbor” gives the party subject to the Rule 11 5 motion 21 days to withdraw the offending pleading and thereby escape sanctions. See 6 Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1998). The 21-day “safe harbor” period is an 7 absolute prerequisite (unless some other period is established by a court) to a motion for 8 sanctions brought by any party. This provision does not apply to bar court-initiated sanction 9 proceedings; however, the court must issue an order to show cause and there are restrictions 10 on the court’s sua sponte sanctions authority. See id. 11 Here, Defense counsel formally served its Rule 11 “safe harbor” notice on February 12 8, 2024. (Doc. No. 15-3 at 2–3.) After the required 21 days, on March 5, 2024, Defendant 13 filed this Motion with the Court. (Doc. No. 15) Accordingly, Defense counsel has met the 14 procedural requirement for Rule 11 sanctions. 15 C. Sanctions against Plaintiff and Her Counsel 16 The Court declines to find that Plaintiff’s case is frivolous or objectively 17 unreasonable. “A claim is not objectively baseless as long as there is ‘some plausible basis’ 18 for the argument, even if that basis is ‘quite a weak one.’” Simpson v. Cal. Pizza Kitchen, 19 Inc., No. 13-cv-164-JLS (JMA), 2013 WL 12114487, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2013) (citing 20 United Nat. Ins. Co. v. R & D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Court 21 exercises its discretion in light of the totality of the circumstances and finds that this case 22 is not exceptional warranting sanctions. Plaintiff provided evidence of incidents occurring 23 away from the federal enclave, and though ultimately unsuccessful, Plaintiff presented 24 reasonable theories of liability, all supported by facts and evidence. That the Court 25 ultimately found the federal enclave doctrine applied, thus barring Plaintiff’s claims, does 26 not render Plaintiff’s claims frivolous. 27 The Court therefore DENIES Defendant’s motion for sanctions. 28 /// 1 |}IV. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary 3 ||judgment, (Doc. No. 14), and DENIES Defendant’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions, (Doc. 4 ||No. 15). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment on behalf of defendant’s and 5 || against the plaintiff on all remaining claims and close the case. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 ||Dated: August 15, 2024

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